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   This	  study	  is	  on	  the	  battle	  of	  Tarawa,	  and	  how	  the	  battle	  altered	  military	  
doctrine	  in	  amphibious	  warfare	  tactics	  and	  public	  perception	  of	  war.	  Tarawa	  was	  
the	  first	  battle	  of	  its	  kind	  being	  the	  first	  amphibious	  assault	  against	  a	  fortified	  
objective	  utilizing	  joint	  land,	  sea,	  and	  aerial	  attacks.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  first	  battle	  that	  
was	  filmed	  from	  its	  beginning	  to	  its	  end	  and	  shown	  uncensored	  to	  the	  American	  
public.	  This	  study	  will	  examine	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  Battle	  for	  Tarawa,	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  fighting,	  and	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  battle.	  It	  will	  also	  examine	  the	  
public’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  uncensored	  stories	  and	  images	  of	  American	  dead	  and	  try	  to	  
attempt	  to	  understand	  why	  they	  were	  shocked	  at	  what	  they	  saw.	  It	  will	  explore	  the	  
debate	  of	  producing	  and	  showing	  the	  film	  to	  the	  public	  and	  examine	  the	  lessons	  
learned	  that	  altered	  military	  doctrine	  on	  amphibious	  war	  for	  future	  operations.	  The	  
importance	  of	  this	  study	  is	  in	  understanding	  how	  military	  operations	  evolve	  
through	  testing	  them	  in	  combat	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  servicemen	  must	  often	  
be	  sacrificed	  to	  rewrite	  military	  doctrine.	  The	  other	  area	  of	  importance	  is	  in	  
understanding	  how	  the	  media	  coverage	  of	  wars	  can	  affect	  the	  public	  perception	  of	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
	  
	   The	  Battle	  of	  Tarawa	  was	  of	  great	  significance	  but	  gets	  overshadowed	  by	  
those	  with	  bigger	  names.	  Iwo	  Jima,	  Okinawa,	  and	  Normandy	  are	  all	  storied	  fights	  
from	  the	  epic	  saga	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Tarawa	  was	  one	  as	  well,	  but	  it	  was	  
overshadowed	  by	  the	  larger	  operations	  in	  better-­‐known	  places.	  This	  particular	  
battle	  was	  full	  of	  firsts	  in	  warfare	  and	  major	  contributions	  to	  World	  War	  II	  as	  a	  
whole.	  It	  was	  the	  testing	  ground	  for	  Marine	  Corps	  doctrine	  on	  amphibious	  warfare	  
and	  its	  new	  photographic	  service	  branch1.	  The	  results	  of	  Tarawa	  changed	  public	  
perception	  of	  warfare	  and	  altered	  military	  tactics	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  war.	  Without	  a	  
Tarawa,	  American	  military	  planners	  and	  the	  American	  public	  would	  not	  have	  
learned	  the	  valuable	  lessons	  they	  needed	  to	  achieve	  victory	  in	  such	  a	  massive	  
conflict.	  This	  battle	  revealed	  to	  the	  United	  States	  not	  only	  flaws	  in	  tactics	  but	  also	  
the	  disconnect	  between	  its	  people	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  war.	  	  
	   The	  Battle	  of	  Tarawa	  became	  the	  first	  battle	  filmed	  and	  shown	  uncensored	  to	  
an	  American	  public	  that	  had	  become	  relatively	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  harsh	  realities	  of	  
war.	  In	  the	  interwar	  period,	  politicians	  and	  much	  of	  the	  public	  wanted	  to	  adhere	  to	  
George	  Washington’s	  policy	  of	  staying	  out	  of	  Europe’s	  affairs.	  This	  goal	  would	  prove	  
to	  be	  impossible	  with	  technology	  and	  growing	  economic	  forces	  bringing	  people	  
together	  and	  making	  conflict	  inevitable.	  The	  atmosphere	  of	  isolation	  fostered	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




problems	  in	  terms	  of	  warfare	  and	  global	  conflict.	  It	  created	  unfamiliarity	  with	  war’s	  
destructive	  nature	  and	  false	  impressions	  as	  to	  what	  had	  to	  be	  sacrificed	  to	  achieve	  
victory.	  America	  had	  not	  witnessed	  a	  major	  war	  on	  its	  soil	  since	  the	  Civil	  War	  of	  
1861-­‐1865.	  After	  the	  Civil	  War	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  a	  period	  of	  growth	  
expanding	  across	  the	  western	  territories	  and	  into	  new	  lands	  outside	  the	  mainland.	  
During	  this	  time	  America	  intervened	  in	  several	  affairs	  including	  a	  war	  against	  Spain,	  
and	  fighting	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  Haiti,	  Panama,	  Nicaragua,	  Mexico,	  and	  China.	  World	  
War	  I	  soon	  followed	  with	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  opting	  to	  remain	  neutral	  until	  
numerous	  factors	  persuaded	  him	  to	  advocate	  entry	  into	  the	  war.	  As	  destructive	  as	  
World	  War	  I	  was,	  America	  was	  only	  involved	  for	  about	  a	  year	  and	  suffered	  a	  far	  
lower	  casualty	  rate	  than	  the	  nations	  that	  were	  more	  deeply	  involved.	  It	  also	  
occurred	  overseas	  preventing	  the	  American	  people	  from	  witnessing	  the	  destruction	  
that	  occurred	  across	  Europe.	  	  There	  were	  a	  few	  factors	  from	  these	  campaigns	  that	  
gave	  Americans	  a	  false	  perception	  of	  war.	  One	  was	  they	  occurred	  in	  areas	  outside	  
the	  United	  States	  so	  people	  were	  not	  personally	  exposed	  the	  brutality	  involved	  in	  
war.	  Another	  was	  that	  these	  were	  short	  campaigns	  that	  ended	  in	  success.	  This	  may	  
have	  provided	  people	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  wars	  fought	  in	  the	  modern	  age	  would	  no	  
longer	  be	  lengthy	  conflicts.	  	  The	  practice	  of	  “yellow	  journalism”	  was	  another	  factor	  
in	  these	  engagements.	  It	  told	  exaggerated	  stories	  to	  people	  for	  years	  beginning	  
during	  the	  Spanish	  American	  War.	  	  
	  	   Prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor	  waking	  the	  United	  States	  from	  its	  slumber,	  many	  




fought	  to	  rebound	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  They	  fought	  over	  wages	  and	  racial	  
superiority	  instead	  of	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  increasing	  tensions	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  
Pacific.	  The	  “day	  of	  infamy”	  sent	  America	  hurtling	  into	  a	  war	  that	  the	  people	  were	  
not	  mentally	  prepared	  for.	  World	  War	  II	  also	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  documented	  
wars	  in	  world	  history.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  news	  was	  heavily	  censored	  prior	  to	  the	  
Tarawa	  invasion.	  In	  the	  opening	  acts	  of	  American	  involvement	  the	  United	  States	  had	  
lost	  6,200	  killed	  in	  Operation	  Torch	  and	  the	  Tunisian	  Campaign.2	  The	  initial	  invasion	  
of	  Italy	  was	  equally	  as	  costly	  with	  the	  invasion	  of	  Sicily	  resulting	  7,500	  casualties.3	  
Yet	  there	  were	  no	  headlines	  in	  the	  papers	  criticizing	  American	  losses,	  and	  there	  was	  
no	  mass	  hysteria	  where	  people	  threw	  their	  hands	  up	  in	  disgust.	  The	  American	  
public	  was	  not	  adequately	  being	  informed	  about	  the	  fighting	  overseas	  leaving	  the	  
country	  with	  little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  sacrifice	  happening	  abroad.	  Historian	  Derrick	  
Wright	  discusses	  the	  public	  perspective	  saying,	  “The	  folks	  back	  home	  had	  come	  to	  
look	  upon	  the	  war	  as	  something	  that	  happened	  to	  other	  people;	  sons,	  husbands,	  and	  
brothers	  went	  away	  to	  war,	  and	  some	  of	  them	  did	  not	  return,	  but	  for	  many	  people	  
life	  remained	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes	  much	  as	  it	  had	  been	  before	  Pearl	  Harbor.”4	  
While	  Wright	  may	  have	  exaggerated,	  he	  does	  present	  an	  interesting	  view	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  public.	  The	  American	  people	  had	  not	  seen	  the	  modern	  war	  that	  
destroyed	  Europe	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  nor	  had	  they	  experienced	  the	  hardships	  
the	  British	  had	  during	  the	  bombing	  of	  Britain.	  Lack	  of	  these	  experiences	  left	  them	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psychologically	  unprepared	  for	  the	  true	  destructive	  nature	  of	  modern	  warfare.	  The	  
lack	  of	  experience	  combined	  with	  censorship	  of	  news	  from	  the	  frontlines	  made	  
Tarawa	  a	  significant	  benchmark	  for	  American	  perception	  of	  war	  as	  the	  truth	  
unfolded.	  
	   When	  the	  news	  broke	  in	  that	  in	  76	  hours	  1,000	  Marines	  had	  been	  killed,	  with	  
ghastly	  images	  revealing	  the	  dead,	  the	  reaction	  was	  shock	  and	  horror.	  Newspaper	  
correspondent	  Robert	  Sherrod,	  who	  witnessed	  the	  fighting,	  forewarned	  of	  this	  
reaction,	  questioning	  not	  whether	  America	  had	  the	  military	  or	  economic	  ability	  to	  
wage	  war	  but,	  “whether	  we	  had	  the	  heart	  to	  fight	  a	  war.”5	  In	  such	  a	  simple	  
statement,	  Sherrod	  expressed	  his	  concern	  that	  some	  military	  planners	  shared:	  the	  
fear	  that	  the	  American	  people	  would	  be	  apprehensive	  of	  a	  long	  and	  costly	  war.	  This	  
was	  a	  concern	  because	  under	  a	  democratic	  government	  the	  military	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  
the	  will	  of	  the	  people.	  Under	  this	  system	  of	  government	  the	  military	  cannot	  function	  
to	  its’	  full	  effect	  without	  the	  public’s	  consent.	  This	  fact	  has	  been	  well	  documented	  
throughout	  history	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  great	  fears	  of	  the	  United	  States	  political	  and	  
military	  leaders	  including	  an	  anonymous	  Army	  general.	  When	  this	  general	  was	  
asked	  in	  1942	  about	  his	  opinion	  regarding	  Americans	  and	  soldiers,	  his	  response	  
was,	  “I’m	  afraid	  the	  Americans	  of	  this	  generation	  are	  not	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  Americans	  
who	  fought	  the	  last	  war.”6	  It	  also	  became	  well	  known	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  who	  adopted	  a	  
war	  of	  attrition	  and	  hoped	  to	  force	  the	  American	  government	  to	  the	  negotiation	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  Sherrod,	  Tarawa:	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table	  by	  defeating	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  American	  public.	  Sherrod	  commented	  on	  this	  
attitude,	  having	  experienced	  it	  personally,	  in	  the	  following	  statement:	  
They	  don’t	  have	  a	  chance	  and	  they	  know	  it,	  unless	  we	  get	  fainthearted	  
and	  agree	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  peace	  with	  them.	  But,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  make	  
us	  grow	  sick	  of	  our	  losses,	  they	  will	  hang	  on	  under	  their	  fortifications,	  
like	  so	  many	  bedbugs.	  They	  don’t	  care	  how	  many	  men	  they	  lose—
human	  life	  being	  a	  minor	  consideration	  to	  them.	  The	  Japs’	  only	  chance	  
is	  our	  getting	  soft,	  as	  they	  predicated	  their	  whole	  war	  on	  us	  being	  too	  
luxury	  loving	  to	  fight.7	  
	   After	  Tarawa	  those	  fears	  of	  American	  faintheartedness	  nearly	  came	  true.	  
When	  the	  story	  broke	  of	  the	  deaths	  of	  nearly	  1,000	  Marines	  and	  the	  pictures	  were	  
released	  revealing	  the	  gory	  details,	  people	  were	  outraged.	  As	  will	  later	  be	  shown	  
American	  citizens	  questioned	  the	  intelligence,	  the	  worth	  of	  the	  operation,	  the	  
leaders,	  and	  cost	  in	  human	  life.	  Tarawa	  introduced	  the	  public	  to	  the	  devastation	  of	  
modern	  warfare.	  Despite	  the	  emotions	  aroused	  by	  the	  pictures	  and	  stories,	  Tarawa	  
had	  a	  tremendous	  impact	  on	  the	  American	  perception	  of	  war.	  It	  revealed	  the	  truth	  
to	  people	  and	  made	  them	  aware	  of	  the	  long,	  costly	  road	  that	  lay	  ahead.	  	  
	   The	  exposure	  of	  the	  United	  States	  citizens	  to	  the	  gore	  on	  the	  beaches	  of	  Betio	  
(the	  island	  of	  the	  Tarawa	  Atoll	  where	  most	  of	  the	  fighting	  occurred)	  was	  a	  valuable	  
lesson	  learned.	  It	  was	  valuable	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  there	  were	  many	  larger	  and	  bloodier	  
fights	  on	  the	  horizon.	  Aside	  from	  the	  psychological	  aspect	  of	  Tarawa,	  there	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




significant	  tactical	  lessons	  learned	  as	  well.	  If	  these	  lessons	  had	  not	  been	  learned	  at	  
Tarawa,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  disastrous	  consequences	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  
Before	  World	  War	  II	  many	  military	  planners	  had	  concluded	  that	  amphibious	  
warfare	  was	  almost	  impossible	  and	  wrote	  it	  off	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  Great	  Britain	  at	  
Gallipoli	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  The	  Gallipoli	  Operation,	  proposed	  by	  Winston	  Churchill,	  
was	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  open	  a	  second	  front	  against	  the	  Central	  Powers	  and	  a	  sea	  
route	  to	  Russia.	  Lacking	  intelligence	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  logistical	  complications	  of	  
an	  amphibious	  attack,	  the	  operation	  was	  a	  disaster	  from	  the	  start.	  British	  and	  
French	  forces	  had	  no	  air	  support,	  and	  their	  navy	  was	  defeated	  in	  the	  initial	  
bombardment,	  leaving	  the	  amphibious	  invasion	  with	  no	  support	  against	  a	  heavily-­‐
defended	  beachhead.	  The	  result	  was	  an	  embarrassing	  defeat	  with	  250,000	  
casualties.	  Of	  those	  46,000	  were	  killed.8	  This	  disaster	  made	  some	  Naval	  and	  Army	  
officers	  skeptical	  that	  such	  operations	  were	  worth	  the	  cost	  in	  lives.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  
writings	  on	  “Joint	  Army	  and	  Navy	  Operations”	  in	  the	  Naval	  Institute	  Proceedings	  in	  
1926,	  Navy	  Captain	  W.S.	  Pye	  stated:	  
The	  chances	  for	  success	  of	  an	  invasion	  by	  forces	  transported	  overseas	  
are	  becoming	  smaller	  and	  smaller.	  The	  greater	  facility	  of	  movement	  of	  
forces	  on	  shore	  by	  railroad	  and	  motors;	  the	  rapidity	  of	  communication;	  
the	  increase	  in	  power	  of	  mobile	  artillery;	  the	  increased	  efficiency	  of	  the	  
submarine	  and	  aircraft,	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  size	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





regular	  armies	  and	  navies,	  have	  made	  invasion	  by	  sea	  almost	  an	  
impossibility…9	  
	   While	  these	  new	  innovations	  in	  weapons	  could	  provide	  the	  needed	  
technology	  to	  make	  amphibious	  operations	  possible,	  they	  also	  made	  some	  leaders	  
fearful	  of	  the	  cost	  in	  human	  life	  these	  types	  of	  operations	  would	  require.	  This	  
attitude	  made	  Tarawa	  all	  the	  more	  significant	  because	  while	  many	  viewed	  such	  
operations	  as	  risky,	  military	  planners	  knew	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  a	  war	  
with	  Japan,	  amphibious	  operations	  were	  unavoidable.	  This	  reality	  was	  
acknowledged	  in	  the	  Navy’s	  writing	  of	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE	  in	  1919,	  which	  recognized	  
that	  forward	  operating	  bases	  would	  have	  to	  be	  captured	  from	  the	  Japanese	  to	  
protect	  and	  supply	  the	  Navy’s	  long-­‐range	  fleet.10	  The	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time	  was	  
also	  downsizing	  its	  military	  following	  World	  War	  I.	  Though	  proportionally	  the	  
Marine	  Corps	  shrank	  least,	  it	  was	  a	  tiny	  service	  with	  only	  1,400	  officers	  and	  18,000	  
enlisted	  men	  recorded	  in	  1939.11	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE	  gave	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  adopt	  the	  mission	  of	  base	  defense	  and	  seizure	  as	  its	  primary	  
objective.	  Marine	  leaders	  studied	  and	  evaluated	  the	  mistakes	  made	  at	  Gallipoli	  to	  
establish	  their	  own	  doctrine	  of	  amphibious	  invasions	  and	  convinced	  themselves	  that	  
they	  could	  carry	  out	  these	  operations	  successfully.	  The	  Tentative	  Manual	  for	  Landing	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Operations	  was	  drafted	  in	  1931,	  and	  produced	  a	  body	  of	  operating	  principles	  to	  be	  
taught	  to	  Marine	  officers.	  The	  Tarawa	  Atoll	  became	  the	  testing	  site	  for	  the	  Marine	  
Corps	  doctrine	  on	  amphibious	  warfare.	  The	  lessons	  learned	  there	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  
the	  key	  to	  unlocking	  the	  Pacific	  and	  victory	  over	  Japan.	  	  
	   This	  study	  will	  look	  at	  the	  historiography	  of	  Tarawa	  to	  explore	  how	  others	  
have	  studied	  this	  battle.	  It	  will	  also	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  battle	  from	  its	  
planning	  stages	  to	  its	  end	  result,	  giving	  the	  reader	  a	  synopsis	  of	  the	  encounter	  and	  
highlighting	  the	  mistakes	  made	  that	  would	  be	  fixed	  for	  the	  success	  of	  future	  
operations.	  This	  section	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  the	  lessons	  
learned	  at	  Tarawa	  were	  applied	  in	  future	  landings	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  will	  explain	  
why	  this	  battle	  was	  necessary	  in	  the	  success	  in	  the	  war	  against	  Japan.	  Finally,	  this	  
analysis	  will	  examine	  the	  importance	  the	  filming	  had	  on	  altering	  public	  perception	  
of	  war	  and	  why	  this	  perception	  was	  so	  important	  in	  American	  society.	  	  
Historiography	  
	   There	  have	  only	  been	  a	  few	  studies	  conducted	  on	  Tarawa.	  The	  Betio	  landings	  
and	  fighting	  there	  were	  overshadowed	  by	  later	  battles	  and	  even	  today	  have	  been	  
given	  little	  attention.	  The	  studies	  conducted	  on	  this	  topic	  are	  narrative	  in	  their	  
approach	  and	  most	  of	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  fighting	  and	  the	  tactical	  lessons	  learned.	  
The	  most	  encompassing	  narratives	  are	  by	  Joseph	  Alexander.	  Alexander	  is	  a	  former	  
Marine,	  having	  served	  29	  years	  as	  an	  officer	  in	  the	  Marine	  Corps,	  including	  service	  
in	  Vietnam.	  He	  also	  worked	  for	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  as	  an	  official	  historian	  who	  helped	  




Marine	  Corps	  doctrine	  of	  amphibious	  warfare.	  He	  has	  written	  two	  extensive	  
accounts	  about	  the	  Battle	  of	  Tarawa.	  Utmost	  Savagery:	  The	  Three	  Days	  at	  Tarawa	  
explores	  the	  idea	  of	  mounting	  an	  amphibious	  assault	  against	  a	  fortified	  objective.	  He	  
focuses	  on	  the	  critical	  tactical	  and	  strategic	  lessons	  that	  were	  learned,	  using	  his	  
personal	  knowledge,	  interviews,	  and	  after-­‐action	  reports.	  Alexander	  argued	  
Tarawa’s	  importance	  was	  in	  giving	  the	  American	  military	  confidence	  that	  a	  
seaborne	  assault	  against	  a	  strongly	  fortified	  position	  was	  possible.	  He	  furthers	  his	  
argument	  claiming,	  “American	  confidence	  in	  our	  capability	  to	  launch	  any	  future	  
assault	  from	  the	  sea	  against	  other	  fortified	  coastlines—Normandy,	  Iwo	  Jima,	  as	  
examples—would	  have	  been	  crippled.”12	  Alexander	  also	  wrote	  a	  short,	  but	  detailed,	  
account	  of	  Tarawa	  called	  Across	  the	  Reef:	  With	  the	  Marines	  at	  Tarawa.	  In	  Across	  the	  
Reef,	  	  Alexander	  gave	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  planning	  and	  command	  structure	  as	  well	  as	  
a	  summary	  of	  the	  fighting.	  Overall,	  both	  of	  Alexander’s	  writings	  contribute	  to	  
Tarawa’s	  legacy	  by	  exploring	  the	  tactical	  side	  of	  it.	  
	   Very	  useful	  and	  revealing	  accounts	  of	  the	  Betio	  fighting	  came	  from	  Robert	  
Sherrod,	  who	  was	  a	  combat	  correspondent,	  and	  Norman	  Hatch,	  who	  was	  the	  
Combat	  Cameraman	  who	  filmed	  the	  fighting.	  Sherrod’s	  book,	  Tarawa:	  The	  Story	  of	  a	  
Battle,	  was	  his	  story	  of	  what	  he	  witnessed	  and	  his	  attitude	  towards	  the	  American	  
public	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  book	  contains	  a	  wealth	  of	  information,	  as	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
few	  who	  had	  access	  to	  the	  battlefield	  commanders,	  sailors,	  and	  infantrymen.	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Sherrod	  fills	  his	  story	  with	  personal	  experiences	  and	  interviews	  with	  the	  Marines	  
and	  Navy	  personnel	  alike.	  He	  is	  also	  unique	  in	  that	  he	  was	  a	  civilian	  and	  interacted	  
with	  the	  American	  public.	  Throughout	  the	  book,	  he	  mentioned	  his	  disdain	  for	  
Americans’	  perception	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  faulty	  information	  they	  were	  receiving.	  	  
	   Another	  primary	  account	  comes	  from	  Norman	  Hatch.	  Hatch	  was	  credited	  for	  
filming	  the	  battle	  from	  start	  to	  finish.	  His	  work	  was	  the	  first	  filming	  of	  a	  battle	  
between	  the	  Marines	  and	  an	  enemy	  combatant	  .	  Hatch	  worked	  with	  author	  Charles	  
Jones	  to	  explore	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Combat	  Cameramen	  in	  the	  Marine	  Corps.	  Hatch	  
and	  Jones	  work	  together	  to	  add	  the	  story	  of	  the	  filming	  to	  Tarawa’s	  legacy.	  Hatch	  
revealed	  his	  experience	  of	  wading	  ashore	  into	  machine	  gun	  fire,	  providing	  the	  
reader	  with	  the	  emotions	  of	  the	  fearful	  walk	  into	  the	  storm.	  He	  discussed	  the	  
hardships	  of	  having	  to	  film	  his	  fellow	  Marines	  getting	  shot	  or	  blown	  up	  but	  also	  
reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  it.	  Hatch’s	  most	  important	  contribution	  was	  his	  discussion	  
of	  the	  political	  debate	  over	  the	  film	  and	  the	  public	  opinion	  of	  the	  war;	  consequently	  
it	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  central	  points	  of	  discussion	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	   Other	  historical	  studies	  come	  from	  John	  Wukovits	  and	  Derrick	  Wright.	  In	  One	  
Square	  Mile	  of	  Hell,	  John	  Wukovits	  told	  the	  story	  of	  Tarawa	  from	  an	  interesting	  
perspective.	  He	  also	  used	  interviews	  in	  the	  battle.	  He	  focused	  on	  two	  childhood	  
friends	  and	  wrote	  the	  book	  following	  these	  two	  from	  their	  childhood	  to	  their	  deaths	  
at	  Tarawa.	  It	  was	  an	  interesting	  look	  that	  described	  the	  emotional	  impact	  of	  warfare	  
on	  the	  common	  fighting	  man.	  Derrick	  Wright’s	  Hell	  of	  a	  Way	  to	  Die	  focuses	  on	  the	  




the	  premise	  that	  Tarawa	  was	  the	  first	  true	  offensive	  of	  the	  Pacific	  War	  that	  relied	  on	  
an	  amphibious	  assault	  against	  a	  defended	  shore,	  and	  the	  victory	  that	  ensued	  there	  
was	  a	  key	  to	  victory	  over	  the	  Japanese	  in	  the	  Pacific.13	  	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  will	  add	  to	  all	  of	  these	  studies	  by	  focusing	  on	  
America’s	  martial	  naiveté	  and	  false	  perceptions	  of	  war.	  It	  will	  then	  explore	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  American	  society	  was	  psychologically	  unfit	  to	  wage	  a	  war	  of	  this	  
scale.	  This	  significant	  problem	  will	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  United	  States’	  reaction	  to	  
the	  stories,	  pictures	  and	  film	  that	  were	  released	  following	  the	  battle.	  An	  examination	  
of	  the	  film	  will	  show	  the	  importance	  it	  had	  in	  changing	  public	  perception	  of	  war	  and	  
preparing	  civilians	  for	  the	  losses	  to	  come.	  Finally,	  this	  study	  will	  explore	  the	  
importance	  of	  Tarawa	  on	  a	  tactical	  level.	  It	  will	  investigate	  the	  lessons	  learned	  to	  
explain	  how	  important	  this	  battle	  was	  for	  future	  operations	  and	  success	  in	  the	  
Pacific.	  	  
Martial	  Naiveté	  
America	  had	  not	  experienced	  the	  centuries	  of	  war	  that	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  had	  
experienced	  throughout	  history.	  It	  had	  fought	  the	  British	  Empire	  twice	  with	  one	  
ending	  in	  victory	  and	  the	  other	  ending	  in	  a	  draw.	  America	  had	  also	  fought	  a	  war	  
against	  Mexico	  that	  ended	  in	  victory	  granting	  the	  United	  States	  more	  territory.	  
America	  at	  the	  time	  of	  these	  conflicts	  was	  a	  sparsely	  populated	  country,	  which	  
meant	  that	  it	  had	  not	  experienced	  the	  devastation	  of	  other	  great	  wars.	  The	  Civil	  War	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  Wright	  does	  mention	  that	  Guadalcanal	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showed	  Americans	  how	  destructive	  war	  really	  was.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  one	  fought	  in	  the	  
modern	  era	  and	  in	  a	  society	  whose	  population	  had	  grown	  along	  with	  cities.	  It	  was	  
the	  largest	  loss	  of	  life	  and	  most	  destructive	  war	  that	  America	  had	  ever	  seen	  and	  still	  
ranks	  as	  the	  bloodiest	  in	  its	  history.	  Following	  the	  Civil	  War	  the	  United	  States	  
entered	  its	  age	  of	  imperialism.	  Being	  influenced	  by	  Social	  Darwinism	  and	  Manifest	  
Destiny,	  American	  policy	  was	  to	  move	  west	  and	  conquer	  the	  indigenous	  people	  that	  
were	  deemed	  inferior.	  American	  expansion	  continued	  west	  leading	  to	  the	  Indian	  
Wars	  where	  the	  Native	  Americans	  were	  nearly	  eliminated.	  Soon	  attention	  shifted	  to	  
territorial	  acquisitions	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  United	  States	  leading	  to	  wars	  
with	  Spain	  and	  fighting	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  All	  of	  these	  wars	  ended	  in	  decisive	  
American	  victories	  giving	  people	  the	  false	  impressions	  that	  wars	  could	  be	  won	  
quickly	  and	  easily.	  World	  War	  I	  would	  amplify	  these	  feelings	  as	  it	  took	  place	  on	  a	  
global	  scale	  among	  the	  world’s	  powers	  and	  America’s	  entrance	  helped	  the	  allies	  
defeat	  the	  Central	  Powers.	  
	   When	  World	  War	  I	  erupted	  across	  Europe	  and	  parts	  of	  Asia,	  the	  United	  States	  
opted	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  it	  as	  long	  as	  possible.	  It	  took	  repeated	  torpedo	  attacks	  against	  
merchant	  ships,	  the	  sinking	  of	  a	  cruise	  liner,	  and	  a	  discovery	  of	  a	  secret	  German	  
telegram	  proposing	  that	  Mexico	  attack	  the	  United	  States	  before	  Americans	  decided	  
to	  enter	  the	  war.	  As	  destructive	  as	  this	  war	  was,	  it	  took	  place	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  the	  American	  military	  was	  there	  a	  little	  more	  than	  a	  year.	  When	  it	  was	  
over,	  the	  United	  States	  emerged	  as	  the	  lone	  economic	  power.	  World	  War	  I	  




debts,	  and	  toppled	  governments.	  People	  around	  the	  world	  realized	  that	  the	  modern	  
age	  had	  made	  wars	  much	  more	  devastating	  than	  wars	  of	  old.	  This	  led	  to	  many	  
believing	  that	  World	  War	  I	  would	  be	  the	  last	  major	  conflict	  the	  world	  would	  see.	  
America	  did	  not	  experience	  the	  personal	  destruction	  that	  Europe	  had	  endured.	  It	  
had	  lost	  life	  but	  not	  on	  the	  scale	  the	  European	  nations	  had	  leaving	  some	  to	  question	  
whether	  they	  should	  get	  involved	  in	  European	  alliances.	  
	   By	  the	  1920s	  the	  American	  focus	  turned	  towards	  profits	  and	  improving	  the	  
standard	  of	  living.	  During	  the	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  1920s	  many	  Americans	  
enjoyed	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  living	  than	  ever	  before.	  People	  enjoyed	  the	  newest	  
products	  and	  comforts	  of	  living.	  Even	  with	  the	  stock	  market	  collapse	  and	  the	  coming	  
of	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  people	  still	  desired	  to	  regain	  their	  high	  standards	  of	  living.	  
When	  Hitler	  began	  mobilizing	  his	  army	  and	  storming	  across	  Western	  Europe,	  
America	  maintained	  its	  stance	  that	  it	  would	  stay	  out	  of	  alliances	  and	  European	  
affairs.	  Despite	  having	  participated	  in	  numerous	  military	  victories	  and	  economic	  
prosperity	  many	  Americans	  began	  to	  favor	  isolationism.	  The	  people	  experienced	  
periods	  of	  growth	  and	  depression	  within	  the	  span	  of	  a	  few	  years.	  The	  Great	  
Depression	  left	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  suffering	  and	  not	  interested	  in	  Europe’s	  or	  
Asia’s	  problems.	  Many	  wanted	  to	  fix	  the	  problems	  at	  home	  and	  feared	  getting	  
involved	  overseas	  would	  result	  in	  a	  careless	  sacrifice.	  Robert	  Sherrod	  explained	  that	  
it	  was	  a	  generational	  attitude	  that	  had	  evolved	  over	  the	  course	  of	  American	  history.	  
He	  clarified	  this	  by	  saying,	  “But	  I	  didn’t	  know	  if	  we	  had	  the	  heart	  to	  win	  a	  war.	  Our	  




generation	  had	  been	  told	  in	  its	  first	  ten	  years,	  teens,	  and	  voting	  age	  that	  it	  was	  not	  
necessary	  to	  fight.”14	  	  This	  attitude	  applied	  to	  not	  only	  military	  personnel	  but	  also	  
the	  common	  United	  States	  citizen	  and	  became	  one	  of	  the	  fears	  for	  American	  
leadership.	  	  
	   The	  American	  public’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  was	  outrage.	  
Americans	  demanded	  action	  and	  called	  for	  war.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  is	  
the	  American	  perception	  of	  war	  at	  this	  time	  was	  based	  on	  a	  quick	  and	  successful	  
campaign	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  a	  quick	  and	  dramatic	  victory	  in	  a	  war	  with	  Spain,	  and	  a	  
series	  of	  incursions	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  called	  the	  Banana	  Wars.	  
These	  successes	  created	  an	  attitude	  of	  martial	  naiveté,	  which	  was	  the	  American	  
public’s	  false	  perception	  of	  war	  being	  something	  other	  than	  what	  it	  truly	  was.	  	  In	  
reality,	  World	  War	  II	  was	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  war	  that	  would	  cost	  countless	  lives	  
before	  the	  lines	  of	  victory	  were	  crossed.	  It	  was	  a	  war	  that	  the	  American	  people	  were	  
not	  psychologically	  ready	  for.	  This	  became	  clear	  following	  events	  on	  the	  home	  front.	  
Although	  many	  companies	  had	  agreed	  to	  a	  no	  strike	  pledge,	  they	  continued	  to	  occur.	  
In	  1943	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  reported	  a	  loss	  of	  13,500,000	  man-­‐days	  
of	  production	  lost	  to	  strikes.15	  There	  were	  also	  race	  riots	  that	  erupted	  throughout	  
the	  cities	  as	  competition	  for	  jobs	  increased.	  Riots	  had	  erupted	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  
Mobile,	  Alabama,	  and	  Beaumont,	  Texas.	  The	  most	  famous	  occurred	  in	  Detroit	  in	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1943.	  This	  riot	  left	  34	  dead	  and	  required	  6,000	  federal	  troops	  to	  bring	  order.16	  This	  
riot	  caused	  the	  entire	  city	  to	  shut	  down	  for	  weeks	  until	  peace	  could	  be	  restored.	  	  
This	  was	  complicated	  further	  by	  the	  news	  coverage	  of	  the	  war.	  Most	  of	  the	  
articles	  were	  heavily	  censored	  and	  did	  not	  reveal	  much	  information	  about	  the	  
fighting	  abroad.	  The	  truth	  was	  the	  United	  States	  suffered	  defeats	  at	  Wake	  Island,	  the	  
Philippines,	  and	  Guam,	  as	  well	  as	  embarrassing	  setbacks	  in	  North	  Africa.	  The	  people	  
needed	  to	  see	  the	  war	  for	  what	  it	  was	  to	  understand	  the	  truth	  that	  the	  servicemen	  
faced.	  Tarawa	  would	  alter	  that	  perception	  because	  it	  came	  at	  a	  time	  when	  President	  
Roosevelt	  loosened	  his	  restriction	  on	  the	  news	  coming	  home	  from	  the	  frontlines.	  
The	  relaxing	  of	  the	  censorship	  gave	  correspondents	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ride	  with	  the	  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Chapter	  2:	  The	  Battle	  
	   Prior	  to	  America’s	  entrance	  into	  the	  war	  the	  main	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  
amphibious	  landings	  was	  the	  Gallipoli	  Operation	  in	  1915.	  In	  reviewing	  the	  failed	  
Gallipoli	  operation	  and	  the	  likely	  possibility	  of	  a	  war	  with	  Japan,	  some	  planners	  
viewed	  amphibious	  warfare	  as	  a	  tactical	  nightmare.17	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  their	  
thinking	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  development	  of	  advanced	  weaponry	  during	  the	  
Industrial	  Age	  coupled	  with	  the	  experiences	  of	  mass	  charges	  against	  these	  weapons	  
during	  World	  War	  I.	  United	  States	  Navy	  Captain	  Asa	  Walker	  discussed	  this	  
reasoning	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  
All	  the	  chances	  are	  against	  success	  and	  attempt	  is	  but	  courting	  
disaster.	  Modern	  armaments	  serve	  to	  accentuate	  this	  fact,	  since	  the	  
range	  of	  vast	  bodies	  of	  men	  and	  horses,	  with	  the	  artillery	  and	  stores,	  
even	  organization	  presents	  great	  difficulties.	  If,	  then,	  we	  complicate	  
these	  difficulties	  by	  subjecting	  the	  troops	  to	  the	  fire	  of	  a	  determined	  
enemy,	  begun	  at	  long	  range	  and	  continued	  during	  the	  confusion	  
attendant	  on	  disembarking,	  what	  but	  pre-­‐eminent	  disaster	  can	  be	  the	  
result.18	  
	   Though	  this	  passage	  was	  written	  prior	  to	  experiences	  in	  World	  War	  I	  it	  
revealed,	  even	  before	  amphibious	  assaults	  had	  been	  attempted,	  some	  military	  
planners	  were	  skeptical	  of	  them.	  They	  feared	  the	  new	  long-­‐range	  weaponry	  and	  the	  
complications	  of	  moving	  men	  and	  supplies	  from	  the	  open	  water	  to	  an	  open	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beachhead	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strongly	  fortified	  enemy	  positions.	  Despite	  these	  concerns	  
it	  was	  evident	  that	  these	  types	  of	  operations	  were	  a	  necessity.	  The	  military	  planners	  
who	  believed	  these	  operations	  were	  possible	  were	  those	  within	  the	  Marine	  Corps.	  
Marine	  leaders	  studied	  the	  failures	  of	  Gallipoli	  and	  determined	  the	  flaws	  were	  
“correctable	  by	  proper	  planning	  and	  appropriate	  doctrine	  on	  the	  use	  of	  naval	  
gunfire	  and	  the	  deployment	  of	  landing	  forces.19	  The	  Marines	  were	  also	  encouraged	  
after	  studying	  a	  successful	  German	  landing	  made	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Riga	  in	  1917.20	  This	  
came	  at	  an	  important	  time	  for	  the	  Marine	  Corps,	  as	  there	  were	  four	  attempts	  
between	  1829	  and	  1932	  to	  either	  merge	  the	  Marines	  with	  the	  Army	  or	  abolish	  
them.21	  With	  the	  adoption	  of	  amphibious	  operations	  as	  their	  primary	  mission,	  the	  
Marines	  gave	  the	  military	  a	  reason	  to	  keep	  them	  as	  a	  separate	  branch.	  	  
	  The	  task	  of	  planning	  such	  operations	  was	  handed	  to	  the	  Navy	  and	  Marine	  
Corps	  under	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE.	  This	  plan	  viewed	  Japan’s	  growing	  presence	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  United	  States’	  interest	  abroad.	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE	  studied	  a	  
possible	  war	  with	  Japan	  and	  the	  strategy	  needed	  to	  defend	  American	  bases	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  region.	  ORANGE	  studied	  the	  dangers	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  in	  a	  war	  with	  
Japan.	  It	  acknowledged	  that	  American	  bases	  in	  Guam	  and	  the	  Philippines	  were	  at	  
risk	  due	  to	  their	  location.	  Planners	  predicted	  that	  in	  a	  war	  with	  Japan	  American	  
bases	  in	  the	  Pacific	  would	  have	  to	  defend	  against	  a	  numerically	  superior	  Japan.	  An	  
intelligence	  report	  in	  1928	  projected	  that	  the	  Japanese	  could	  transport	  about	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300,000	  men	  to	  the	  Philippines	  within	  30	  days;	  the	  United	  States	  only	  had	  an	  
estimated	  11,000	  troops	  stationed	  there.22	  It	  was	  evident	  that	  should	  a	  war	  with	  
Japan	  begin,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  expect	  an	  initial	  loss	  of	  Pacific	  bases.	  It	  was	  also	  
acknowledged	  that	  the	  distance	  from	  Guam	  and	  the	  Philippines	  would	  make	  it	  
extremely	  difficult	  for	  the	  Navy	  to	  sail	  directly	  to	  relieve	  those	  garrisons.	  The	  Navy	  
would	  have	  to	  take	  individual	  islands	  establishing	  bases	  along	  the	  way.	  Under	  this	  
scheme	  it	  was	  evident	  to	  officers	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  avoid	  amphibious	  
operations	  against	  the	  Japanese	  because	  of	  the	  great	  distance	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  
the	  Japanese	  mainland.	  Without	  advanced	  bases	  to	  supply	  and	  protect	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  
fleet,	  the	  war	  would	  be	  a	  logistical	  nightmare.	  With	  this	  problem	  in	  mind,	  the	  Chief	  
of	  Naval	  Operations	  Robert	  Coontz	  wanted	  to	  expand	  the	  Marines’	  duties	  beyond	  
their	  traditional	  Naval	  duties.	  This	  new	  approach	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Marine	  
Expeditionary	  Force	  that	  would	  focus	  on	  base	  seizure	  and	  defense.23	  Of	  course,	  base	  
seizure	  meant	  that	  the	  Marines	  would	  have	  to	  study	  the	  possibility	  of	  amphibious	  
assaults	  in	  the	  face	  of	  many	  skeptics.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  Marines	  were	  the	  best	  suited	  
for	  this	  mission	  originated	  in	  1906	  under	  Major	  Dion	  Williams,	  who	  planted	  the	  
seed	  for	  other	  Marines	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  success	  in	  these	  operations.24	  	  	  
The	  more	  the	  planners	  studied	  the	  complications	  of	  a	  war	  with	  Japan,	  the	  
more	  they	  came	  to	  realize	  their	  biggest	  challenges	  were	  distance,	  resupply,	  and	  
logistics.	  While	  Commandant	  John	  Lejeune	  was	  reorganizing	  the	  Marine	  Corps,	  he	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assigned	  his	  adjutant	  Earl	  H.	  Ellis	  to	  study	  amphibious	  operations.	  Ellis	  listed	  his	  
results	  in	  1921	  in	  Operational	  Plan	  712.	  In	  his	  plan	  he	  argued	  that	  such	  operations	  
were	  possible	  but	  stressed	  that	  success	  “depended	  on	  rapid	  ship-­‐to-­‐shore	  
movement	  of	  waves	  of	  assault	  craft	  covered	  by	  overwhelming	  naval	  gunfire	  and	  
aerial	  attacks.”25	  OP	  Plan	  712	  set	  the	  pattern	  that	  American	  amphibious	  doctrine	  
would	  be	  based	  on.	  All	  of	  the	  principles	  were	  outlined	  in	  the	  Tentative	  Manual	  of	  
Landing	  Operation	  drafted	  from	  1931	  to	  1934.	  This	  document	  listed	  six	  main	  
principles	  for	  a	  successful	  beach	  landing	  against	  fortified	  defenses.	  They	  are	  as	  
follows:	  
1.	  Command	  Relations	   “There	  must	  be	  a	  unified	  command	  of	  
landing	  operations	  and	  a	  precise	  
allocation	  of	  subordinate	  responsibilities	  
and	  an	  adequate	  communications	  
network	  binding	  sea,	  land,	  and	  air	  forces	  
together.”	  
2.	  Naval	  gunfire	  support	   “The	  assault	  force	  would	  be	  so	  
vulnerable	  as	  it	  reached	  the	  beach,	  and	  
so	  likely	  to	  be	  badly	  outnumbered	  that	  
heavy	  support	  of	  naval	  guns	  would	  be	  
required	  to	  suppress	  the	  defenders	  as	  
much	  as	  possible.	  “	  
3.	  Aerial	  Support	   “Aerial	  gunfire	  and	  bombing	  support	  as	  
especially	  necessary	  at	  the	  critical	  
moment	  when	  the	  troops	  would	  touch	  
ashore,	  when	  naval	  gunfire	  would	  have	  
to	  cease	  and	  the	  ground	  troops’	  artillery	  
would	  not	  yet	  be	  in	  action.”	  
4.	  Ship-­‐to-­‐shore	  movement	   “This	  movement	  must	  be	  a	  tactical	  
formation	  to	  lead	  directly	  into	  the	  
assault;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  ferrying	  
operation.”	  
5.	  Securing	  the	  beachhead	   Must	  have	  trained	  beach	  parties	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




secure	  an	  area	  large	  enough	  to	  support	  
and	  organize	  a	  constant	  flow	  of	  troops	  
and	  supplies	  as	  well	  as	  coordinate	  air	  
and	  naval	  support.	  
6.	  Logistics	   Everything	  must	  be	  accessible	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  landing	  and	  in	  the	  order	  it	  
would	  be	  needed.	  It	  became	  known	  as	  
“combat	  loading”26	  
	  
	   As	  the	  Marines	  evolved,	  so	  too	  did	  strategy	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  
Staff	  had	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  for	  the	  Pacific	  Campaign.	  A	  debate	  
emerged	  between	  General	  MacArthur	  and	  Admirals	  Chester	  Nimitz	  and	  Ernest	  King	  
during	  a	  Pacific	  Military	  Conference	  in	  Washington	  during	  1943.27	  MacArthur	  
favored	  a	  south-­‐to-­‐north	  approach	  toward	  Japan	  that	  would	  require	  all	  forces	  to	  
liberate	  the	  Philippines	  and	  mount	  a	  push	  to	  Japan.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  Army-­‐centered	  
campaign	  using	  a	  northern	  approach	  from	  Australia	  to	  the	  Philippines.	  King	  and	  
Nimitz	  favored	  the	  island-­‐hopping	  strategy	  that	  had	  been	  written	  in	  War	  Plan	  
ORANGE.28	  	  This	  approach	  had	  the	  Navy	  and	  Marines	  making	  a	  westward	  thrust	  
through	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  establishing	  bases	  in	  the	  Marshalls,	  Carolines,	  Marianas,	  
Iwo	  Jima,	  and	  Okinawa	  islands.29	  It	  was	  accepted	  that	  both	  strategies	  needed	  to	  be	  
implemented.	  By	  1943,	  the	  war	  had	  expanded	  through	  the	  Pacific,	  and	  the	  United	  
States	  was	  beginning	  its	  offensive	  push	  to	  Japan.	  American	  forces	  had	  ousted	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Weigley,	  260-­‐262.	  This	  chart	  was	  created	  using	  the	  information	  from	  Weigley.	  Some	  of	  the	  
information	  is	  direct	  quotes	  while	  the	  ones	  not	  in	  quotation	  marks	  are	  paraphrased.	  “Tactical	  
Formation”	  refers	  to	  movement	  in	  which	  ships,	  equipment	  and	  personnel	  are	  loaded,	  organized,	  and	  
unloaded	  in	  a	  way	  that	  best	  suits	  immediate	  combat	  operations.	  
27	  Derrick	  Wright,	  A	  Hell	  of	  a	  Way	  to	  Die	  (London:	  Windrow	  &	  Greene,	  1996),	  16.	  
28	  Wright,	  16-­‐17.	  




Japanese	  from	  the	  Aleutian	  Islands	  in	  Alaska,	  the	  3rd	  Marine	  Division	  had	  landed	  on	  
Bougainville,	  and	  the	  1st	  Marine	  Division	  was	  finishing	  its	  conquest	  of	  the	  Solomon	  
Islands.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  Navy	  and	  Marine	  planners	  quickly	  turned	  towards	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Central	  Pacific.	  Success	  there	  would	  prove	  disastrous	  for	  the	  
Japanese	  Navy,	  as	  one	  of	  their	  largest	  bases	  was	  located	  at	  Truk	  in	  the	  Caroline	  
Islands.	  Establishing	  forward	  bases	  in	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  would	  also	  provide	  needed	  
air	  support	  and	  resupply	  bases	  for	  a	  push	  toward	  Japan.	  The	  first	  objective	  became	  
the	  Tarawa	  Atoll	  located	  in	  the	  Gilbert	  Islands.	  
	   Tarawa	  became	  a	  battle	  of	  many	  firsts.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  modern	  test	  of	  Marine	  
Corps	  doctrine	  on	  amphibious	  assaults	  against	  a	  fortified	  objective.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  
first	  time	  combat	  correspondents	  and	  photographers	  were	  sent	  in	  with	  combat	  
teams.	  Captain	  James	  Stockman	  summed	  it	  up	  calling	  it	  an	  “operation	  that	  was	  
assault	  in	  nature	  from	  start	  to	  finish,”	  adding	  that	  it	  relied	  on	  a	  close	  coordination	  of	  
land,	  sea,	  and	  air	  power	  to	  be	  successful.30	  Up	  to	  1943	  few	  offensives	  had	  been	  
conducted	  against	  the	  Japanese.	  America	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  defeating	  the	  
Japanese	  Navy	  at	  Midway,	  and	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  1st	  Marine	  
Division’s	  six-­‐month	  campaign	  on	  Guadalcanal.	  With	  attention	  shifting	  towards	  the	  
Central	  Pacific,	  Admirals	  Nimitz	  and	  King	  had	  their	  chance	  to	  open	  their	  island-­‐
hopping	  strategy.	  The	  Gilbert	  Island	  chain	  in	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  became	  a	  point	  of	  
emphasis	  for	  the	  planners.	  Fleet	  Admiral	  Ernest	  J.	  King	  outlined	  this	  significance	  in	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  Capt.	  James	  Stockman,	  The	  Battle	  for	  Tarawa	  (Washington	  D.C:	  Historical	  Division	  of	  Public	  




an	  official	  report.	  He	  explained	  that	  they	  were	  south	  and	  east	  of	  important	  Japanese	  
bases	  in	  the	  Marshalls	  and	  Carolines,	  and	  that	  the	  Gilberts	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  staging	  
point	  for	  operational	  thrusts	  into	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan.31	  	  Principally	  the	  importance	  
of	  the	  Gilberts	  was	  to	  establish	  air	  dominance	  using	  those	  islands	  to	  attack	  Japanese	  
strong	  points	  at	  Truk	  and	  the	  Marianas.	  The	  Gilberts	  consisted	  of	  16	  atolls	  scattered	  
roughly	  2,000	  miles	  southwest	  of	  Pearl	  Harbor	  with	  the	  main	  objective	  coming	  at	  
Betio	  in	  the	  Tarawa	  atoll.32	  	  Admiral	  Nimitz	  proposed	  Operational	  Plan	  13-­‐43	  on	  5	  
October	  1943;	  this	  was	  Nimitz’s	  plan	  to	  seize	  and	  establish	  bases	  on	  Makin,	  
Apamama,	  and	  Tarawa.	  Once	  the	  plan	  was	  approved,	  its	  name	  was	  changed	  to	  
Operation	  GALVANIC.	  The	  specific	  objectives	  of	  GALVANIC	  were	  as	  follows:	  
a. Gain	  control	  of	  the	  Gilberts.	  
b. Prepare	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  Marshalls.	  
c. Improve	  security	  and	  lines	  of	  communication.	  
d. Support	  the	  operations	  in	  the	  South-­‐Southwest	  Pacific	  and	  Burma	  areas	  by	  
extending	  pressure	  on	  the	  Japanese.33	  
	  
Betio	  was	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  Operation	  GALVANIC	  and	  the	  island	  where	  
most	  of	  fighting	  occurred.	  It	  had	  the	  best	  airstrip	  that	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  forward	  
operating	  and	  resupply	  base.	  Although	  it	  was	  not	  as	  strategically	  significant	  as	  the	  
Marshall	  Islands,	  these	  objectives	  reveal	  why	  the	  Gilberts	  were	  made	  a	  priority	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  Admiral	  Ernest	  J.	  King	  Official	  Reports	  cited	  in	  Stockman,	  1.	  	  
32	  Joseph	  Alexander,	  Across	  the	  Reef:	  With	  the	  Marines	  at	  Tarawa	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  History	  and	  
Museums	  Division,	  Headquarters,	  U.S.	  Marine	  Corps,	  1993),	  1.	  




before	  the	  Marshalls.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  no	  islands	  close	  enough	  to	  the	  Marshall	  
Islands	  to	  launch	  surveillance	  aircraft	  or	  bombers	  from.	  The	  Gilbert	  Islands	  were	  
also	  more	  familiar	  to	  the	  American	  forces,	  while	  the	  Marshall	  Islands	  were	  larger,	  
unfamiliar,	  and	  protected	  by	  eight	  air	  bases.34	  This	  made	  the	  Gilberts	  less	  risky,	  but	  
still	  necessary	  for	  success	  in	  the	  Marshalls.	  	  The	  other	  issue	  was	  the	  threat	  to	  Allied	  
security	  and	  communication.	  The	  Gilberts	  were	  in	  the	  way	  of	  American	  merchant	  
shipping,	  serving	  as	  a	  Japanese	  outpost	  that	  could	  interdict	  shipping	  traffic	  and	  
protect	  the	  Japanese	  bases	  on	  the	  Marshall	  Islands.35	  The	  assignment	  was	  passed	  to	  
the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  the	  Pacific	  Fleet	  (CinCPac),	  Admiral	  Chester	  Nimitz.	  
Nimitz	  quickly	  created	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  Force	  headed	  by	  Admiral	  Raymond	  
Spruance	  who	  helped	  organize	  Task	  Force	  53,	  which	  was	  assigned	  to	  Tarawa.	  
Admiral	  Spruance	  selected	  the	  2nd	  Marine	  Division	  headed	  by	  General	  Julian	  C.	  
Smith	  to	  lead	  the	  attack	  on	  Betio	  Island.36	  	  The	  assault	  was	  to	  be	  scheduled	  for	  20	  
November	  1943,	  with	  the	  primary	  objective	  being	  Betio.	  This	  particular	  island	  was	  
three	  miles	  long,	  800	  yards	  wide,	  and	  about	  300	  acres;	  it	  was	  surrounded	  by	  a	  
fringing	  coral	  reef	  hundreds	  of	  yards	  out	  from	  the	  beach.37	  Betio	  was	  also	  the	  most	  
heavily	  fortified	  territory,	  yard	  per	  yard,	  which	  the	  Marines	  would	  encounter	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  War.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  16-­‐17.	  The	  Gilberts	  were	  more	  familiar	  to	  the	  United	  States	  because	  
an	  expedition	  took	  place	  there	  by	  a	  Navy	  Lt.	  Charles	  Wilkes	  in	  1842.	  It	  had	  also	  been	  administered	  by	  
Great	  Britain	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  II,	  Alexander	  11-­‐12.	  Sherrod	  described	  four	  people	  in	  his	  book	  who	  
were	  British	  subjects	  and	  shipmasters	  that	  were	  used	  to	  provide	  intelligence	  on	  the	  waters	  and	  tides	  
around	  Betio.	  See	  Sherrod	  12-­‐22.	  
35	  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  17.	  
36	  Stockman,	  3.	  
37	  Charles	  Jones,	  War	  Shots:	  Norman	  Hatch	  &	  the	  U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	  Combat	  Cameramen	  of	  World	  War	  




	   The	  Japanese	  strength	  at	  Betio	  was	  4,	  836	  men,	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Special	  
Naval	  Landing	  Force	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  rikusentai.	  The	  commanders	  selected	  
members	  for	  this	  unit	  who	  demonstrated	  “superior	  physical	  fitness	  and	  good	  
judgment.”38	  	  Japanese	  soldiers	  who	  qualified	  for	  the	  rikusentai	  attended	  multiple	  
schools	  of	  training	  including	  a	  school	  that	  psychologically	  indoctrinated	  loyalty	  and	  
courage.	  When	  the	  Japanese	  realized	  how	  vital	  the	  Gilberts	  were	  to	  them,	  they	  sent	  
the	  111th	  Construction	  Battalion	  to	  construct	  defenses	  across	  Betio.	  	  They	  focused	  
on	  reinforced	  concrete	  bunkers	  and	  bombproofs,	  beach	  obstacles,	  tank	  traps,	  
trenches,	  and	  covered	  gun	  positions.	  They	  also	  specialized	  in	  using	  the	  natural	  
environment	  to	  conceal	  their	  positions.	  Coconut	  logs,	  sand,	  and	  any	  other	  natural	  
elements	  of	  the	  island	  were	  used	  to	  conceal	  nearly	  every	  defensive	  structure	  
assembled	  on	  Betio.	  Once	  construction	  was	  nearly	  completed,	  the	  7th	  Sasebo	  Special	  
Naval	  Landing	  Force	  arrived	  to	  arm	  it	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  different	  weapons;	  the	  
Japanese	  force	  had	  transformed	  a	  barren	  island	  into	  a	  bristling	  island	  fortress.	  
According	  to	  historian	  Joseph	  Alexander,	  it	  was	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  defensive	  
system	  that	  the	  Marines	  would	  face	  until	  Iwo	  Jima	  in	  1945,	  and	  yard	  for	  yard	  the	  
toughest	  of	  the	  war.39	  	  
	   On	  20	  July	  1943,	  Rear	  Admiral	  Keiji	  Shibasaki	  was	  appointed	  commander	  of	  
the	  Japanese	  garrison	  on	  Betio.	  His	  mission	  plan	  was	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy	  invasion	  
at	  the	  water’s	  edge.	  The	  Japanese	  “Battle	  Dispositions”	  were	  released	  in	  October	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  Ibid,	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1942	  with	  the	  directive,	  “wait	  until	  the	  enemy	  is	  within	  effective	  range	  (when	  
assembling	  for	  landing)	  and	  direct	  your	  fire	  on	  the	  enemy	  transport	  group	  and	  
destroy	  it.”	  It	  continued	  “If	  the	  enemy	  starts	  a	  landing,	  knock	  out	  the	  landing	  boats	  
with	  mountain	  gunfire,	  tank	  guns,	  and	  infantry	  guns,	  then	  concentrate	  all	  fires	  on	  
the	  enemy’s	  landing	  point	  and	  destroy	  him	  at	  the	  water’s	  edge.”40	  With	  the	  defenses	  
set	  and	  elements	  in	  place,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  an	  epic	  engagement	  between	  two	  
well-­‐disciplined	  and	  determined	  foes.	  Rear	  Admiral	  Shibasaki	  confidently	  stated	  
“the	  Americans	  could	  not	  take	  Tarawa	  with	  a	  million	  men	  in	  a	  hundred	  years.”41	  	  
Nearly	  10,000	  Marines	  of	  the	  2nd	  Marine	  Division	  would	  test	  this	  claim	  in	  76	  hours	  
in	  what	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  vicious	  fights	  of	  the	  war.	  
While	  boastful	  in	  his	  estimate,	  Shibasaki	  had	  a	  right	  to	  be	  confident	  as	  the	  
island	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  heavily	  defended	  and	  well	  constructed	  citadels	  in	  World	  
War	  II.	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  confirmed	  this	  strength	  prior	  to	  the	  invasion	  on	  20	  
November	  1943,	  as	  indicated	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  saying,	  “we	  had	  
excellent	  aerial	  photos	  and	  far	  better	  intelligence	  than	  we	  can	  normally	  expect	  to	  
have	  concerning	  enemy	  territory.”42	  	  The	  one	  issue	  American	  planners	  were	  unsure	  
of	  was	  the	  tides	  surrounding	  the	  reef.	  They	  faced	  unpredictable	  tides	  at	  Tarawa,	  as	  
the	  tide	  tables	  available	  had	  not	  been	  completed	  and	  were	  inaccurate.	  The	  lack	  of	  
hydrographic	  data	  created	  a	  tense	  atmosphere	  amongst	  planners.	  A	  team	  of	  sixteen	  
men	  of	  different	  nationalities,	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  Gilberts	  and	  were	  familiar	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with	  the	  tides,	  were	  assembled	  to	  provide	  intelligence	  on	  the	  water	  levels.	  Mission	  
planners	  needed	  them	  to	  help	  time	  the	  operation	  to	  have	  about	  five	  feet	  of	  water	  
above	  the	  reef;	  that	  was	  what	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  landing	  craft	  to	  float	  over	  the	  
reef	  and	  deploy	  men	  and	  supplies	  on	  the	  beach.	  They	  also	  wanted	  to	  execute	  the	  
mission	  during	  an	  incoming	  tide	  so	  that	  as	  the	  day	  went	  on	  it	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  
ferry	  in	  supplies.	  The	  attack	  was	  scheduled	  during	  a	  neap	  tidal	  phase	  when	  tides	  
were	  less	  extreme	  than	  during	  spring	  tides.	  The	  date	  selected	  was	  20	  November	  
1943	  because	  it	  offered	  the	  most	  favorable	  situation	  with	  a	  midday	  high	  water	  level	  
of	  4.9	  feet	  at	  10:47am.43	  The	  only	  issue	  with	  the	  selected	  date	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  
a	  “dodging	  tide,”	  which	  typically	  occurs	  during	  a	  neap	  tide.	  When	  these	  types	  of	  
tides	  occur,	  the	  water	  level	  drops	  lower	  than	  usual	  and	  does	  not	  change	  for	  an	  
extended	  period	  of	  time.44	  This	  possibility	  meant	  that	  the	  Marines	  would	  run	  the	  
risk	  of	  having	  their	  landing	  craft	  grounded	  on	  the	  reef,	  forcing	  them	  to	  wade	  ashore	  
from	  as	  far	  out	  as	  800	  yards.	  Colonel	  David	  Shoup,	  who	  was	  placed	  in	  command	  of	  
ground	  forces	  on	  Betio,	  voiced	  his	  concern	  to	  news	  correspondent	  Robert	  Sherrod	  
about	  the	  reef	  situation	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  
What	  worries	  me	  more	  than	  anything	  is	  that	  our	  boats	  may	  not	  be	  able	  
to	  get	  over	  the	  coral	  shelf	  that	  sticks	  out	  about	  500	  yards.	  We	  may	  have	  
to	  wade	  in.	  The	  first	  waves,	  of	  course	  will	  get	  in	  all	  right	  on	  the	  
“alligators’	  (amphibious	  landing	  craft),	  but	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  draw	  too	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much	  water	  to	  get	  in	  fairly	  close,	  we’ll	  either	  have	  to	  wade	  in	  with	  
machine	  guns	  shooting	  at	  us,	  or	  the	  amtracks	  will	  have	  to	  run	  a	  shuttle	  
service	  between	  the	  beach	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  shelf.	  We	  have	  got	  to	  
calculate	  high	  tide	  pretty	  closely	  for	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  to	  make	  it.45	  
The	  statement	  reveals	  many	  problems	  the	  Marines	  faced	  in	  getting	  ashore	  at	  
Betio.	  The	  primary	  concern	  for	  Shoup	  and	  many	  others	  was	  the	  reef	  and	  getting	  
across	  it.	  Marine	  Corps	  doctrine	  for	  amphibious	  war	  stressed	  rapid	  troop	  and	  
resupply	  movements.	  The	  imposing	  reef	  was	  foreseen	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  not	  just	  at	  
Tarawa	  but	  also	  at	  other	  venues	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  The	  problem	  had	  been	  addressed	  
during	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE,	  leading	  to	  a	  search	  for	  a	  vehicle	  that	  could	  rapidly	  deploy	  
men	  and	  equipment	  on	  beaches.	  The	  first	  model	  military	  planners	  settled	  on	  was	  
developed	  by	  Andrew	  Higgins	  in	  the	  swamps	  of	  Louisiana.	  It	  had	  a	  “shallow	  draft,	  a	  
broad,	  flat	  bow	  for	  landing	  and	  retracting	  and	  protected	  propeller.”46	  When	  the	  
Navy	  officially	  adopted	  this	  vehicle	  into	  the	  service,	  it	  was	  outfitted	  with	  a	  
retractable	  bow	  ramp	  and	  named	  Landing	  Craft	  Vehicle	  Personnel	  (LCVP);	  a	  
separate	  model	  was	  created	  for	  moving	  heavy	  equipment	  named	  Landing	  Craft	  
Mechanized	  (LCM).47	  	  Soon	  after	  it	  was	  commissioned,	  the	  other	  problem	  arose	  with	  
how	  to	  deal	  with	  surrounding	  reefs	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  face	  in	  the	  island-­‐
hopping	  advance	  to	  Japan.	  	  The	  military	  began	  experimenting	  with	  an	  amphibious	  
tank	  that	  could	  cruise	  through	  the	  water	  like	  a	  boat	  and	  crawl	  over	  reefs	  that	  the	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Higgins	  boat	  could	  not.	  They	  eventually	  developed	  their	  first	  Landing	  Vehicle	  
Tracked	  (LVT-­‐1)	  or	  “alligator.”48	  	  Shortly	  before	  the	  time	  of	  the	  invasion	  of	  Tarawa,	  
the	  LVTs	  had	  been	  designed	  as	  troop	  transports	  and	  logistical	  vehicles	  because	  they	  
had	  little	  to	  no	  armor	  plating	  and	  no	  weapons	  for	  defense.	  Many	  of	  these	  models	  
featured	  large,	  open	  windows	  in	  the	  front	  and	  sides	  with	  weak	  armor	  that	  could	  be	  
penetrated	  by	  a	  small	  caliber	  rifle	  shot.49	  Despite	  their	  obvious	  flaws,	  their	  
usefulness	  was	  undeniable	  in	  being	  able	  to	  cross	  reefs,	  so	  the	  Amphibious	  Tractor	  
Battalion	  was	  born.	  When	  they	  were	  introduced	  into	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  there	  were	  
100	  LVT-­‐1s,	  but	  after	  the	  campaign	  at	  Guadalcanal	  there	  were	  only	  75	  available	  for	  
the	  assault	  on	  Tarawa.	  This	  number	  became	  an	  obvious	  problem	  as	  the	  plan	  called	  
for	  the	  first	  three	  waves	  to	  deliver	  1,500	  men	  and	  continue	  with	  ferrying	  in	  
supplies.50	  The	  question	  then	  arose	  as	  to	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  the	  LVT-­‐1s	  were	  
destroyed	  and	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  could	  not	  cross	  the	  reef.	  General	  Holland	  “Howling	  
Mad”	  Smith,	  commander	  of	  the	  V	  Amphibious	  Corps,	  estimated	  that	  the	  first	  wave	  
would	  be	  the	  only	  one	  to	  make	  it	  ashore;	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  men	  and	  equipment	  would	  
have	  grounded	  out	  on	  the	  reef	  hundreds	  of	  yards	  away.51	  	  Colonel	  David	  Shoup	  and	  
General	  Julian	  Smith	  both	  made	  it	  a	  priority	  to	  find	  and	  acquire	  more	  LVTs.	  
Fortunately	  there	  were	  some	  newer	  models,	  LVT-­‐2s,	  based	  at	  the	  San	  Diego	  Naval	  
Base.	  A	  fight	  ensued	  between	  the	  Navy	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  over	  the	  necessity	  of	  these	  
vehicles.	  The	  Marines	  knew	  that	  these	  machines	  were	  the	  only	  means	  of	  getting	  men	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and	  equipment	  directly	  to	  the	  beaches.	  The	  Navy	  did	  not	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  storing	  
these	  craft	  on	  their	  ships.	  Admiral	  Kelly	  Turner	  told	  Gen.	  Holland	  Smith	  that	  they	  
were	  “not	  proper	  craft”	  and	  they	  were	  “weak	  and	  unseaworthy.”52	  After	  a	  series	  of	  
debates,	  the	  Marines	  were	  able	  to	  procure	  an	  additional	  50	  of	  the	  LVT-­‐2s	  from	  
California	  when	  Holland	  Smith	  threatened	  to	  stop	  the	  operation	  unless	  additional	  
LVTs	  were	  assigned	  to	  Operation	  GALVANIC.	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  discussed	  his	  
fight	  with	  the	  Navy	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  wife	  saying,	  “I	  and	  my	  staff	  fought	  like	  steers	  to	  
get	  50	  Amphibian	  tractors	  clear	  from	  San	  Francisco,	  sent	  to	  Samoa	  and	  loaded	  on	  
special	  ships	  to	  Tarawa.”	  He	  continued,	  “The	  Navy	  said	  they	  couldn’t	  do	  it	  but	  we	  
made	  them.”53	  The	  older	  LVT-­‐1s	  were	  outfitted	  with	  old	  boilerplates	  and	  machine	  
guns	  for	  their	  defense	  since	  none	  were	  outfitted	  with	  armor.	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  
this	  study	  LVT-­‐1	  and	  LVT-­‐2	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  AMTRACS,	  and	  the	  LCVP	  (flat	  
bottom	  boats	  with	  retractable	  bows)	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  Higgins	  boats.	  	  	  As	  the	  
new	  landing	  craft	  were	  being	  rushed	  from	  the	  American	  West	  Coast	  to	  the	  Central	  
Pacific,	  the	  plans	  were	  near	  complete	  for	  D-­‐Day	  on	  Betio.	  	  
Not	  only	  was	  this	  operation	  the	  first	  amphibious	  assault	  against	  a	  defended	  
position,	  it	  was	  also	  the	  first	  operation	  to	  utilize	  a	  joint	  naval	  and	  air	  bombardment.	  
The	  Navy	  informed	  the	  Marines	  that	  they	  would	  be	  dropping	  ordnance	  over	  Betio	  
for	  three	  hours	  prior	  to	  the	  landings	  on	  D-­‐Day.	  The	  amount	  of	  ordnance	  to	  be	  
dropped	  on	  Betio	  was	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  amount	  used	  by	  American	  forces	  up	  to	  that	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time.	  While	  the	  Marines	  were	  skeptical	  of	  the	  Navy’s	  promises,	  naval	  officers	  were	  
confident,	  stating	  at	  a	  post-­‐rehearsal	  press	  conference,	  “We	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  
neutralize	  it,	  we	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  destroy	  it.	  Gentlemen,	  we	  will	  obliterate	  it.”	  
General	  Smith	  voiced	  his	  concern	  in	  the	  same	  meeting,	  reminding	  the	  Navy,	  “Even	  
though	  you	  navy	  officers	  do	  come	  in	  to	  about	  1,000	  yards,	  I	  remind	  you	  that	  you	  
have	  armor.	  I	  want	  you	  to	  know	  that	  Marines	  are	  crossing	  the	  beach	  with	  bayonets,	  
and	  that	  the	  only	  armor	  they’ll	  have	  is	  a	  khaki	  shirt.”54	  The	  Marines	  had	  good	  reason	  
to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  such	  boasts	  by	  the	  Navy.	  The	  Navy	  had	  suffered	  a	  loss	  at	  
Guadalcanal	  leaving	  the	  1st	  Marine	  Division	  stranded	  for	  weeks	  and	  had	  not	  proven	  
themselves	  in	  sea-­‐to-­‐shore	  fire	  support.	  The	  other	  cause	  for	  concern	  was	  the	  Navy’s	  
poor	  performance	  in	  the	  war	  exercises	  under	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE.	  One	  area	  of	  
concern	  was	  the	  problems	  with	  naval	  gunfire.	  This	  weakness	  was	  due	  to	  their	  
weapons	  systems	  being	  flat-­‐trajectory,	  firing	  high	  velocity	  rounds	  designed	  to	  
penetrate	  the	  armor	  of	  enemy	  ships,	  not	  to	  destroy	  bunkers.55	  Historian	  Allan	  
Millett	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  other	  problems	  like	  the	  inability	  of	  naval	  vessels	  to	  fire	  
registration	  rounds	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  long-­‐firing	  barrages	  damaged	  the	  ships’	  guns’	  
rifling.	  Millett	  explains	  that	  these	  problems	  led	  to	  Naval	  doctrine	  on	  preliminary	  
bombardment	  being	  “short	  intense	  area	  barrages	  designed	  to	  neutralize	  exposed	  
enemy	  infantry	  and	  machine	  guns.”	  56	  This	  doctrine	  proved	  to	  be	  ineffective	  as	  the	  
type	  of	  weapons	  systems	  on	  naval	  ships	  would	  require	  direct	  hits	  that	  would	  be	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impossible	  without	  guidance	  from	  the	  shore;	  even	  then	  the	  rounds	  would	  not	  
penetrate	  heavily	  fortified	  structures.	  The	  short	  firing	  barrages	  were	  also	  a	  problem	  
because	  they	  allowed	  needed	  time	  for	  hidden	  enemies	  to	  regroup	  and	  gain	  their	  
bearings.	  This	  would	  work	  out	  well	  for	  the	  Japanese,	  as	  they	  were	  excellent	  in	  
preparing	  defenses	  and	  digging	  concealed	  trenches	  and	  bunkers	  that	  would	  protect	  
them	  from	  the	  shelling.	  An	  anonymous	  sergeant	  illustrated	  this	  when	  he	  stated,	  “I	  
can	  testify	  that	  they	  are	  the	  damnedest	  diggers	  in	  the	  world.	  It’s	  like	  pulling	  a	  tick	  
out	  of	  a	  rug	  to	  get	  one	  out	  of	  his	  hole.”57	  This	  prediction	  was	  what	  Sherrod	  later	  
described	  as	  a	  “prophecy”	  as	  the	  Naval	  shelling	  merely	  scratched	  the	  surface,	  
leaving	  many	  Japanese	  fighters	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  fight	  from	  their	  holes.	  Colonel	  
Mike	  Edson	  explained	  to	  Sherrod	  that	  the	  Navy’s	  mistake	  was	  in	  viewing	  land	  
targets	  as	  ships.	  Edson	  rationalized	  that	  the	  mistake	  was	  “in	  assuming	  that	  land	  
targets	  are	  like	  ships—when	  you	  hit	  a	  ship	  it	  sinks	  and	  all	  is	  lost,	  but	  on	  land	  you’ve	  
got	  to	  get	  direct	  hits	  on	  many	  installations,	  and	  that’s	  impossible,	  even	  with	  three	  
thousand	  tons	  of	  shells	  and	  bombs.”58	  Despite	  these	  concerns,	  planning	  continued	  
and	  the	  procedures	  were	  in	  place.	  Proposals	  for	  an	  initial	  invasion	  to	  establish	  an	  
artillery	  base	  on	  an	  adjacent	  island	  were	  abandoned	  on	  the	  fear	  of	  Japanese	  
submarines	  and	  fleet	  forces	  engaging	  troop	  transports.	  Navy	  officers	  felt	  this	  plan	  
too	  risky	  as	  one	  submarine	  could	  kill	  thousands	  of	  waiting	  Marines	  with	  one	  
torpedo.	  It	  was	  concluded	  that	  time	  was	  of	  the	  essence	  and	  the	  mission	  was	  a	  go.	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On	  the	  morning	  of	  November	  20,	  1943,	  the	  battle	  began	  when	  the	  sixteen-­‐
inch	  batteries	  of	  the	  battleships	  Colorado	  and	  Maryland	  fired	  on	  Japanese	  positions.	  
The	  USS	  Maryland	  was	  named	  the	  Command	  and	  Control	  ship	  for	  this	  operation.	  
This	  decision	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  error	  in	  judgment	  because	  every	  time	  the	  16-­‐inch	  
batteries	  fired,	  the	  communications	  circuitry	  was	  disabled	  by	  the	  shockwave	  from	  
the	  ship’s	  guns.	  The	  faulty	  communication	  crippled	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  ships,	  planes,	  
and	  ground	  forces	  to	  stay	  in	  contact,	  creating	  a	  wealth	  of	  confusion	  throughout	  the	  
battle.	  	  While	  the	  ships	  fired	  their	  guns	  on	  Betio	  the	  Marines	  arose	  from	  their	  bunks	  
and	  ate	  their	  traditional	  steak	  and	  eggs	  before	  being	  sent	  into	  the	  battle.	  Some	  
thought	  resistance	  would	  be	  light	  and	  the	  enemy	  would	  already	  be	  destroyed.	  
Others	  prepared	  themselves	  for	  what	  might	  be	  their	  last	  moment	  on	  this	  earth	  by	  
attending	  worship	  services	  before	  heading	  into	  the	  fire.	  On	  deck	  the	  Marines	  
witnessed	  the	  first	  joint	  air	  and	  naval	  bombardment	  in	  United	  States	  military	  
history,	  and	  cheered	  as	  hits	  were	  scored	  against	  some	  of	  the	  Japanese	  8-­‐inch	  coastal	  
defense	  guns.	  The	  island	  seemed	  to	  be	  burning,	  with	  explosions	  ripping	  the	  land	  to	  
pieces	  and	  smoke	  enveloping	  it.	  The	  smoke	  was	  so	  thick	  that	  it	  actually	  hindered	  the	  
operation.	  Gunnery	  officers	  had	  to	  delay	  their	  bombing	  because	  they	  could	  not	  
accurately	  sight	  their	  targets,	  and	  air	  strikes	  were	  also	  delayed	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  
smoke	  and	  coral	  dust	  to	  settle.	  This	  delay	  was	  disastrous	  because	  it	  allowed	  the	  
Japanese	  to	  recover	  from	  their	  shell	  shock	  and	  prepare	  for	  the	  Marines.	  	  This	  
recovery	  was	  unknown	  to	  the	  Marines	  who	  cheered	  wildly	  for	  the	  Navy	  bombers	  




went	  wrong	  with	  the	  naval	  bombardment.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  Navy	  had	  little	  
experience	  in	  shore	  bombardments.	  When	  ships	  began	  their	  attack,	  they	  made	  
repeated	  errors	  in	  range,	  trajectory,	  ammunition	  type,	  and	  fuse	  settings.59	  Some	  
rounds	  were	  so	  far	  off	  that	  reconnaissance	  planes	  reported	  multiple	  shells	  missing	  
the	  island	  entirely	  and	  exploding	  in	  the	  ocean.	  	  
From	  the	  ocean	  it	  must	  have	  appeared	  as	  though	  the	  naval	  bombardment	  
was	  as	  destructive	  as	  naval	  officers	  predicted	  it	  would	  be.	  Witnessing	  the	  
pummeling	  from	  the	  ocean,	  Sherrod	  reflected	  the	  feeling	  of	  those	  going	  ashore	  
saying,	  “Surely,	  we	  all	  thought,	  no	  mortal	  man	  could	  live	  through	  such	  destructive	  
power.	  Surely,	  I	  thought,	  if	  there	  were	  actually	  any	  Japs	  left	  on	  the	  island	  (which	  I	  
doubted	  strongly),	  they	  would	  all	  be	  dead	  by	  now.”60	  The	  response	  to	  him	  and	  the	  
Marines	  would	  rudely	  be	  given	  when	  a	  geyser	  erupted	  from	  a	  Japanese	  mortar	  shell	  
that	  hit	  50	  yards	  from	  Sherrod’s	  boat.	  	  
Faulty	  communication	  led	  to	  a	  terribly	  confusing	  start	  to	  an	  already	  complex	  
operation.	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  AMTRACs	  was	  delayed	  by	  40	  minutes	  from	  its	  original	  
time.	  Naval	  gunfire	  was	  halted	  because	  of	  the	  risk	  it	  posed	  Navy	  bombers,	  and	  the	  
smoke	  was	  obstructing	  the	  aviators	  from	  being	  able	  to	  determine	  friend	  from	  foe.	  To	  
make	  matters	  worse,	  the	  aerial	  component	  was	  more	  than	  30	  minutes	  late	  after	  the	  
Navy	  had	  stopped	  firing.	  This	  gave	  the	  Japanese	  time	  to	  regroup	  and	  concentrate	  on	  
where	  the	  Marines	  would	  be	  landing.	  	  The	  Navy	  pilots’	  lack	  of	  experience	  in	  ground	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operations	  quickly	  showed.	  Admiral	  Kelly	  Turner’s	  staff	  aviation	  officer,	  Lieutenant	  
Commander	  Fredrick	  Ashworth,	  commented	  “I’m	  reluctant	  to	  say	  that	  I	  was	  
involved	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  air	  support	  for	  the	  landing	  at	  Tarawa	  for	  it	  was	  pretty	  
sorry.	  We	  didn’t	  really	  know	  what	  we	  were	  doing.”	  Another	  fighter	  wing	  
commander	  stated	  in	  an	  after-­‐action	  report,	  “The	  great	  majority	  of	  our	  bombs	  dug	  
out	  a	  nice	  well	  and	  raised	  a	  great	  cloud	  of	  coral	  dust	  which	  hampered	  the	  bombing	  
of	  other	  planes.”61	  	  	  
As	  the	  Marines	  approached,	  the	  other	  obstacle	  feared	  was	  not	  the	  Japanese	  
defenses	  but	  the	  reef	  protecting	  the	  island.	  Up	  to	  this	  point,	  the	  planners	  had	  
received	  little	  more	  than	  conflicting	  reports	  about	  the	  status	  of	  the	  tides.	  General	  
Julian	  Smith	  and	  Admiral	  Harry	  Hill	  could	  simply	  “hope	  for	  the	  best	  and	  plan	  for	  the	  
worst.”62	  The	  fears	  came	  to	  be	  realized	  when	  the	  first	  wave	  crossed	  over	  the	  reef.	  It	  
was	  discovered	  to	  be	  worse	  than	  predicted	  with	  the	  water	  levels	  reaching	  no	  more	  
than	  three	  feet	  over	  the	  reef.63	  This	  depth	  was	  fine	  with	  the	  first	  waves	  of	  AMTRACs	  
as	  they	  crawled	  over	  the	  top	  and	  continued	  to	  the	  beaches.	  The	  concern	  was	  that	  
eventually	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  cross,	  forcing	  the	  Marines	  to	  wade	  
ashore	  from	  up	  to	  800	  yards	  away.	  As	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  described,	  “	  The	  first	  
waves	  reached	  the	  beach	  without	  excessive	  losses,	  but	  later	  waves	  got	  hung	  up	  by	  
unforeseen	  tide	  conditions	  which	  prevented	  the	  boats	  from	  crossing	  the	  reef	  and	  
the	  men	  had	  to	  disembark	  and	  wade	  nearly	  a	  half	  mile	  to	  the	  beach.”	  He	  continued,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Alexander	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  106-­‐107.	  
62Ibid,	  76.	  




“Their	  losses	  were	  terrible,	  but	  on	  they	  came.”64	  They	  also	  discovered	  mines,	  tank	  
traps,	  and	  a	  multitude	  of	  other	  beach	  obstacles	  that	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  heavy	  
equipment	  that	  would	  be	  coming	  in.	  	  
	   At	  0910	  the	  first	  waves	  of	  Marines	  crawled	  over	  the	  reef	  successfully	  and	  
began	  landing	  on	  their	  designated	  beaches.	  Immediately	  the	  Japanese	  garrison	  fired	  
their	  machine	  guns	  with	  interlocking	  fields	  of	  fire	  and	  Triple	  A	  dual	  purpose	  guns	  on	  
the	  landing	  parties.65	  The	  AMTRACs	  quickly	  began	  attempting	  to	  shuttle	  Marines	  in,	  
knowing	  that	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  could	  not	  cross	  the	  reef.	  As	  the	  ferocity	  of	  the	  
fighting	  picked	  up,	  the	  number	  of	  AMTRACs	  decreased,	  having	  been	  rapidly	  
destroyed	  by	  Japanese	  fire.	  Within	  an	  hour	  the	  little	  island	  of	  Betio	  turned	  into	  the	  
gates	  of	  hell.	  The	  only	  protection	  many	  of	  the	  men	  could	  find	  was	  underneath	  an	  
coconut	  log	  seawall.	  However,	  the	  seawall	  did	  not	  protect	  from	  Japanese	  snipers	  
scattered	  all	  over	  the	  island	  because	  the	  Japanese	  snipers	  tied	  themselves	  to	  the	  
palm	  trees	  and	  could	  shoot	  down	  into	  the	  hiding	  Marines.	  Sherrod	  recalled	  an	  
incident	  in	  which	  a	  Marine	  running	  along	  the	  beach	  was	  shot	  in	  the	  head	  causing	  his	  
eyes	  to	  nearly	  bulge	  out	  of	  his	  head	  as	  he	  hit	  the	  ground.	  Sherrod	  went	  on	  to	  discuss	  
the	  opening	  scenes	  of	  the	  landing	  describing	  the	  dead	  and	  wounded	  coming	  every	  
minute,	  and	  the	  screams	  of	  those	  whose	  limbs	  were	  torn	  off.	  66	  As	  D-­‐Day	  progressed,	  
Colonel	  Shoup	  became	  concerned	  over	  the	  precariousness	  of	  their	  situation.	  Not	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  General	  Julian	  C.	  Smith	  letter	  to	  Harriotte	  Smith,	  28	  November	  1943,	  Julian	  C.	  Smith	  Collection,	  
Personal	  Papers	  Section,	  MCHC.	  	  	  
65	  The	  Triple	  A	  Dual	  Purpose	  Guns	  were	  a	  weapon	  system	  that	  was	  designed	  for	  anti-­‐aircraft	  use,	  but	  
could	  be	  adjusted	  to	  act	  as	  a	  type	  of	  heavy	  caliber	  weapon	  for	  ground	  forces.	  




waves	  had	  made	  it	  ashore,	  AMTRACs	  were	  being	  knocked	  out,	  and	  communications	  
were	  failing.	  Units	  that	  had	  to	  ditch	  into	  the	  ocean	  or	  wade	  ashore	  discovered	  their	  
radios	  were	  not	  waterproof,	  causing	  nearly	  all	  them	  to	  malfunction.	  The	  Marines	  
had	  to	  rely	  on	  runners	  to	  relay	  messages,	  which	  was	  risky	  because	  of	  the	  time	  it	  
took	  to	  go	  anywhere	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  fire	  and	  the	  danger	  of	  the	  runner	  being	  
killed	  or	  wounded.	  Those	  units	  that	  had	  to	  wade	  ashore	  and	  were	  suffering	  severe	  
casualty	  rates,	  leaving	  many	  without	  officers	  or	  leading	  to	  the	  mixing	  of	  different	  
units,	  further	  complicated	  the	  communication	  issue.	  	  
As	  the	  battle	  progressed	  the	  inexperience	  of	  Navy	  pilots	  in	  providing	  close	  air	  
support	  continued	  to	  show.	  The	  Navy,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  Marines,	  led	  the	  
aerial	  bombardment.	  While	  the	  Navy	  pilots	  possessed	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  courage	  and	  
motivation	  to	  prove	  themselves,	  they	  lacked	  experience	  and	  training	  in	  air-­‐to-­‐
ground	  operations.	  Marine	  pilots	  had	  a	  wealth	  of	  experience	  in	  close	  air	  support.	  
They	  had	  practiced	  it	  in	  Haiti,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  and	  Nicaragua	  during	  the	  
Banana	  Wars.	  Furthermore,	  Marine	  Corps	  training	  instills	  the	  unique	  belief	  that	  
every	  Marine	  is	  a	  rifleman	  and	  even	  pilots	  were	  trained	  as	  such	  before	  being	  sent	  to	  
their	  specialty	  schools.	  This	  training	  gave	  Marine	  pilots	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
what	  was	  involved	  in	  ground	  operations.	  This	  training,	  combined	  with	  the	  
expanding	  mission	  of	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  to	  base	  defense	  and	  seizure,	  made	  
commanders	  realize	  the	  need	  for	  aerial	  components	  to	  provide	  close	  air	  support	  for	  
ground	  forces;	  they	  then	  made	  it	  a	  staple	  for	  all	  Marine	  pilots	  to	  train	  in	  air-­‐to-­‐




close	  air	  support,	  they	  must	  fly	  low	  and	  slow	  so	  that	  they	  could	  maintain	  visuals	  and	  
communications	  with	  infantry	  units	  on	  the	  ground.67	  This	  type	  of	  training	  and	  
experience	  would	  have	  proved	  vital	  to	  the	  success	  on	  Tarawa	  because	  the	  aerial	  
support	  would	  have	  been	  more	  effective	  providing	  help	  to	  the	  ground	  forces	  during	  
the	  operation.	  	  Marine	  pilots	  had	  also	  demonstrated	  their	  skills	  at	  Guadalcanal	  using	  
beat-­‐up	  planes	  to	  hold	  off	  the	  Japanese	  counter	  offensive	  until	  the	  infantry	  could	  be	  
relieved.	  This	  heroic	  group	  of	  fliers,	  known	  as	  the	  Cactus	  Air	  Force,	  was	  a	  composite	  
squadron	  of	  Marine	  pilots	  that	  assembled	  together	  to	  defend	  America’s	  hold	  on	  
Guadalcanal.	  Many	  officers	  and	  historians	  have	  since	  argued	  that	  without	  the	  
support	  provided	  by	  the	  Cactus	  Air	  Force	  on	  Guadalcanal,	  the	  Marines	  would	  have	  
been	  overrun.	  Despite	  all	  of	  this	  experience	  in	  air-­‐to-­‐ground	  operations,	  the	  Navy	  
opted	  to	  stick	  with	  Navy	  and	  Army	  bombers.	  Their	  lack	  of	  experience	  would	  soon	  
show	  during	  the	  bombing	  and	  strafing	  runs	  conducted	  at	  Tarawa.	  	  
Major	  Norman	  Hatch	  of	  the	  newly-­‐formed	  combat	  photography	  division	  got	  
his	  baptism	  by	  fire	  when	  his	  boat	  was	  hit	  by	  machine	  gun	  fire	  and	  they	  were	  forced	  
to	  wade	  ashore.	  He	  recorded	  Marines	  getting	  shot	  in	  the	  water	  and	  witnessed	  a	  
Higgins	  boat	  suffer	  a	  direct	  hit	  by	  a	  75mm	  antiaircraft	  gun	  resulting	  in	  faces	  being	  
blown	  off	  and	  limbs	  littering	  the	  lagoon.68	  The	  following	  radio	  transcript	  between	  
Major	  John	  Schoettel	  and	  Colonel	  Shoup	  indicated	  just	  how	  precarious	  the	  situation	  
was.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Millett,	  333-­‐334.	  




[Schoettel]	  0959:	  Receiving	  heavy	  fire	  all	  along	  beach.	  Unable	  to	  land	  all.	  
Issue	  in	  doubt.	  
[Schoettel]	  1007:	  Boats	  held	  up	  on	  reef	  of	  right	  flank	  Red	  1.	  Troops	  receiving	  
heavy	  fire	  in	  water.	  
[Shoup]	  1012:	  Land	  Red	  Beach	  2	  and	  work	  west.	  
[	  Schoettel]	  1018:	  We	  Have	  nothing	  left	  to	  land.69	  	  
This	  brief	  radio	  transcript	  illustrates	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  fighting	  and	  the	  dire	  
situation	  the	  Marines	  were	  facing.	  Upon	  reaching	  the	  beach,	  the	  first	  waves	  
sustained	  heavy	  casualties	  or	  confusion	  from	  units	  getting	  mixed	  up	  among	  the	  
chaos	  in	  the	  water.	  One	  reprieve	  for	  the	  embattled	  Marines	  was	  a	  pier	  that	  jutted	  
roughly	  1,000	  yards	  over	  the	  reef	  and	  into	  deeper	  waters.70	  By	  late	  afternoon	  
American	  forces	  had	  only	  a	  marginal	  toehold	  on	  the	  beaches	  with	  the	  farthest	  
progress	  being	  150	  yards	  inland.71	  The	  Marines	  who	  had	  successfully	  made	  it	  off	  the	  
beach	  had	  their	  progress	  slowed	  by	  the	  extensive	  bunker	  complexes	  and	  machine	  
gun	  emplacements.	  Most	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  out	  one	  at	  a	  time	  and	  were	  difficult	  to	  see	  
because	  they	  were	  covered	  in	  earthwork	  and	  had	  narrow	  firing	  ports.	  The	  morning	  
took	  a	  heavy	  toll	  not	  just	  on	  men	  but	  also	  machines,	  as	  the	  AMTRACs	  became	  the	  
prime	  targets	  for	  Japanese	  gunners.	  The	  numbers	  of	  AMTRACs	  started	  with	  42	  in	  
the	  first	  wave,	  and	  went	  to	  24	  in	  the	  second,	  and	  21	  in	  the	  third;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Alexander,	  Across	  the	  Reef,	  17.	  
70	  Ibid,	  5.	  The	  pier	  provided	  cover	  for	  those	  who	  had	  to	  wade	  ashore.	  It	  also	  served	  an	  important	  
logistics	  role	  because	  supplies	  could	  be	  delivered	  to	  it	  and	  the	  wounded	  evacuated.	  
71	  Stockman	  21.	  There	  were	  three	  beaches	  selected	  for	  landings.	  Red	  Beach	  1,	  2,	  and	  3.	  Red	  Beach	  3	  




day	  the	  numbers	  of	  AMTRACs	  were	  so	  limited	  that	  they	  were	  restricted	  to	  moving	  
supplies	  to,	  and	  wounded	  from,	  the	  pier.72	  By	  nightfall	  commanders	  began	  to	  lose	  
confidence	  that	  they	  could	  defend	  against	  a	  mass	  Japanese	  charge	  such	  as	  the	  1st	  
Marine	  Division	  had	  experienced	  on	  Guadalcanal.	  They	  had	  units	  disorganized	  and	  
scattered	  all	  over	  with	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  among	  officers	  higher	  than	  among	  
enlisted	  men.	  The	  fear	  became	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  stage	  a	  massive	  offensive	  
that	  night.	  In	  the	  position	  they	  were	  in,	  Marine	  commanders	  knew	  if	  this	  attack	  
came,	  they	  would	  be	  driven	  right	  back	  into	  the	  ocean.	  As	  luck	  would	  have	  it,	  a	  shell	  
from	  the	  Naval	  bombardment	  killed	  the	  Japanese	  commander	  Shibasaki	  during	  the	  
initial	  bombardment,	  and	  all	  communication	  lines	  had	  been	  destroyed.	  This	  
occurrence	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  Japanese	  forces	  to	  organize	  and	  stage	  an	  
offensive	  big	  enough	  to	  kick	  the	  Americans	  off	  the	  beach.	  	  
The	  situation	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Day	  Two	  was	  that	  three	  assault	  battalions	  
held	  small	  toeholds	  on	  the	  beach;	  the	  third	  had	  gained	  the	  most	  ground	  pushing	  
only	  70	  yards	  inland.73	  Colonel	  Shoup,	  realizing	  his	  losses	  were	  heavy	  to	  his	  officers	  
and	  platoon	  sergeants,	  needed	  more	  men	  to	  help	  coordinate	  a	  push	  inland.	  Another	  
problem	  was	  that	  the	  6th	  Marine	  infantry	  regiment	  was	  held	  in	  reserve	  by	  Holland	  
Smith,	  giving	  the	  initial	  waves	  a	  mere	  2:1	  numerical	  superiority;	  Alexander	  explains,	  
“this	  was	  well	  below	  the	  doctrinal	  minimum.”74	  	  American	  forces	  would	  gain	  
momentum	  with	  the	  help	  of	  reinforcements	  landing	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  105mm	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  Alexander,	  Across	  the	  Reef	  18-­‐19.	  	  
73	  Sherrod,	  86.	  




pack	  howitzers	  the	  night	  before.	  	  Units	  from	  each	  beach	  started	  the	  slow	  push	  across	  
the	  sea	  wall	  and	  into	  the	  island.	  What	  they	  found	  was	  that	  the	  Japanese	  defenses	  
further	  in	  were	  more	  difficult	  to	  overcome	  and	  caused	  more	  casualties	  than	  did	  the	  
ones	  that	  had	  confronted	  the	  D-­‐Day	  landings.	  	  The	  arrival	  of	  heavy	  equipment	  
helped	  turn	  the	  momentum.	  However,	  Marines	  learned	  that	  the	  light	  tanks	  sent	  into	  
Tarawa	  were	  useless	  against	  reinforced	  bunkers,	  and	  that	  while	  the	  heavy	  tanks	  
were	  effective,	  they	  were	  extremely	  vulnerable	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  infantry.	  Several	  
times	  in	  the	  battle,	  tanks	  that	  were	  closed	  up	  fell	  into	  tank	  traps,	  ran	  over	  mines,	  or	  
were	  hit	  by	  concealed	  anti-­‐tank	  guns	  or	  Japanese	  suicide	  bombers.	  It	  became	  clear	  
that	  joint	  tank-­‐infantry	  tactics	  needed	  to	  be	  introduced	  in	  Marine	  Corps	  training.	  	  
There	  were	  also	  numerous	  cases	  of	  engineers	  being	  able	  to	  attack	  bunkers	  
with	  TNT,	  and	  flamethrowers	  proved	  how	  important	  they	  would	  be	  in	  forcing	  the	  
Japanese	  out	  of	  their	  bunkers.75	  Despite	  the	  small	  increase	  in	  momentum,	  the	  
situation	  was	  still	  bleak.	  On	  the	  water,	  hundreds	  of	  Marines	  continued	  to	  get	  shot	  up	  
as	  they	  waded	  ashore.	  Bodies	  became	  bloated	  and	  lifeless	  in	  the	  surf,	  and	  those	  that	  
washed	  ashore	  began	  decomposing	  in	  the	  oppressive	  Pacific	  heat.	  Sherrod	  summed	  
up	  the	  action	  early	  in	  the	  second	  day	  saying,	  “There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  hundred	  bodies	  
which	  do	  not	  move	  at	  all	  on	  the	  dry	  flats.“	  He	  continued.	  “This	  is	  worse,	  far	  worse	  
than	  it	  was	  yesterday.”76	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  The	  extreme	  heat	  from	  the	  flamethrowers	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  from	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  TNT	  caused	  many	  
Japanese	  soldiers	  to	  exit	  their	  fortifications.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  was	  Major	  Bill	  Chamberlin’s	  siege	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a	  Japanese	  command	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Alexander	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  Savagery,	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To	  many	  the	  condition	  ashore	  seemed	  similar	  to	  what	  they	  experienced	  the	  
previous	  day,	  and	  indeed	  it	  looked	  that	  way	  due	  to	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  and	  lack	  
of	  progress.	  However,	  a	  few	  officers	  such	  as	  Colonel	  Evans	  Carlson	  believed	  it	  had	  
stabilized	  somewhat.	  Shoup	  radioed	  from	  ashore	  asking	  for	  permission	  to	  release	  
the	  6th	  Marine	  regiment	  being	  held	  in	  reserve;	  this	  request	  was	  immediately	  
granted.	  With	  reinforcements	  and	  the	  artillery	  batteries	  operating,	  the	  momentum	  
shifted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Americans.	  Shoup	  revealed	  this	  change	  in	  one	  transmission	  
saying,	  “Casualties:	  many.	  Percentage	  of	  dead:	  unknown.	  Combat	  efficiency:	  we	  are	  
winning.”77	  	  
By	  Day	  Three	  the	  situation	  had	  completely	  changed.	  Supplies	  were	  now	  
flowing	  onto	  the	  pier,	  and	  Betio	  had	  been	  cut	  in	  half,	  pushing	  the	  Japanese	  into	  
pockets	  on	  the	  south	  side	  of	  the	  Island.	  Despite	  the	  failing	  Japanese	  defenses	  
American	  commanders	  feared	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  force	  the	  Marines	  to	  
eliminate	  them	  one	  at	  a	  time,	  inflicting	  as	  many	  casualties	  as	  possible.	  General	  Julian	  
Smith,	  now	  ashore	  assessing	  the	  operation,	  reported	  that	  progress	  was	  slow	  due	  to	  
strong	  Japanese	  resistance	  on	  the	  eastern	  end	  of	  the	  island	  and	  to	  the	  westward	  side	  
of	  their	  frontlines.	  He	  predicted,	  “Complete	  occupation	  will	  take	  at	  least	  five	  days	  
more.	  Naval	  and	  air	  bombardment	  a	  great	  help	  but	  does	  not	  take	  out	  
emplacements.”78	  This	  prediction	  would	  be	  proved	  wrong	  by	  the	  Japanese	  that	  night	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  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  174.	  




as	  they	  staged	  three	  major	  counter	  attacks.79	  The	  third	  was	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  
violent,	  resulting	  in	  the	  breaking	  of	  Marine	  lines.	  At	  0400	  nearly	  400	  Japanese	  
charged	  into	  the	  Marines	  resulting	  in	  fighting	  hand	  to	  hand.	  Lieutenant	  Norman	  
Thomas	  radioed	  for	  artillery	  support,	  “We	  are	  killing	  them	  as	  fast	  as	  they	  come	  at	  us,	  
but	  we	  can’t	  hold	  out	  much	  longer;	  we	  need	  reinforcements!”80	  Major	  William	  Jones	  
responded	  that	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  men	  and	  he	  had	  to	  hold.	  After	  the	  fighting	  
there	  were	  200	  Japanese	  bodies	  and	  body	  parts	  strewn	  across	  the	  battlefield	  and	  an	  
additional	  125	  lying	  farther	  away.	  American	  forces	  had	  40	  dead	  and	  100	  wounded.	  
Some	  haggard	  survivors	  looked	  at	  Major	  Jones	  telling	  him,	  “They	  told	  us	  we	  had	  to	  
hold,	  and	  by	  God	  we	  held.”81	  By	  late	  morning	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  sent	  the	  following	  
message	  to	  Admiral	  Harry	  Hill,	  “Decisive	  defeat	  heavy	  enemy	  counterattack	  last	  
night	  destroyed	  bulk	  of	  hostile	  resistance.	  Expect	  complete	  annihilation	  of	  enemy	  on	  
Betio	  this	  date.	  Strongly	  recommend	  that	  you	  and	  your	  chief	  of	  staff	  come	  ashore	  
this	  date	  to	  get	  information	  about	  the	  type	  of	  hostile	  defenses	  which	  will	  be	  
encountered	  in	  future	  operations.”82	  
After	  76	  violent	  hours,	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  announced	  Betio	  secured.	  Out	  of	  
nearly	  5,000	  enemy	  troops	  stationed	  there,	  only	  146	  were	  taken	  prisoner.	  83	  Most	  of	  
these	  prisoners	  were	  Korean	  laborers;	  only	  seven	  were	  Japanese.	  The	  view	  of	  Betio	  
is	  one	  the	  survivors	  wished	  they	  could	  forget.	  An	  island	  of	  less	  than	  a	  square	  mile	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  mass	  charges	  conducted	  by	  the	  Japanese	  resulted	  in	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  Marines	  crushing	  most	  of	  the	  
remaining	  resistance	  on	  the	  island	  ending	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  faster	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  predicted.	  
80Ibid,	  200.	  
81Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  201.	  
82	  Stockman,	  59.	  




was	  nothing	  but	  destruction	  and	  death.	  Palm	  trees	  were	  leveled,	  and	  shell	  holes	  
cratered	  the	  sandy	  rock	  making	  it	  look	  like	  the	  moon.	  Bodies	  and	  body	  parts	  rotted	  
and	  festered	  through	  stages	  of	  decomposition	  all	  over,	  some	  so	  badly	  mangled	  it	  
was	  hard	  to	  tell	  if	  they	  were	  American	  or	  Japanese.	  Robert	  Sherrod	  provides	  the	  
most	  descriptive	  image	  of	  the	  aftermath	  describing	  his	  tour	  of	  the	  island.	  
The	  ruptured	  and	  twisted	  bodies	  which	  expose	  their	  rotting	  inner	  organs	  are	  
inexpressibly	  repelling.	  Betio	  would	  be	  more	  habitable	  if	  the	  Marines	  could	  
leave	  for	  a	  few	  days	  and	  send	  a	  million	  buzzards	  in.	  The	  fire	  from	  a	  burning	  
pile	  of	  rubble	  has	  reached	  six	  nearby	  Jap	  bodies,	  which	  start	  to	  sizzle	  and	  pop	  
as	  the	  flame	  consumes	  flesh	  and	  gasses.	  Fifteen	  more	  are	  scattered	  around	  a	  
food	  dump,	  and	  two	  others	  are	  blown	  to	  a	  hundred	  pieces—a	  hand	  here,	  a	  
head	  there,	  a	  hobnailed	  foot	  farther	  away.84	  
This	  description	  provides	  readers	  with	  a	  strong	  picture	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  
battle	  and	  further	  reveals	  the	  gruesome	  realities	  of	  war,	  realities	  that	  the	  public	  was	  
not	  ready	  to	  accept.	  The	  battle	  concluded	  with	  Generals	  Julian	  Smith	  and	  Holland	  
Smith	  surveying	  the	  destruction.	  They	  were	  in	  awe	  of	  the	  defenses	  they	  saw,	  and	  
impressed	  that	  the	  Marines	  had	  kept	  pushing	  forward.	  They	  began	  to	  shed	  tears	  
seeing	  Marine	  dead	  scattered	  in	  the	  water	  and	  face	  down	  on	  the	  beach.	  They	  saw	  a	  
dead	  Marine	  with	  a	  landing	  marker	  placed	  by	  his	  outstretched	  hand	  telling	  other	  
landing	  parties	  where	  to	  go.	  Holland	  Smith,	  realizing	  the	  man	  died	  doing	  his	  job,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




asked,	  “How	  can	  such	  men	  be	  defeated?”85	  While	  this	  was	  a	  proud	  moment	  of	  
victory	  for	  the	  Marine	  Corps,	  the	  news	  that	  was	  returning	  home	  caused	  the	  public	  to	  
question	  the	  sacrifice.	  Those	  tragic	  words	  of	  “heavy	  casualties”	  sent	  a	  chill	  down	  the	  
spines	  of	  Americans.	  The	  reaction	  people	  had	  upon	  seeing	  the	  news	  of	  American	  
losses	  in	  such	  a	  distant	  world	  reveals	  much	  about	  their	  psychological	  state.	  Their	  
shock	  that	  men	  die	  in	  war	  reflects	  a	  nation	  mentally	  unprepared	  and	  reluctant	  to	  
give	  what	  it	  took	  to	  achieve	  victory.	  It	  would	  take	  the	  filming	  and	  documentation	  of	  
Robert	  Sherrod	  and	  Norman	  Hatch	  to	  provide	  the	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  
country	  should	  expect	  and	  what	  it	  was	  facing.	  To	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
American	  psyche	  prior	  to	  and	  going	  into	  the	  war,	  this	  study	  will	  now	  look	  at	  the	  
filming	  and	  documentation	  of	  Tarawa.	  It	  will	  reveal	  the	  martial	  naiveté	  that	  the	  
American	  public	  had	  and	  explore	  why	  the	  filming	  was	  so	  important	  in	  educating	  a	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chapter	  3:	  Heavy	  Casualties	  
Following	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  massive	  Japanese	  charge,	  organized	  resistance	  
collapsed.	  On	  23	  November	  1943,	  Betio	  was	  declared	  secured	  around	  1300.	  With	  
Betio	  under	  U.S.	  control,	  the	  drive	  began	  to	  secure	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  islands	  in	  the	  
Gilberts,	  which	  was	  successfully	  done	  with	  few	  losses.	  Also	  underway	  was	  the	  drive	  
for	  the	  correspondents	  to	  get	  their	  stories	  of	  the	  Marines’	  sacrifice	  out	  to	  the	  
American	  public.	  	  While	  many	  of	  the	  correspondents	  began	  their	  stories	  with	  good	  
intentions,	  their	  tales	  grew	  bigger	  and	  more	  embroidered	  the	  further	  away	  from	  the	  
battlefield	  they	  traveled.	  	  Historian	  Derrick	  Wright	  points	  out	  that	  Tarawa	  became	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  documented	  battles	  in	  U.S.	  history.	  86	  This	  documentation	  was	  the	  
result	  of	  a	  couple	  of	  factors.	  One	  was	  the	  new	  Photographic	  Section	  of	  the	  Marine	  
Corps,	  and	  the	  other	  was	  President	  Roosevelt’s	  loosening	  control	  of	  the	  media.	  
These	  two	  facts	  together	  allowed	  for	  raw	  images	  to	  be	  sent	  right	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  
hope	  was	  to	  educate	  people	  on	  the	  war	  to	  increase	  war	  bond	  sales.	  The	  sale	  of	  war	  
bonds	  had	  steadily	  dropped	  off	  as	  the	  fervor	  of	  Pearl	  Harbor	  faded.	  President	  
Roosevelt	  needed	  a	  boost	  in	  supporting	  the	  war	  effort	  and	  believed	  the	  only	  way	  to	  
do	  it	  was	  to	  bring	  the	  war	  home.	  The	  effort	  to	  raise	  awareness	  initially	  backfired	  
with	  the	  public	  becoming	  appalled	  at	  news	  featuring	  the	  feared	  phrase	  of	  “heavy	  
casualties.”	  The	  earliest	  case	  of	  this	  backfire	  had	  occurred	  in	  the	  New	  Guinea	  
campaign	  at	  the	  battle	  of	  Buna-­‐Gona.	  Life	  Magazine	  photojournalist	  George	  Strock	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




produced	  the	  first	  known	  picture	  of	  American	  dead	  during	  World	  War	  II.87	  The	  
photograph	  featured	  three	  dead	  Americans	  lying	  face	  down	  in	  the	  surf	  of	  Buna	  
Beach	  and	  made	  national	  news	  as	  many	  people	  witnessed	  American	  dead	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  since	  the	  Civil	  War.	  Up	  until	  then,	  military	  censors	  strictly	  forbade	  the	  
publication	  of	  photos	  of	  war	  dead.	  This	  censorship	  was	  done	  with	  the	  thinking	  that	  
the	  more	  positive	  the	  news,	  the	  more	  support	  people	  would	  give.	  This	  philosophy	  
worked	  to	  a	  point,	  but	  over	  time	  people	  became	  less	  interested	  in	  the	  war	  because	  
they	  were	  worrying	  about	  wages,	  race	  relations,	  and	  their	  personal	  lives.	  The	  fear	  
within	  the	  government	  and	  news	  media	  was	  that	  American	  society	  had	  grown	  
complacent	  in	  a	  war	  that	  was	  far	  from	  over.	  Senior	  Life	  correspondent	  Cal	  Whipple	  
is	  the	  man	  who	  fought	  the	  bureaucrats	  over	  loosening	  restrictions	  on	  the	  press.	  
Whipple	  believed	  that	  revealing	  this	  picture	  and	  others	  to	  people	  would	  give	  a	  
complacent	  America	  the	  reality	  it	  needed	  to	  bolster	  support	  behind	  the	  war	  effort.	  
To	  get	  these	  pictures	  Whipple	  wanted	  journalists	  to	  be	  able	  to	  get	  cleared	  to	  go	  
places	  where	  the	  fighting	  was	  and	  get	  more	  of	  their	  pictures	  cleared	  when	  they	  
returned	  home,88	  Whipple’s	  efforts	  to	  bypass	  censorship	  of	  wartime	  media	  paid	  off	  
as	  the	  photo	  was	  produced	  in	  September	  1943	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  other	  battles	  
to	  be	  documented	  more	  fully.	  The	  next	  battle	  following	  the	  release	  of	  Strock’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Ben	  Cosgrove,	  “Behind	  the	  picture:	  “Three	  Dead	  Americans,	  Buna	  Beach	  1943.”	  Fox	  News,	  18	  
October	  2013.	  http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/10/18/photo-­‐that-­‐won-­‐world-­‐war-­‐
ii/&amp;ts=noscript&amp;rnd=1382380716533.	  
88	  David	  Dunlap,	  “Cal	  Whipple,	  94,	  Dies;	  Won	  the	  1943	  Fight	  to	  Print	  Photo	  of	  War	  Dead.”	  New	  York	  





photograph	  was	  Tarawa	  and	  it	  captured	  the	  full	  fury	  of	  combat	  as	  it	  was	  the	  first	  
battle	  where	  correspondents	  were	  to	  experience	  a	  battle	  first	  hand.	  
Immediately	  after	  the	  battle	  of	  Tarawa	  the	  news	  broke,	  spreading	  across	  the	  
United	  States	  with	  headlines	  referencing	  heavy	  losses.	  	  Katherine	  Phillips,	  sister	  of	  
Sid	  Phillips	  of	  the	  1st	  Marine	  Division,	  was	  distraught	  and	  worried	  about	  her	  
brother.	  	  Upon	  hearing	  about	  Tarawa,	  she	  stated:	  	  
When	  we	  saw	  those	  first	  pictures	  of	  Tarawa,	  we	  were	  overcome,	  just	  
overcome.	  Those	  American	  boys’	  bodies	  just	  floating	  in	  the	  surf.	  It	  was	  just	  
devastating	  to	  us.	  We	  just	  sat	  around	  and	  cried,	  and	  I	  know	  that’s	  why	  they	  
had	  kept	  it	  from	  the	  American	  public	  for	  so	  long.	  Our	  dislike	  for	  the	  Japanese	  
was	  very	  violent.	  That	  they	  would	  do	  this	  to	  us.	  And	  would	  kill	  our	  boys	  like	  
that.	  And	  of	  course	  the	  idea	  was	  kill	  the	  Japs.	  I’m	  ashamed	  to	  say	  it,	  but	  that’s	  
the	  way	  it	  was.	  We	  just	  had	  to	  get	  that	  war	  over	  with.89	  .	  
Katherine	  Phillips	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  her	  fears	  that	  her	  brother	  was	  among	  
those	  killed	  on	  Betio.	  The	  pictures	  depicting	  the	  bloated	  bodies	  of	  dead	  Marines	  
floating	  helplessly	  in	  the	  surf	  and	  tangled	  in	  barbed	  wire	  with	  their	  heads	  blown	  off	  
nauseated	  much	  of	  the	  public.	  These	  images,	  combined	  with	  others	  featuring	  an	  
island	  completely	  ravaged	  by	  man’s	  destructive	  capabilities,	  were	  too	  shocking	  for	  
most	  to	  take	  in.	  People	  were	  now	  cognizant	  that	  machines	  alone	  could	  not	  win	  
battles;	  victory	  could	  be	  achieved	  only	  through	  flesh	  and	  blood.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




What	  concerned	  Americans	  the	  most	  were	  the	  losses	  sustained	  over	  a	  small	  
space	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  the	  Japanese	  mainland	  and	  in	  just	  76	  hours.	  On	  
a	  territory	  of	  less	  than	  one	  square	  mile	  in	  diameter,	  the	  Marines	  sustained	  
approximately	  3,133	  casualties,	  1,000	  of	  whom	  were	  killed.90	  This	  casualty	  figure	  
was	  similar	  to	  those	  sustained	  at	  Guadalcanal	  with	  the	  main	  difference	  being	  
Guadalcanal	  lasted	  six	  months.	  Hearing	  the	  numbers,	  the	  public,	  at	  least	  the	  part	  
represented	  by	  the	  media	  reacted	  with	  shock	  at	  the	  losses	  on	  such	  a	  small	  distant	  
place.	  Losses	  on	  Tarawa	  were	  listed	  at	  20%	  of	  the	  landing	  force,	  which	  was	  said	  to	  
be	  an	  acceptable	  number	  in	  a	  frontal	  attack	  against	  a	  fortified	  objective.91	  General	  
Holland	  Smith	  also	  commented	  on	  this	  statistic	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  The	  New	  York	  
Times.	  He	  said,	  “people	  should	  realize	  that	  the	  Marines	  on	  Tarawa	  killed	  four	  Japs	  
for	  every	  Marine	  that	  died.”	  Smith	  continued,	  “Americans	  should	  know	  that	  in	  an	  
offensive	  operation	  like	  this	  one	  you	  should	  expect	  to	  lose	  more	  than	  the	  enemy	  
does.”	  92	  
Despite	  General	  Smith’s	  defense	  of	  the	  losses,	  newspapers	  continued	  to	  print	  
lurid	  headlines	  and	  the	  public	  outcry	  grew	  louder.	  One	  article	  read,	  “The	  battle	  for	  
Betio,	  the	  fiercest,	  bloodiest	  and	  most	  ruthless	  I	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  two	  years	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Stockman,	  72.	  These	  numbers	  were	  eventually	  released	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  first	  newspaper	  to	  
discuss	  heavy	  casualties	  was	  by	  the	  Washington	  Post	  dated	  November	  27,	  1943	  and	  was	  titled	  “U.S.	  
Casualties	  Very	  heavy	  at	  Tarawa.”	  It	  did	  not	  release	  specific	  figures	  but	  later	  articles	  did.	  Later	  
articles	  began	  releasing	  approximate	  numbers.	  Articles	  produced	  in	  December	  released	  the	  figure	  of	  
1,026	  dead	  and	  2,557	  wounded.	  See	  “General	  Defends	  Tarawa	  Planning,”	  from	  the	  Washington	  Post	  
and	  Robert	  Turnbull’s	  “Tarawa	  Proved	  Marines’	  Mastery,”	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Times.	  
91	  Ibid,	  67.	  
92	  Robert	  Trumbull,	  By	  Telephone	  to	  THE	  NEW,YORK	  TIMES.	  1943.	  "TARAWA	  'PROVED'	  MARINES'	  




Pacific	  war,	  showed	  how	  long	  and	  costly	  that	  road	  will	  be.”93	  Another	  article	  
described	  the	  fight	  as	  the	  “toughest	  fight	  in	  Marine	  Corps	  history”	  and	  that	  losses	  
were	  “very	  heavy”.94	  	  In	  another	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  General	  Alexander	  
Vandegrift	  had	  to	  defend	  the	  operation	  when	  he	  was	  questioned	  by	  an	  inquiry	  
asking	  why	  the	  losses	  were	  so	  high.95	  One	  other	  article	  that	  was	  released	  read,	  
“Scenes	  of	  Horror	  remain	  on	  Betio,”	  and	  “Battleground	  of	  Tarawa	  Atoll	  a	  Ghastly	  
Picture	  of	  Dead	  Bodies	  and	  Destruction.”96	  General	  Julian	  Smith’s	  wife	  testified	  to	  
the	  media	  storm	  that	  ensued	  after	  Tarawa’s	  public	  appearance.	  She	  stated	  “our	  
unwavering	  love	  was	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  got	  us	  through	  the	  darks	  days	  of	  the	  battle	  
and	  its	  aftermath,	  when	  the	  brutal	  attacks	  by	  the	  press	  begin	  to	  appear	  in	  print.”97	  It	  
grew	  so	  loud	  that	  pressure	  was	  put	  on	  Congress	  to	  investigate	  the	  battle	  to	  
determine	  what	  had	  happened	  at	  Tarawa.98	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  joined	  the	  
debate	  when	  he	  went	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  War	  declaring,	  “These	  frontal	  assaults	  by	  
the	  Navy,	  as	  at	  Tarawa,	  are	  a	  tragic	  and	  unnecessary	  massacre	  of	  human	  lives.”	  
MacArthur	  then	  voiced	  his	  displeasure	  to	  President	  Roosevelt	  and	  Admiral	  Nimitz	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Henry	  Keys,	  “Betio	  Proves	  Tokyo	  Road	  Long,	  Rough,”	  Washington	  Post,	  November	  28,	  1943.	  
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.clemson.edu/hnpwashingtonpost/docview/151600680/756D
B252517642ECPQ/1?accountid=6167	  
94	  Richard	  Johnston,	  “Island	  Battle	  Called	  Toughest	  in	  History	  of	  Marine	  Corps,”	  Washington	  Post,	  
November	  27,	  1943.	  
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.clemson.edu/hnpwashingtonpost/docview/151587172/96867
BD3815D4463PQ/1?accountid=6167	  
95	  “VANDEGRIFT	  BACKS	  METHOD	  AT	  TARAWA.”	  (1943,	  Dec	  18).	  New	  York	  Times	  (1923-­‐Current	  File).	  
Retrieved	  from	  http://search.proquest.com/docview/106553896?accountid=6167	  
96	  “Scenes	  of	  Horror	  Remain	  on	  Betio,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  28,	  1943.	  
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.clemson.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/106740892/186026
6C63BC4BCBPQ/26?accountid=6167	  
97	  Harriotte	  Byrd	  Smith,	  But	  That’s	  Another	  Story	  (New	  York:	  Vantage	  Press,	  1992),	  243.	  




saying	  “Frontal	  assaults	  is	  only	  for	  mediocre	  commanders.	  Good	  commanders	  do	  
not	  turn	  in	  heavy	  losses.”99	  	  
It	  also	  did	  not	  help	  that	  General	  Holland	  Smith	  criticized	  the	  operation	  and	  
stated	  “costly	  mistakes	  had	  been	  made	  and	  that	  our	  reconnaissance	  had	  not	  
revealed	  all	  of	  the	  Jap	  installations.”100	  Holland	  Smith’s	  controversial	  statement	  
created	  tension	  throughout	  America	  and	  stirred	  the	  public’s	  emotion	  even	  more.	  It	  
also	  riled	  up	  senior	  officers	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  Tarawa	  invasion.	  Julian	  Smith	  
stated,	  “I	  am	  so	  mad	  I	  can	  hardly	  write,	  at	  an	  interview	  that	  Holland	  gave	  the	  press,	  
in	  which	  he	  made	  a	  lot	  of	  unwarranted	  statements	  .	  .	  .	  Neither	  of	  which	  were	  
true.”101	  Mentally,	  many	  Americans	  had	  taken	  a	  victory	  in	  a	  landmark	  operation	  and	  
viewed	  it	  as	  a	  tragic	  sacrifice.	  The	  battle	  for	  Betio	  was	  intense	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  but	  
after	  traveling	  from	  the	  front	  lines	  to	  rear	  echelon	  units	  the	  stories	  became	  bigger	  
and	  bolder.	  The	  papers	  were	  interested	  in	  selling	  papers	  more	  than	  the	  true	  stories	  
of	  courageous	  Marines	  protecting	  each	  other	  or	  of	  all	  the	  efforts	  that	  took	  place	  in	  
planning	  the	  operation.	  They	  instituted	  the	  use	  of	  what	  Robert	  Sherrod	  called	  vivid	  
verbs	  in	  their	  headlines.	  These	  verbs	  were	  used	  to	  grab	  the	  readers	  and	  stir	  their	  
emotions.	  Some	  examples	  of	  these	  headlines	  were	  “U.S.	  Casualties	  Very	  Heavy	  At	  
Tarawa,”	  “Nimitz	  Visits	  Death-­‐Laden	  Tarawa	  Atoll,”	  and	  “Bloody	  Betio.”	  While	  these	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  Ibid	  	  229.	  
100	  Julian	  C.	  Smith	  Letter	  to	  Harriotte	  Smith,	  24	  December	  1943,	  Julian	  C.	  Smith	  Collection,	  Personal	  
Papers	  Section,	  MCHC.	  This	  reference	  to	  Holland	  Smith	  was	  mentioned	  again	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  Julian	  
Smith	  to	  George	  Lockwood	  on	  December	  28,	  1943.	  	  In	  the	  letter	  Holland	  was	  described	  as	  being	  
upset	  because	  he	  was	  misquoted.	  However,	  in	  1948	  Holland	  published	  his	  memoirs	  in	  Coral	  and	  
Brass	  where	  he	  criticized	  the	  entire	  operation	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  a	  mistake.	  See	  Coral	  and	  Brass	  111-­‐
113,	  134.	  




headlines	  were	  not	  an	  exaggeration	  of	  the	  battle,	  they	  painted	  a	  more	  somber	  
picture	  than	  the	  public	  had	  seen	  before	  Tarawa.102	  	  The	  stories	  to	  accompany	  these	  
headlines	  were	  equally	  compelling.	  One	  article	  described	  a	  wounded	  man’s	  face	  as	  
“little	  more	  than	  a	  mass	  of	  butchered	  meat.”	  It	  continued,	  “The	  body	  twitched.	  
Improvised	  crimson-­‐stained	  bandages	  hid	  gaping	  holes	  in	  the	  bodies	  of	  others.”103	  
Other	  times	  the	  papers	  simply	  quoted	  what	  commanders	  and	  eyewitnesses	  said.	  	  
Two	  of	  the	  most	  scrutinized	  pieces	  came	  from	  Sergeant	  James	  G.	  Lucas	  and	  General	  
Holland	  Smith.	  Sergeant	  Lucas	  opened	  an	  editorial	  saying	  “Grim	  Tarawa	  Defense	  a	  
Surprise”	  and	  that	  “Marines	  Went	  in	  Chuckling,	  to	  find	  swift	  Death	  Instead	  of	  Easy	  
Conquest.”104	  General	  Holland	  Smith	  gave	  the	  media	  several	  quotations	  that	  
disturbed	  readers	  and	  angered	  senior	  commanders	  involved	  in	  the	  operation.	  	  One	  
of	  his	  earliest	  missteps	  came	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  correspondent.	  
He	  was	  asked	  what	  was	  the	  main	  factor	  for	  the	  victory,	  and	  he	  responded	  saying,	  “it	  
was	  willingness	  to	  die.”	  Later	  in	  the	  article	  Smith	  went	  on	  to	  say,	  “The	  Tarawa	  battle	  
could	  be	  likened	  to	  Pickett’s	  Charge	  in	  the	  Civil	  War.”105	  	  This	  was	  an	  odd	  
exaggeration,	  especially	  to	  be	  made	  by	  a	  senior	  commander	  involved	  in	  the	  
operation,	  but	  it	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  many	  readers	  around	  the	  country.	  These	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  not	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individual	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  Most	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  the	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  of	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  Reveals."	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Times	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  File),	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captions	  of	  Tarawa	  being	  a	  “surprise”	  and	  the	  Marines’	  “willingness	  to	  die”	  along	  
with	  the	  comparison	  to	  Pickett’s	  charge	  made	  the	  public	  furious	  with	  the	  losses	  
sustained.	  One	  woman	  wrote	  Admiral	  Nimitz	  after	  reading	  all	  the	  stories	  and	  
accused	  him	  of	  “murdering	  my	  son.”106	  This	  woman’s	  charge	  of	  murder	  paralleled	  
the	  media’s	  charge	  of	  misdeeds.	  These	  headlines	  and	  the	  public’s	  response	  to	  them	  
illustrated	  a	  society	  being	  influenced	  by	  the	  media	  and	  their	  lack	  of	  experience	  in	  
war.	  	  
Sherrod	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  outspoken	  critics	  against	  the	  public	  and	  the	  
media.	  He	  placed	  much	  the	  blame	  for	  America’s	  faintheartedness	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  
reporters	  had	  created	  trumped	  up	  stories	  to	  comfort	  people.	  	  What	  Sherrod	  knew	  
the	  common	  soldier	  wanted	  was	  for	  people	  to	  know	  that	  “we	  don’t	  knock	  the	  hell	  
out	  of	  em	  every	  day	  of	  every	  battle.”	  He	  continued,	  “wars	  are	  fought	  and	  war	  is	  
horrible.”107	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  also	  spoke	  out	  against	  the	  misinformation	  that	  
corrupted	  people’s	  minds.	  It	  one	  letter	  to	  his	  wife,	  Smith	  opened	  saying	  “There	  had	  
to	  be	  a	  Tarawa.	  It	  was	  a	  battle	  of	  firsts	  .	  .	  .	  It	  set	  the	  pattern	  for	  future	  amphibious	  
operations	  in	  the	  Central	  Pacific.”	  He	  continued,	  “It	  brought	  the	  grim	  reality	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  cheap	  shortcut	  to	  win	  wars.”108	  	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  media’s	  ability	  to	  shock	  and	  awe	  the	  public	  was	  the	  Marines’	  own	  
fault.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  an	  operation	  like	  this	  had	  ever	  been	  conducted.	  	  The	  
news	  prior	  to	  this	  point	  had	  been	  heavily	  censored	  to	  the	  point	  where	  even	  letters	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  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  229.	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  Sherrod,	  114-­‐115.	  




from	  soldiers	  home	  were	  expurgated.	  One	  military	  censor	  discovered	  four	  different	  
letters	  saying	  “I	  wish	  we	  could	  give	  you	  the	  story	  of	  the	  battle	  without	  all	  the	  
sugarcoating	  you	  see	  in	  the	  papers.”	  Or	  another	  from	  a	  sergeant	  read,	  “The	  war	  
being	  written	  about	  in	  the	  papers	  must	  be	  a	  different	  war	  from	  the	  one	  we	  see.”109	  
This	  editing	  indicates	  that	  what	  the	  people	  were	  seeing	  was	  much	  different	  from	  
what	  those	  actually	  fighting	  were	  seeing.	  What	  the	  people	  had	  been	  witnessing	  were	  
claims	  that	  their	  boys	  were	  speeding	  to	  victory,	  and	  the	  belief	  their	  military	  could	  
win	  the	  war	  with	  minimal	  losses.	  When	  War	  Bond	  sales	  dropped	  in	  May	  1943,	  the	  
President	  slackened	  restrictions	  on	  information	  coming	  home.	  His	  goal	  was	  to	  
educate	  people	  on	  the	  war’s	  difficulties	  to	  pick	  up	  support	  for	  the	  war	  effort.	  
President	  Roosevelt’s	  loosening	  of	  censorship	  of	  the	  war	  led	  to	  many	  news	  
correspondents	  lining	  up	  to	  see	  a	  battle	  up	  close,	  and	  what	  better	  story	  for	  them	  to	  
report	  than	  the	  first	  amphibious	  landing	  utilizing	  joint	  air,	  sea,	  and	  land	  forces.	  
These	  correspondents	  were	  given	  unique	  access	  to	  landing	  with	  the	  Marines	  in	  the	  
later	  waves	  of	  the	  assault	  force.	  Unfortunately	  the	  latter	  waves	  were	  the	  ones	  that	  
had	  to	  wade	  ashore	  after	  the	  AMTRACs	  had	  been	  shot	  out.	  	  This	  problem	  forced	  
reporters	  to	  witness	  the	  worst	  hell	  of	  the	  battle,	  and	  they	  simply	  reported	  what	  they	  
saw.	  This	  approach	  made	  it	  appear	  as	  though	  every	  Marine	  involved	  in	  the	  Betio	  
landings	  had	  to	  walk	  ashore	  in	  withering	  enemy	  fire.	  This	  description	  was	  further	  
complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  story	  of	  the	  reef-­‐crossing	  AMTRACs	  was	  withheld	  
from	  the	  public	  to	  protect	  future	  operations.	  After	  Betio	  senior	  officials	  realized	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




key	  to	  unlocking	  the	  Pacific	  were	  the	  AMTRACs.	  These	  planners	  feared	  that	  
reporting	  on	  these	  vehicles	  would	  enable	  the	  Japanese	  to	  adapt	  to	  American	  
strategy	  and	  be	  prepared.	  Hiding	  this	  story	  from	  the	  public,	  along	  with	  the	  reporters	  
all	  having	  to	  wade	  ashore,	  did	  two	  key	  things.	  One	  was	  that	  it	  strengthened	  the	  
belief	  that	  every	  Marine	  had	  to	  walk	  hundreds	  of	  yards	  ashore.	  The	  other	  was	  it	  
gave	  merit	  to	  General	  Holland	  Smith’s	  argument	  that	  many	  mistakes	  were	  made	  
because	  it	  appeared	  that	  there	  was	  faulty	  intelligence	  on	  the	  reef.110	  The	  
combination	  of	  these	  dynamics	  provided	  the	  impression	  that	  most	  men	  were	  
helplessly	  killed	  in	  the	  water	  because	  of	  flawed	  intelligence.	  What	  failed	  to	  be	  
reported	  was	  that	  75%	  of	  the	  casualties	  occurred	  inland,	  and	  that	  the	  first	  wave	  
landed	  without	  excessive	  losses.111	  	  
Despite	  the	  factual	  information	  presented	  by	  the	  senior	  commanders	  
Americans	  were	  still	  shocked	  by	  the	  number	  of	  dead	  in	  three	  days	  of	  fighting.	  This	  
reaction	  of	  shock	  brings	  up	  Sherrod’s	  question	  of,	  “Why	  did	  so	  many	  Americans	  
throw	  up	  their	  hands	  at	  the	  heavy	  losses	  on	  Tarawa?	  “112	  What	  led	  to	  so	  many	  
thinking	  that	  this	  war	  was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  clean	  war	  and	  that	  no	  one	  would	  suffer?	  
These	  questions	  led	  to	  many	  survivors	  of	  Betio	  and	  those	  commanding	  the	  
operation	  to	  question	  how	  America	  would	  react	  to	  future	  operations	  closer	  to	  Japan	  
with	  a	  much	  higher	  casualty	  rate.	  It	  was	  of	  grave	  concern	  to	  military	  planners	  in	  the	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  was	  the	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into	  the	  battle.	  That	  is	  why	  there	  was	  a	  fight	  between	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  and	  the	  Navy	  to	  acquire	  more	  
AMTRACs,	  because	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  reef.	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  Collection,	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  Section,	  MCHC.	  	  




Pacific,	  Europe,	  and	  to	  the	  President.	  President	  Roosevelt	  realized	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
general,	  but	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people	  that	  dictates	  the	  outcome	  of	  war.	  Without	  their	  
support	  of	  the	  war	  effort,	  those	  losses	  suffered	  would	  be	  for	  nothing,	  and	  society’s	  
ardor	  was	  already	  dampened	  by	  Tarawa’s	  losses.	  If	  they	  sustained	  another	  costly	  
landing,	  which	  all	  officers	  knew	  they	  would,	  the	  fear	  became	  that	  America	  would	  
succumb	  to	  the	  Japanese	  strategy	  of	  a	  war	  of	  attrition.	  Japanese	  leaders	  realized	  
they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  economic	  means	  or	  manpower	  to	  defeat	  the	  United	  States.	  
They	  just	  had	  to	  drag	  on	  the	  war	  and	  inflict	  so	  many	  losses	  that	  the	  American	  public	  
would	  demand	  an	  end.	  President	  Roosevelt	  needed	  something	  to	  help	  educate	  
people	  on	  what	  it	  was	  going	  to	  take	  to	  win	  this	  battle	  against	  a	  fanatical	  foe	  and	  the	  
significance	  of	  such	  a	  small	  place	  so	  far	  away	  from	  Japan.	  What	  he	  needed	  would	  














Chapter	  4:	  The	  Film	  that	  Changed	  America	  
	  
Sergeant	  Norman	  Hatch,	  a	  native	  of	  Gloucester,	  Massachusetts,	  became	  a	  
Marine	  after	  having	  no	  direction	  in	  his	  life	  after	  high	  school	  and	  growing	  up	  in	  a	  
family	  struggling	  from	  the	  Depression.	  He	  was	  originally	  planning	  to	  enlist	  in	  the	  
Navy;	  delays	  in	  his	  enlistment	  date	  frustrated	  him	  and	  drove	  him	  to	  the	  Marine	  
recruiting	  station.	  When	  Hatch	  asked	  how	  long	  it	  would	  take	  to	  enlist,	  the	  recruiter	  
responded,	  “When	  do	  you	  want	  to	  go?	  Friday	  or	  two	  weeks	  from	  Friday?”113	  Soon	  
after	  in1939	  he	  was	  on	  a	  train	  headed	  to	  Parris	  Island,	  South	  Carolina,	  for	  Marine	  
Corps	  boot	  camp.	  Hatch	  spent	  several	  months	  working	  for	  Leatherneck	  Magazine	  
before	  transferring	  to	  a	  new	  special	  unit	  started	  by	  the	  Marine	  Corps,	  the	  Combat	  
Cinematography	  Division.	  Its	  purpose	  was	  to	  chronicle	  the	  exploits	  of	  the	  Marines	  as	  
other	  services	  had	  already	  done.	  They	  would	  produce	  both	  still	  photos	  and	  moving	  
picture	  films	  in	  an	  effort	  not	  only	  to	  capture	  Marine	  Corps	  history	  but	  also	  to	  
educate	  people	  on	  the	  Marines.	  Marine	  Corps	  officers	  realized	  the	  importance	  of	  
documenting	  their	  exploits	  for	  historical	  purposes.	  They	  also	  understood	  that	  they	  
lagged	  far	  behind	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  in	  providing	  frontline	  coverage	  to	  the	  public.	  
This	  gap	  came	  to	  be	  realized	  with	  the	  gallant	  defense	  of	  Wake	  Island	  by	  Major	  James	  
Devereux.	  Major	  Devereux	  put	  up	  a	  stiff	  fight	  against	  overwhelming	  odds,	  yet	  there	  
was	  no	  one	  there	  to	  film	  or	  photograph	  the	  actual	  battle.114	  A	  movie	  about	  Wake	  
Island	  was	  produced	  in	  1942	  but	  it	  was	  scripted	  and	  filmed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	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Paramount	  Pictures	  using	  actors.	  It	  was	  critically	  acclaimed	  but	  was	  full	  of	  
inaccuracies	  proving	  to	  be	  more	  propaganda	  than	  facts.	  	  It	  was	  also	  realized	  that	  
many	  of	  the	  communiqués	  about	  the	  war	  were	  inaccurate,	  dry	  propaganda	  that	  
sought	  to	  bring	  comfort	  to	  those	  not	  on	  the	  front	  lines.	  When	  the	  division	  was	  first	  
established	  at	  Quantico,	  Virginia,	  Norman	  Hatch	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  sent	  to	  begin	  
learning	  filming	  techniques	  from	  people	  with	  Hollywood	  experience.	  	  
Training	  commenced	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1942	  at	  Quantico.	  Hatch	  learned	  from	  	  
Hollywood	  directors	  and	  cinematographers	  how	  to	  quickly	  set	  up	  and	  get	  the	  best	  
shots.	  He	  also	  had	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  do	  it	  while	  moving	  around	  quickly	  in	  the	  woods,	  
enduring	  Virginia’s	  infamous	  summer	  heat	  and	  humidity	  around	  the	  swamps	  and	  
marshes	  of	  the	  Potomac	  River.	  	  As	  their	  training	  went	  on	  the	  1st	  Marine	  Division	  was	  
making	  a	  name	  for	  itself	  on	  Guadalcanal.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  1st	  Marine	  Division	  
made	  them	  heroes	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  their	  victory	  was	  not	  as	  well	  documented	  as	  John	  
Ford’s	  The	  Battle	  of	  Midway.	  Ford’s	  documentary	  became	  the	  first	  combat	  footage	  in	  
history,	  which	  excited	  Hatch	  and	  members	  of	  his	  unit.	  The	  Combat	  Cinematography	  
division	  was	  then	  attached	  to	  the	  2nd	  Marine	  Division	  upon	  its	  being	  shipped	  to	  New	  
Zealand	  while	  plans	  for	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  drive	  were	  underway.	  Sergeant	  Hatch	  
had	  no	  idea	  that	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  invasion	  of	  Betio	  would	  have	  such	  a	  
profound	  impact	  on	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  as	  well	  as	  on	  American	  society.	  
Sergeant	  Hatch	  was	  positioned	  in	  a	  Higgins	  boat	  under	  the	  command	  of	  
Major	  Jim	  Crowe.	  	  As	  Hatch	  and	  his	  boat	  approached	  the	  shore	  they	  came	  under	  




the	  reef.115	  This	  decision	  meant	  that	  Hatch	  would	  get	  to	  experience	  the	  terror	  of	  
wading	  500	  yards	  ashore	  carrying	  a	  variety	  of	  gear	  that	  could	  not	  get	  wet.	  On	  top	  of	  
that,	  he	  had	  to	  do	  it	  without	  getting	  shot	  to	  pieces.	  Once	  Hatch	  made	  it	  ashore	  he	  
hesitated	  to	  start	  filming	  due	  to	  being	  tired	  and	  in	  a	  state	  of	  shock	  from	  the	  intense	  
fire.	  As	  soon	  as	  he	  witnessed	  a	  man	  near	  him	  have	  his	  buttocks	  blown	  off	  he	  realized	  
he	  needed	  to	  do	  his	  job.116	  Once	  he	  gained	  his	  bearings,	  he	  and	  his	  partner	  Kelly	  
Kelliner	  began	  setting	  up	  their	  equipment	  to	  capture	  the	  fighting.	  At	  the	  time	  Hatch	  
thought	  he	  was	  just	  doing	  his	  job	  filming	  the	  events	  to	  document	  the	  battle.	  What	  he	  
did	  not	  realize	  was	  that	  he	  was	  capturing	  the	  real	  and	  brutal	  nature	  of	  war	  that	  
would	  be	  shown	  to	  an	  American	  public	  that	  had	  not	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  ferocity	  of	  a	  
battle.	  He	  captured	  the	  slaughter	  of	  Marines	  getting	  blown	  to	  pieces	  by	  the	  Japanese	  
75-­‐mm	  antiaircraft	  guns,	  bodies	  and	  body	  parts	  floating	  in	  the	  surf,	  and	  corpsmen	  
either	  treating	  the	  wounded	  or	  covering	  the	  dead	  with	  ponchos.	  All	  of	  these	  images	  
were	  somber	  even	  for	  the	  most	  battle-­‐hardened	  veterans	  to	  stomach	  let	  alone	  
America’s	  naive	  civilians.	  Hatch’s	  signature	  scene	  came	  at	  Major	  Chamberlain’s	  
assault	  on	  a	  Japanese	  bunker.	  The	  Japanese	  came	  pouring	  out	  and	  were	  cut	  down	  by	  
the	  Marine	  riflemen.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  and	  one	  of	  the	  few	  times	  the	  Japanese	  and	  
Americans	  would	  be	  captured	  on	  film	  fighting	  in	  close	  combat.117	  	  
	   Tarawa	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  documented	  battles	  in	  warfare.	  Between	  all	  
the	  correspondents	  and	  film	  crews,	  900	  still	  photos	  were	  taken;	  2,500	  feet	  of	  black	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and	  white	  film,	  and	  5,000	  feet	  of	  color	  film	  were	  shot.118	  Sergeant	  Hatch	  sealed	  up	  
all	  of	  his	  equipment	  and	  put	  it	  on	  a	  flying	  boat	  plane	  bound	  for	  Washington,	  D.C.	  He	  
had	  no	  idea	  just	  how	  powerful	  his	  film	  would	  be.	  All	  Hatch	  was	  concerned	  about	  was	  
the	  fact	  he	  had	  survived	  and	  that	  he	  was	  headed	  home.	  After	  a	  long	  trip	  back	  to	  
Hawaii,	  Hatch	  started	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  up	  his	  camp	  and	  preparing	  his	  mind	  for	  
training	  when	  he	  received	  orders	  to	  immediately	  head	  to	  Washington	  for	  a	  
debriefing	  about	  his	  film.	  Hatch	  thought	  initially	  that	  he	  was	  in	  trouble	  and	  had	  
messed	  up	  by	  overexposing	  the	  film	  or	  getting	  dirt	  in	  the	  lens.	  Regardless	  of	  his	  
paranoia,	  all	  he	  could	  do	  is	  get	  on	  a	  plane	  and	  face	  whatever	  was	  going	  to	  happen.	  
He	  voiced	  his	  fears	  to	  historian	  Charles	  Jones	  saying,	  “I	  thought	  I	  was	  going	  to	  have	  
my	  sword	  broken	  and	  my	  epaulets	  torn	  off	  because	  I	  hadn’t	  done	  any	  good.”	  He	  
continued,	  “The	  first	  time	  you’re	  doing	  something	  in	  combat,	  you	  can	  forget	  to	  
change	  your	  lens	  .	  .	  .	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  things	  that	  could	  happen.”119	  What	  he	  
was	  unaware	  of	  was	  that	  he	  was	  actually	  being	  flown	  in	  to	  help	  edit	  the	  film	  to	  be	  
shown	  in	  movie	  theaters	  across	  the	  country.	  	  
	   On	  the	  long	  flight	  back	  to	  D.C.,	  Hatch	  reminisced	  about	  all	  he	  had	  experienced	  
on	  Betio.	  Through	  his	  reflections	  he	  realized	  why	  his	  work	  was	  so	  important	  and	  
that	  was	  to	  provide	  truth	  to	  the	  public	  about	  the	  realism	  of	  combat	  operations.	  The	  
films	  produced	  by	  the	  Combat	  Cinematography	  Division	  would	  provide	  the	  public	  
with	  the	  unclean	  images	  of	  warfare.	  They	  would	  finally	  see	  something	  dirty	  and	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grim	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Hollywood	  versions	  featuring	  handsome	  actors	  like	  
Humphrey	  Bogart,	  or	  depicting	  brawny	  Americans	  beating	  the	  enemy	  without	  
breaking	  a	  sweat.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  Marine,	  those	  movies	  were	  the	  “kind	  of	  crap	  
gives	  the	  folks	  back	  home	  the	  wrong	  kind	  of	  idea	  about	  what	  we	  are	  up	  against.”120	  
Hatch	  arrived	  in	  San	  Francisco	  on	  15	  December	  1943	  and	  he	  was	  introduced	  to	  
World	  War	  I	  veteran	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Dan	  Bender.	  As	  they	  proceeded	  to	  their	  
next	  stop	  Bender	  took	  him	  down	  Main	  Street	  and	  asked	  him	  what	  he	  noticed.	  Hatch	  
was	  astonished	  to	  find	  the	  marquees	  above	  movie	  theaters	  promoting	  newsreel	  
footage	  called	  “Marines	  Fighting	  at	  Tarawa.”121	  Even	  more	  jaw	  dropping	  for	  Hatch	  
was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  theatres	  gave	  credit	  to	  him	  as	  the	  one	  who	  captured	  the	  
footage.	  	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Bender	  had	  realized	  the	  public	  was	  faint	  of	  heart,	  and	  
being	  a	  veteran	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  he	  knew	  what	  war	  was	  all	  about.	  Bender	  was	  aware	  
that	  the	  news	  being	  reported	  was	  sensationalized	  and	  inaccurate.	  He	  explained	  to	  
Hatch	  that	  he	  picked	  up	  the	  raw	  footage	  from	  the	  plane	  and	  viewed	  it	  before	  sending	  
it	  to	  Washington	  for	  processing.	  Bender	  immediately	  saw	  the	  film	  as	  being	  the	  cure	  
for	  the	  public’s	  martial	  naiveté.	  The	  main	  issue	  became	  the	  violence	  exhibited	  in	  
Hatch’s	  film.	  Movies	  in	  that	  era	  did	  not	  reveal	  the	  violence	  and	  gore	  that	  people	  
often	  see	  in	  movies	  today.	  They	  were	  more	  classy	  and	  romantic	  than	  they	  were	  
action	  packed.	  Even	  the	  newsreels	  played	  before	  movies	  pushing	  for	  war	  bond	  sales	  
or	  giving	  news	  about	  the	  war	  was	  propaganda	  providing	  false	  information	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






success	  without	  the	  sacrifice.	  This	  inaccuracy	  was	  another	  criticism	  discussed	  by	  
Robert	  Sherrod	  saying	  “Our	  information	  services	  had	  failed	  to	  impress	  the	  people	  
with	  the	  hard	  facts	  of	  the	  war	  .	  .	  .	  our	  communiqués	  gave	  the	  impression	  we	  were	  
bowling	  over	  the	  enemy	  every	  time	  our	  bombers	  dropped	  a	  few	  pitiful	  tons	  of	  
bombs.”122	  Many	  officials	  who	  viewed	  the	  film	  thought	  that	  its	  graphic	  nature	  would	  
be	  too	  much	  for	  a	  public,	  which	  was	  already	  up	  in	  arms	  over	  the	  pictures,	  and	  news	  
stories	  they	  were	  reading.	  The	  fear	  was	  there	  would	  be	  an	  even	  bigger	  uproar,	  
perhaps	  starting	  open	  protests	  against	  the	  war	  and	  a	  bigger	  drop	  in	  the	  war	  effort.	  
However,	  it	  did	  present	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  reveal	  to	  Americans	  what	  they	  were	  
facing	  and	  how	  hard	  a	  fight	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be.	  It	  could	  be	  what	  was	  needed	  to	  renew	  
their	  interest	  in	  the	  war	  effort	  and	  convince	  the	  industrial	  leaders	  to	  avoid	  strikes	  to	  
ensure	  maximum	  production	  for	  U.S.	  service	  members.123	  This	  film	  would	  erase	  the	  
idea	  that	  Americans	  could	  win	  this	  fight	  with	  machines.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  would	  
back	  the	  warning	  to	  America	  by	  Marine	  Commandant,	  Lieutenant	  General	  Alexander	  
Vandegrift.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  he	  warned	  that	  losses	  in	  
future	  operations	  would	  be	  heavier	  than	  Tarawa.	  He	  also	  informed	  people	  they	  
needed	  to	  realize	  that	  “the	  war	  is	  now	  past	  the	  period	  when	  victories	  can	  be	  won	  at	  
a	  low	  cost.”124	  His	  warning	  was	  chilling	  to	  society	  and	  more	  frightening	  in	  that	  it	  was	  
true.	  General	  Vandegrift	  did	  not	  confine	  this	  statement	  to	  only	  the	  Pacific	  campaign	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but	  included	  Europe	  as	  well.	  His	  defense	  was	  that	  the	  Germans	  and	  Japanese	  were	  
backed	  into	  a	  corner	  and	  they	  would	  fight	  bitterly	  for	  the	  territory	  they	  had	  left.	  
While	  this	  prediction	  was	  widely	  accepted	  among	  leading	  officers,	  civilians	  had	  a	  
tough	  time	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  it.	  Sergeant	  Hatch’s	  film	  would	  unveil	  all	  of	  these	  
problems	  to	  the	  people.	  All	  that	  was	  needed	  to	  release	  the	  film	  was	  President	  
Roosevelt’s	  approval.	  
	   As	  controversy	  continued	  to	  swirl	  and	  the	  film	  was	  being	  edited,	  the	  Marines	  
relied	  on	  Colonel	  Mike	  Edson	  to	  try	  to	  quell	  the	  misinformation	  that	  had	  been	  
released	  about	  Betio.	  Well	  spoken,	  direct,	  and	  articulate,	  Edson	  was	  also	  considered	  
a	  hero	  in	  the	  Battle	  for	  Guadalcanal,	  having	  won	  the	  Congressional	  Medal	  of	  Honor.	  
This	  status	  made	  him	  an	  ideal	  choice	  to	  combat	  the	  bad	  press.	  Colonel	  Edson	  was	  
also	  one	  who	  realized	  the	  difficulties	  in	  fighting	  the	  Japanese.	  He	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  decorated	  Marines	  of	  the	  time	  and	  had	  engaged	  in	  close	  combat	  against	  them	  
in	  Guadalcanal.	  He	  discussed	  his	  experiences	  with	  Sherrod	  before	  the	  battle	  began:	  
that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  tough	  fighters	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  “could	  not	  count	  on	  
heavy	  naval	  or	  air	  bombardment	  to	  kill	  all	  the	  Japs	  on	  Tarawa	  or	  even	  a	  large	  
portion	  of	  them.”125	  Edson	  also	  reiterated	  the	  point	  made	  by	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  
that	  the	  casualties,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  operation,	  were	  tragic	  but	  acceptable,	  and	  
that	  the	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  were	  only	  going	  to	  get	  worse	  before	  they	  got	  better.	  
Edson	  continued	  meeting	  with	  news	  correspondents	  dispelling	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  
was	  bad	  intelligence	  on	  the	  reef.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  they	  knew	  about	  the	  reef,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




but	  were	  unsure	  of	  what	  the	  tides	  would	  be	  like.	  This	  was	  different	  than	  early	  
reports	  that	  made	  it	  seem	  like	  the	  United	  States	  had	  little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
protective	  reef	  surrounding	  it.	  In	  one	  example	  a	  Washington	  Post	  article	  reported:	  
	  “A	  shelving	  reef	  hung	  up	  most	  of	  the	  Higgins	  boats	  and	  wave	  after	  wave	  of	  infantry	  
had	  to	  struggle	  500	  yards	  through	  water	  neck	  deep	  under	  a	  murderous	  Japanese	  
barrage.	  At	  low	  tide	  many	  of	  their	  bodies	  dot	  the	  reef.”126	  The	  other	  point	  of	  
contention	  was	  that	  most	  Marines	  died	  in	  the	  water:	  he	  reaffirmed	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
losses	  happened	  inland	  among	  the	  pillboxes	  and	  trenches.127	  He	  finally	  warned	  the	  
people	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  fighters	  the	  Japanese	  were,	  mentioning	  their	  fanaticism	  and	  
their	  desire	  “to	  make	  the	  campaigns	  as	  costly	  as	  possible	  because	  they	  don’t	  believe	  
we	  can	  take	  it.”128	  
	   While	  Edson	  defended	  the	  operation,	  Hatch	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  
Washington	  and	  Hollywood	  to	  finish	  the	  film.	  Famous	  actor-­‐turned-­‐	  director	  Lewis	  
Hayward	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  photographic	  section	  of	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  and	  sent	  to	  
Washington	  to	  work	  on	  the	  documentary	  combining	  all	  the	  images	  and	  film	  from	  the	  
battle.	  Hatch	  was	  sent	  to	  work	  with	  Hollywood	  director	  Frank	  Capra.	  The	  Italian-­‐
born	  Capra	  had	  produced	  a	  number	  of	  hit	  films	  in	  Hollywood	  and	  was	  recruited	  by	  
the	  War	  Activities	  Commission	  (WAC)	  to	  create	  short	  films	  to	  show	  in	  the	  movie	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  Richard	  W	  Johnston	  Representing	  the	  Combined	  American	  Press	  (Distributed	  by	  the	  	  Associated	  
Press.	  1943.	  "Island	  Battle	  Called	  Toughest	  in	  History	  of	  Marine	  Corps."	  The	  Washington	  Post	  (1923-­‐
1954),	  Nov	  27,	  1.	  http://search.proquest.com/docview/151587172?accountid=6167.	  
127	  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  230-­‐231.This	  perception	  of	  that	  most	  of	  the	  casualties	  sustained	  
were	  on	  the	  reef	  and	  water	  was	  created	  by	  the	  way	  the	  press	  covered	  the	  story.	  Nearly	  all	  of	  the	  
photographs	  of	  dead	  Marines	  were	  taken	  with	  them	  on	  the	  beach,	  tangled	  in	  barded	  wire	  on	  the	  
beaches,	  floating	  in	  the	  water,	  or	  draped	  over	  disabled	  landing	  crafts	  on	  the	  reef.	  There	  was	  little	  





theatres	  across	  the	  country.	  Capra	  was	  desperate	  for	  something	  new,	  having	  grown	  
tired	  of	  seeing	  far	  away	  shots	  of	  shore	  bombardments,	  dog	  fights,	  and	  footage	  of	  
Naval	  task	  forces	  underway.	  Hatch’s	  rare	  footage	  of	  Japanese	  battling	  Marines	  up	  
close	  gave	  Capra	  a	  new	  and	  fresh	  take	  on	  the	  war.	  Capra	  recognized	  the	  dramatic	  
images	  and	  footage	  would	  captivate	  the	  minds	  of	  people	  across	  America.	  He	  was	  a	  
good	  person	  to	  have	  a	  connection	  with	  because	  of	  the	  famous	  director’s	  connection	  
to	  the	  WAC.	  This	  connection	  promised	  to	  secure	  16,500	  movie	  theatres	  that	  would	  
allocate	  ten	  percent	  of	  their	  screen	  time	  to	  government-­‐sponsored	  films	  that	  would	  
be	  free	  of	  charge	  to	  the	  public.129	  What	  was	  significant	  about	  this	  was	  the	  popularity	  
of	  movie	  theatres	  across	  the	  country.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  cities	  and	  urbanization	  across	  
the	  country,	  more	  and	  more	  people	  were	  attracted	  to	  the	  new	  forms	  of	  
entertainment.	  Movies	  were	  relatively	  inexpensive,	  and	  they	  were	  extraordinary	  
pieces	  of	  technology	  of	  the	  time.	  They	  attracted	  audiences	  young	  and	  old,	  and	  now	  
they	  were	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  advertise	  the	  first	  documentary	  showing	  actual	  
Marines	  fighting	  a	  real	  battle	  up	  close	  with	  the	  Japanese.	  With	  Capra	  assisting	  in	  the	  
production	  of	  the	  film	  and	  Lewis	  Hayward	  directing	  it,	  production	  companies	  
quickly	  acquired	  it	  so	  that	  they	  could	  show	  it.	  The	  film	  still	  provoked	  questions,	  the	  
main	  one	  being	  whether	  the	  public	  was	  psychologically	  ready	  to	  see	  it.	  	  
	   President	  Roosevelt	  went	  back	  and	  forth	  on	  the	  issue.	  He	  had	  been	  put	  to	  the	  
test	  time	  and	  time	  again	  during	  his	  presidency,	  and	  now	  he	  had	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  
on	  a	  film	  that	  could	  either	  help	  or	  hinder	  the	  war	  effort.	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  film,	  





President	  Roosevelt	  was	  a	  good	  friend	  of	  Robert	  Sherrod.	  At	  a	  White	  House	  
correspondents	  dinner,	  Roosevelt	  saw	  Sherrod.	  Knowing	  Sherrod	  had	  witnessed	  the	  
battle,	  he	  decided	  to	  base	  his	  decision	  on	  the	  journalist’s	  advice.	  President	  Roosevelt	  
asked	  Sherrod	  for	  a	  private	  conversation,	  to	  discuss	  the	  film.	  	  Roosevelt	  asked	  
Sherrod	  if	  he	  had	  seen	  the	  gruesome	  images	  of	  the	  film,	  and	  Sherrod	  acknowledged	  
that	  he	  had.	  When	  asked	  if	  he	  thought	  the	  film	  needed	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  the	  public,	  
Sherrod	  responded	  saying,	  “Gruesome,	  yes,	  Mr.	  President;	  but	  that’s	  the	  way	  war	  is	  
out	  there,	  and	  I	  think	  the	  people	  are	  going	  to	  have	  to	  get	  used	  to	  that	  idea.”130	  
Sherrod	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  the	  President	  that	  the	  American	  people	  did	  not	  understand	  
the	  war.	  This	  error	  in	  understanding	  could	  have	  resulted	  in	  far	  worse	  consequences	  
with	  the	  losses	  America	  would	  sustain	  at	  places	  like	  Saipan,	  Guam,	  Iwo	  Jima,	  and	  
Okinawa.	  President	  Roosevelt	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  the	  film,	  so	  it	  was	  released	  
without	  restriction	  on	  2	  March	  1944.	  The	  newsreel	  companies	  such	  as	  Fox	  
Movietone,	  Paramount,	  and	  Universal	  jumped	  at	  the	  chance	  to	  show	  the	  first	  up-­‐
close	  fight	  of	  a	  battle	  in	  the	  theaters.	  Learning	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐minute	  newsreel	  people	  
flocked	  to	  the	  theaters	  to	  experience	  the	  Battle	  for	  Betio.	  The	  film	  received	  
overwhelming	  praise	  for	  its	  realism	  and	  truthful	  treatment	  of	  the	  war.	  One	  of	  the	  
greatest	  impacts	  it	  had	  on	  people	  was	  the	  accurate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
soldier.	  No	  longer	  did	  people	  have	  the	  images	  of	  the	  Japanese	  as	  being	  animal-­‐like	  in	  
their	  appearance	  as	  created	  by	  American	  propagandists.	  Those	  primate	  features	  
given	  to	  the	  Japanese	  created	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  inferior	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




lacked	  the	  mental	  and	  physical	  fortitude	  to	  stand	  and	  fight	  the	  American	  military.	  
This	  misrepresentation	  furthered	  the	  idea	  that	  Americans	  were	  fighting	  an	  easy	  war	  
that	  they	  would	  win	  quickly	  with	  machines.	  	  Hatch’s	  film	  told	  a	  far	  different	  story,	  
however,	  with	  people	  seeing	  a	  strong,	  intelligent,	  and	  courageous	  foe	  that	  would	  
fight	  to	  the	  death.	  	  
	   With	  the	  Marines	  at	  Tarawa	  hit	  the	  theaters	  across	  America.	  Just	  as	  Tarawa	  
was	  the	  first	  amphibious	  assault	  conducted	  against	  a	  fortified	  position,	  this	  film	  was	  
the	  first	  of	  its	  kind.	  In	  comparison,	  other	  wartime	  documentaries	  failed	  to	  capture	  
actual	  combat	  scenes	  and	  often	  used	  actors	  to	  portray	  participants	  in	  a	  battle.	  The	  
only	  thing	  Director	  Lewis	  Hayward	  had	  to	  add	  were	  the	  sounds	  because	  the	  cameras	  
could	  capture	  only	  images	  but	  not	  sound.	  The	  film	  opened	  to	  the	  image	  of	  an	  anchor	  
and	  globe	  with	  “U.S.	  Marines”	  imprinted	  on	  it	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  the	  Marines’	  Hymn.	  It	  
then	  showed	  footage	  of	  the	  Naval	  Fleet	  steaming	  towards	  the	  Tarawa	  atoll	  with	  
warships	  of	  different	  shapes	  and	  sizes.	  It	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  training	  that	  
happened	  around	  the	  clock	  such	  as	  the	  loading	  and	  test	  firing	  of	  weapons	  and	  the	  
commanders	  seated	  around	  an	  operational	  map	  planning	  the	  invasion.	  The	  map	  
reveals	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  reef,	  Japanese	  defensive	  positions,	  and	  the	  pier	  that	  jutted	  
out	  into	  the	  lagoon.	  Early	  in	  the	  film	  the	  message	  is	  clear	  to	  the	  audience	  that	  these	  
were	  not	  actors	  but	  real	  American	  Marines.	  As	  the	  camera	  pans	  across	  the	  faces	  of	  
young	  Marines	  gathered	  at	  a	  worship	  service	  before	  D-­‐Day,	  viewers	  see	  different	  
facial	  structures	  and	  sizes	  of	  anonymous	  men	  with	  a	  look	  of	  uncertainty	  on	  their	  




“Many	  of	  these	  men	  were	  killed	  the	  following	  morning.”131	  The	  audience	  is	  then	  
exposed	  to	  the	  first	  joint	  sea	  and	  air	  bombardment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  war.	  The	  
massive	  16-­‐inch	  batteries	  on	  battleships	  are	  shown	  hurling	  their	  shells	  to	  the	  
distant	  beaches.	  Throughout	  the	  bombardment	  scene,	  the	  loading	  of	  the	  AMTRACs	  
showed	  an	  important	  message	  that	  reoccurs	  throughout	  the	  film.	  That	  message	  was	  
of	  the	  importance	  of	  all	  the	  equipment	  and	  munitions	  that	  were	  required	  for	  an	  
operation	  like	  this	  and	  others	  that	  would	  follow.	  The	  purpose	  was	  to	  inform	  the	  
audience	  that	  they	  all	  needed	  to	  pitch	  in	  to	  help	  produce	  the	  equipment	  the	  military	  
needed	  to	  win	  this	  war.	  	  
	   The	  film	  continues	  to	  unfold	  the	  horrors	  that	  befell	  many	  at	  Tarawa.	  It	  
presented	  the	  AMTRACs	  crossing	  the	  reef	  and	  some	  being	  struck	  by	  mortars.	  The	  
audience	  gets	  exposed	  to	  the	  sights	  of	  Marines	  wading	  ashore	  in	  chest-­‐deep	  water.	  
As	  it	  fades	  into	  the	  next	  act,	  the	  first	  images	  of	  the	  wounded	  begin	  to	  surface	  with	  a	  
young	  man’s	  leg	  torn	  up	  and	  bloody.	  Before	  the	  spectators	  can	  catch	  their	  breath,	  
the	  most	  famous	  scene	  of	  the	  movie	  occurs	  with	  Lieutenant	  Alexander	  Bonnyman’s	  
charge	  up	  a	  bombproof.	  	  Lieutenant	  Bonnyman	  charged	  up	  the	  bombproof	  and	  held	  
off	  a	  Japanese	  counterattack,	  giving	  his	  life	  to	  protect	  his	  men:	  he	  posthumously	  
received	  the	  Medal	  of	  Honor	  for	  his	  actions.	  Viewers	  see	  Marines	  charging	  up	  the	  hill	  
and	  Japanese	  running	  out	  in	  the	  open	  to	  meet	  them.	  The	  dramatic	  images	  even	  
reveal	  a	  Japanese	  soldier	  getting	  shot	  within	  a	  few	  feet	  of	  the	  camera.	  Now	  the	  
American	  people	  were	  watching	  his	  final	  valiant	  moments	  on	  tape.	  Following	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




charge	  against	  the	  bombproof,	  Hatch	  takes	  the	  audience	  further	  inland	  to	  reveal	  the	  
difficulties	  that	  would	  take	  place	  in	  fighting	  the	  Japanese.	  Americans	  were	  exposed	  
to	  the	  bombproofs,	  bunkers,	  and	  trenches	  dug	  around	  the	  island.	  As	  the	  camera	  
roved	  over	  these	  structures,	  the	  narrator	  explained,	  “These	  bunkers	  were	  so	  well	  
constructed	  that	  demolition	  charges	  and	  heavy	  shelling	  failed	  to	  crumble	  them.”132	  
The	  purpose	  was	  to	  tell	  people	  that	  their	  thoughts	  that	  wars	  could	  be	  won	  with	  
machines	  were	  false;	  the	  only	  way	  to	  win	  was	  through	  the	  flesh	  and	  blood	  of	  
American	  sons.	  	  
	   The	  most	  stunning	  part	  of	  Hatch’s	  film	  came	  towards	  the	  end.	  Once	  the	  fire	  
died	  down,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  film	  the	  destruction	  wrought	  upon	  the	  island.	  While	  the	  
images	  Hatch	  captured	  of	  a	  mass	  of	  dead	  Japanese	  bodies	  clustered	  around	  a	  bunker	  
were	  impactful,	  they	  became	  an	  afterthought	  when	  he	  showed	  the	  bodies	  of	  dead	  
U.S.	  Marines.	  It	  was	  not	  just	  a	  few	  images	  of	  two	  or	  three,	  but	  it	  was	  dozens	  of	  dead	  
American	  bodies.	  The	  heartbreaking	  images	  must	  have	  caused	  the	  theaters	  to	  fall	  
silent.	  The	  bodies	  were	  twisted	  wrecks	  of	  humans	  with	  some	  missing	  heads	  and	  
limbs.	  The	  camera	  slowly	  turned	  across	  the	  beach	  showing	  bloated	  disfigured	  
bodies	  floating	  aimlessly	  in	  the	  surf	  and	  some	  partly	  submerged	  in	  the	  sand.	  What	  
made	  these	  images	  more	  disheartening	  was	  the	  knowledge	  that	  these	  were	  not	  
actors.	  These	  were	  people’s	  sons,	  husbands,	  and	  fathers	  who	  had	  given	  everything	  
they	  had	  in	  a	  feat	  of	  overwhelming	  courage	  to	  achieve	  victory.	  The	  film	  ends	  with	  
the	  flag-­‐raising	  ceremony	  above	  Betio	  and	  Marines	  standing	  victorious.	  People	  now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




saw	  Tarawa	  as	  a	  gallant	  victory	  instead	  of	  a	  tragic	  loss	  of	  life.	  Tarawa	  became	  a	  
battle	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  annals	  along	  with	  other	  great	  battles.	  	  Time	  Magazine	  put	  it	  best	  
saying,	  “It	  gave	  the	  Nation	  a	  name	  to	  stand	  beside	  those	  of	  Concord	  Bridge,	  the	  
BonHomme	  Richard,	  the	  Alamo,	  Little	  Big	  Horn,	  and	  Belleau	  Wood.”133	  Though	  two	  
of	  the	  battles	  listed	  by	  Time	  were	  regarded	  by	  Americans	  as	  heroic	  defeats	  rather	  
than	  victories,	  the	  magazine	  was	  now	  describing	  Tarawa	  as	  glorious	  for	  the	  
American	  military.	  
War	  bond	  sales	  rose	  substantially	  after	  the	  film	  was	  released.	  To	  help	  get	  the	  
word	  out	  about	  the	  film,	  the	  government	  sent	  Norman	  Hatch	  on	  a	  war	  bond	  tour.	  
Hatch	  was	  very	  effective	  in	  his	  effort	  selling	  $23,	  350	  in	  bonds	  by	  telling	  his	  story	  to	  
the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  Cumberland	  Maryland.134	  A	  letter	  from	  the	  American	  Red	  Cross	  
to	  Hatch	  reveals	  the	  seriousness	  that	  people	  now	  had	  towards	  the	  war.	  Its	  closing	  
line	  read,	  “You	  gave	  us	  a	  very	  clear	  picture	  of	  what	  our	  Armed	  Forces	  are	  facing.”135	  
While	  in	  shock	  over	  what	  they	  faced,	  people	  finally	  began	  to	  understand	  the	  
warning	  by	  General	  Vandegrift	  and	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  that	  there	  would	  be	  far	  
more	  costly	  battles	  than	  Tarawa.	  The	  gamble	  to	  release	  the	  film	  had	  done	  what	  
government	  officials	  hoped	  it	  would	  do:	  renew	  interest	  and	  fervor	  in	  the	  war	  effort.	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  few	  downsides	  the	  film	  produced	  was	  that	  enlistment	  into	  the	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  Alexander,	  Across	  the	  Reef,	  1.	  
134	  “$23,350	  In	  Bonds	  Sold	  at	  Peoples	  Bank	  Dedication,”	  The	  Cumberland	  News	  (Cumberland,	  
Maryland),	  February	  15,	  1944.	  Norman	  Hatch’s	  Personal	  Papers,	  MCHC.	  





Marine	  Corps	  dropped	  35%	  as	  young	  men	  saw	  what	  they	  would	  be	  facing	  and	  
wanted	  no	  part	  of	  it.	  136	  	  
President	  Roosevelt’s	  decision	  to	  release	  the	  film	  helped	  to	  improve	  the	  war	  
effort.	  It	  educated	  people	  on	  what	  it	  would	  take	  to	  defeat	  America’s	  enemies.	  It	  
prepared	  the	  public	  for	  higher	  causalities	  to	  come	  at	  bigger	  battles.	  When	  the	  
sacrifices	  mounted	  at	  places	  like	  Saipan,	  Peleliu,	  Okinawa,	  and	  Iwo	  Jima,	  the	  people	  
were	  not	  outraged	  but	  saddened.	  They	  understood	  whom	  they	  were	  fighting	  and	  the	  
costs	  of	  war.	  Hatch	  and	  other	  combat	  cameramen	  on	  Tarawa	  helped	  to	  expose	  the	  
myth	  that	  machines	  alone	  could	  win	  the	  fight.	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  battle’s	  
documentation	  greatly	  impacted	  America’s	  perception	  of	  modern	  warfare.	  
	  Tarawa	  was	  a	  battle	  of	  firsts.	  It	  tested	  amphibious	  warfare	  doctrine;	  it	  
showed	  mistakes	  and	  successes.	  It	  taught	  the	  lessons	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  applied	  
to	  other	  islands	  in	  future	  landings.	  While	  the	  Marines	  were	  successful	  on	  Betio	  
Island,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  same	  mistakes	  made	  in	  a	  place	  like	  Peleliu	  would	  
have	  been	  disastrous	  and	  possibly	  result	  in	  a	  defeat	  for	  American	  forces.	  One	  can	  
imagine	  how	  the	  public	  would	  have	  reacted	  to	  a	  failure	  such	  as	  this.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  
imagine	  that	  other	  amphibious	  landings	  would	  never	  have	  happened.	  As	  tragic	  as	  
Tarawa	  was,	  the	  information	  gained	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  future	  operations	  to	  be	  
successful.	  The	  lessons	  learned	  were	  the	  key	  to	  breaking	  Japanese	  defenses	  across	  
the	  Pacific.	  Colonel	  Edson	  expressed	  these	  thoughts	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  battle	  to	  
Robert	  Sherrod.	  He	  stated,	  “Without	  Tarawa,	  Peleliu,	  Saipan,	  and	  Iwo	  Jima	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




have	  been	  defeats,	  not	  victories.”	  He	  continued,	  “The	  losses	  sustained	  at	  Tarawa	  
were	  small	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  good	  that	  came	  out	  of	  it.”137	  Edson	  was	  not	  alone	  
in	  his	  assessment,	  with	  every	  commander	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  invasion	  force	  
agreeing	  that	  it	  had	  to	  happen.	  It	  had	  to	  happen	  so	  that	  the	  lessons	  learned	  could	  
inform	  the	  military	  how	  to	  better	  conduct	  amphibious	  warfare.	  It	  taught	  them	  how	  
to	  improve	  their	  tactics	  and	  strategy.	  More	  importantly	  it	  taught	  a	  nation	  what	  war	  
was	  all	  about.	  It	  brought	  the	  fight	  and	  an	  understanding	  to	  a	  society	  that	  had	  rarely	  
known	  such	  death	  and	  destruction	  since	  the	  Civil	  War	  some	  78	  years	  prior.	  	  Those	  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chapter	  5:	  Tough	  Lessons	  Learned	  
	   With	  World	  War	  I	  dawned	  the	  modern	  age	  of	  warfare	  introducing	  the	  
deadliest	  weapons	  the	  world	  had	  ever	  seen.	  The	  massive	  loss	  of	  troops	  led	  to	  the	  
war	  entering	  a	  stalemate.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  turn	  the	  fortunes	  of	  war	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
Allies,	  the	  British	  decided	  to	  mount	  an	  amphibious	  invasion	  at	  the	  Gallipoli	  
Peninsula.	  This	  attack	  would	  hopefully	  allow	  them	  to	  invade	  Istanbul,	  aid	  the	  
Russians,	  and	  defeat	  the	  Ottomans.	  This	  attack	  would	  in	  turn	  expose	  Germany’s	  
flank,	  which	  would	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  mass	  stalemate	  taking	  place	  on	  the	  Western	  
Front.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  campaign	  that	  lasted	  from	  February	  1915	  to	  January	  1916,	  
was	  a	  humiliating	  defeat	  for	  the	  Allies	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  250,	  000	  casualties	  with	  46,000	  
dead.138	  This	  attempt	  at	  an	  amphibious	  operation	  made	  many	  military	  planners	  
believe	  that	  such	  a	  maneuver	  was	  nearly	  impossible	  and	  too	  costly	  in	  lives	  to	  
actually	  work.	  The	  Marines	  at	  the	  time	  were	  viewed	  by	  the	  bigger	  branches	  as	  
merely	  a	  security	  force	  and	  were	  paid	  little	  attention	  by	  Congress.	  Many	  argued	  that	  
the	  Industrial	  Age	  had	  produced	  weapons	  that	  made	  setting	  up	  a	  defensive	  
perimeter	  much	  easier.	  Despite	  the	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  amphibious	  operations,	  
the	  Marines	  firmly	  believed	  that	  they	  were	  equipped	  to	  handle	  such	  missions.	  	  
	   Tarawa	  became	  the	  first	  successful	  amphibious	  assault	  against	  a	  heavily	  
fortified	  target	  in	  the	  history	  of	  warfare.	  Its	  success	  proved	  that	  it	  could	  be	  done.	  
The	  Marines	  had	  achieved	  success	  through	  studying	  the	  failure	  at	  Gallipoli	  and	  
rewriting	  the	  doctrine.	  	  The	  overall	  objective	  of	  amphibious	  warfare	  is	  not	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




complicated	  one.	  As	  General	  Eisenhower	  stated,	  “You	  put	  men	  in	  boats,	  and	  as	  long	  
as	  you	  get	  well-­‐trained	  crews	  to	  take	  the	  boats	  in,	  it’s	  the	  simplest	  deployment	  in	  the	  
world—men	  can	  go	  nowhere	  else	  except	  the	  beach.”139	  The	  complications	  of	  these	  
operations	  lie	  in	  the	  delicacy	  of	  them.	  It	  must	  be	  well	  organized,	  coordinated,	  and	  
fast.	  If	  something	  goes	  wrong	  it	  will	  disintegrate	  quickly.	  The	  Marines	  concluded	  
that	  the	  key	  to	  success	  in	  amphibious	  warfare	  was	  timing	  and	  speed.	  Betio	  
reiterated	  that	  point	  with	  its	  major	  flaws	  being	  those	  of	  coordination.	  While	  the	  
assault	  on	  Betio	  was	  a	  success,	  it	  revealed	  many	  shortcomings	  of	  Marine	  Corps	  
doctrine.	  As	  Admiral	  Raymond	  Spruance	  put	  it,	  “The	  lessons	  we	  learned	  capturing	  
Tarawa	  were	  turned	  to	  good	  account,	  however,	  and	  saved	  many	  lives	  during	  future	  
operations.”140	  
	   Although	  some	  ship-­‐to-­‐shore	  landings	  had	  been	  made	  at	  places	  like	  
Guadalcanal,	  New	  Britain,	  and	  New	  Guinea,	  none	  of	  these	  were	  against	  formidable	  
resistance.	  The	  drive	  through	  the	  Gilberts	  in	  the	  Central	  Pacific	  was	  different.	  
Intelligence	  revealed	  the	  heavy	  fortifications	  built	  up	  on	  Betio,	  so	  it	  was	  no	  mystery	  
what	  the	  Marines	  were	  walking	  into.	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  made	  this	  challenge	  
abundantly	  clear	  stating,	  “I	  am	  telling	  you	  the	  truth	  when	  I	  say	  that	  we	  did	  not	  meet	  
a	  single	  surprise.”141	  It	  became	  the	  testing	  ground	  for	  the	  Marines’	  doctrine	  of	  
amphibious	  assaults.	  The	  errors	  in	  this	  test	  case	  were	  found	  to	  be	  many.	  The	  main	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  Isley,	  6.	  
140	  Sherrod,	  153.	  
141	  Julian	  Smith	  letter	  to	  Harriotte	  Smith,	  24	  December	  1943.	  General	  Smith’s	  confidence	  in	  not	  being	  
surprised	  is	  likely	  referring	  to	  the	  Japanese	  defenses	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  men	  having	  to	  wade	  





issues	  that	  were	  learned	  were	  coordination	  of	  air	  and	  naval	  gunfire	  support,	  
communications,	  supplying	  the	  ground	  forces,	  types	  of	  weapons,	  and	  a	  heavily	  
armored	  AMTRAC.	  	  
The	  Navy	  quickly	  assessed	  its	  effectiveness	  following	  the	  assault	  and	  
determined	  Naval	  fire	  had	  been	  ineffective	  for	  the	  types	  of	  defensive	  structures	  
encountered.	  Despite	  being	  the	  heaviest	  saturation	  bombardment	  in	  naval	  history,	  
the	  three-­‐hour	  bombardment	  destroyed	  only	  unprotected	  buildings	  and	  the	  coastal	  
defense	  guns.	  It	  did	  not	  eliminate	  machine	  gun	  nests	  or	  bunkers.	  The	  Navy	  also	  
realized	  ships	  had	  allowed	  lengthy	  gaps	  between	  firing,	  giving	  the	  Japanese	  a	  chance	  
to	  recover	  from	  the	  blasting	  and	  man	  their	  weapons.	  	  Admiral	  Turner	  admitted	  that,	  
“Air	  and	  naval	  gunfire	  preparations	  for	  two	  or	  three	  hours	  is	  not	  adequate.	  The	  
preparation	  should	  begin	  several	  days	  prior	  to	  D-­‐Day	  and	  should	  be	  designated	  both	  
for	  destruction	  and	  for	  unrelenting	  harassing	  effect.”142	  This	  new	  policy	  was	  to	  be	  
combined	  with	  air	  strikes	  and	  would	  last	  throughout	  the	  war.	  They	  also	  began	  
experimenting	  with	  different	  types	  of	  shells	  designed	  to	  penetrate	  thick	  structures.	  
A	  replica	  of	  the	  Betio	  defenses	  was	  constructed	  near	  Hawaii	  to	  provide	  practice	  
targets	  for	  the	  Navy	  to	  train	  with.	  Another	  addition	  to	  be	  made	  was	  providing	  
specialists	  who	  could	  coordinate	  Naval	  gunfire,	  as	  well	  as	  landing	  parties	  that	  could	  
coordinate	  landings.	  	  
	   Another	  grievance	  came	  against	  the	  Navy	  pilots.	  Many	  Marines	  appreciated	  
their	  efforts	  but	  were	  angered	  that	  no	  Marine	  pilots	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  operation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This	  omission	  was	  significant	  because	  naval	  aviators	  did	  not	  get	  the	  close	  air-­‐to-­‐
ground	  support	  training	  that	  Marine	  pilots	  received.	  Marine	  aviators	  also	  had	  close	  
air	  support	  experience	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  during	  the	  Banana	  
Wars.	  The	  naval	  aviators	  involved	  at	  Tarawa	  were	  reported	  to	  have	  missed	  their	  
target	  on	  many	  occasions.	  In	  one	  example,	  an	  airstrike	  was	  called	  on	  a	  rusted	  half-­‐
sunk	  Japanese	  ship	  that	  harbored	  a	  machine	  gun	  crew.	  It	  took	  over	  seven	  tries	  with	  
some	  bombs	  missing	  by	  200	  yards	  or	  more	  before	  they	  were	  successful	  in	  hitting	  
their	  target.143	  Colonel	  Edson	  was	  the	  most	  critical	  of	  this	  flaw,	  citing	  the	  “aviators’	  
lack	  of	  training	  in	  close	  air	  support,	  weapons	  and	  performance.”144	  He	  would	  push	  
the	  Navy	  to	  better	  train	  its	  pilots	  for	  close	  air	  support,	  and	  he	  stressed	  how	  
important	  it	  was	  to	  have	  it	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  Naval	  shelling.	  	  It	  was	  also	  
realized	  that	  specialists	  were	  needed	  in	  directing	  air	  strikes	  in	  support	  of	  ground	  
forces.145	  These	  people	  would	  prove	  a	  valuable	  asset	  in	  being	  able	  to	  communicate	  
more	  effectively	  with	  Navy	  gunners	  and	  pilots.	  
	   After	  surveying	  the	  battlefield	  and	  making	  notes	  of	  the	  Japanese	  defenses,	  
experts	  concluded	  that	  preliminary	  bombardment	  should	  be	  aimed	  toward	  total	  
destruction	  as	  opposed	  to	  neutralization.146	  Tarawa	  also	  revealed	  to	  Navy	  planners	  
the	  importance	  of	  timing	  the	  naval	  bombardment	  with	  the	  aerial	  assaults.	  As	  
Captain	  Stockman	  pointed	  out,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  naval	  and	  air	  raids	  must	  conform	  to	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  Alexander,	  Across	  the	  Reef,	  29.	  
144	  Alexander,	  Utmost	  Savagery,	  233-­‐234.	  
145	  Millett,	  409.	  
146	  It	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  total	  destruction	  is	  impossible.	  What	  they	  meant	  by	  this	  was	  that	  
providing	  a	  few	  hours	  of	  fire	  support	  to	  suppress	  an	  enemy	  force	  was	  not	  good	  enough.	  They	  instead	  




the	  movement	  of	  the	  assault	  waves.147	  The	  reason	  was	  simple:	  the	  landing	  force	  
could	  not	  establish	  its	  own	  fire	  support	  until	  it	  had	  enough	  men	  and	  resources	  on	  
the	  beach.	  If	  the	  supporting	  ships	  and	  planes	  failed	  to	  provide	  fire	  support,	  the	  
landing	  parties	  would	  be	  exposed	  to	  mutually	  supporting	  fires	  from	  the	  enemy.	  This	  
problem	  became	  significant	  during	  the	  battle	  when	  the	  fire	  from	  the	  sea	  and	  air	  
subsided	  during	  the	  landing	  process.	  The	  men	  got	  pinned	  down	  before	  they	  were	  
able	  to	  establish	  a	  base	  of	  covering	  fire	  to	  support	  the	  movement	  of	  other	  landing	  
troops.	  Furthermore,	  the	  supplies	  and	  reinforcements	  were	  turned	  back	  before	  they	  
could	  get	  close	  to	  the	  beach.	  The	  Navy	  understood	  that	  its	  role	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  
landing	  party	  until	  it	  could	  establish	  itself	  ashore.	  	  	  
	   Another	  weakness	  that	  Tarawa	  revealed	  was	  beachhead	  logistics.	  	  It	  was	  
unanimously	  agreed	  that	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  combat	  equipped	  AMTRACs	  should	  be	  
used	  in	  subsequent	  operations.	  The	  cheaply	  armored	  older	  models	  would	  not	  do	  in	  
future	  attacks.	  Along	  with	  more	  and	  better-­‐equipped	  AMTRACs,	  Colonel	  Edson	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  beginning	  waves	  of	  Marines	  were	  weighted	  down	  with	  too	  
much	  equipment,	  making	  them	  slow	  and	  vulnerable,	  especially	  if	  they	  had	  to	  ditch	  
into	  the	  water	  (some	  Marine	  casualties	  involved	  drowning	  from	  the	  equipment).	  	  
This	  led	  to	  a	  detailed	  plan	  of	  combat	  loading	  that	  the	  Marines	  still	  use	  today.	  It	  
designates	  primary	  assault	  forces	  and	  those	  held	  in	  reserve.	  This	  plan	  provides	  for	  
the	  lead	  elements	  to	  load	  themselves	  with	  only	  essential	  gear	  making	  them	  more	  
mobile	  and	  flexible.	  The	  reserve	  elements	  would	  be	  supply	  and	  logistics	  crafts	  each	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




with	  a	  designated	  area.	  This	  would	  help	  in	  understanding	  where	  vital	  supplies	  were	  
during	  the	  climax	  of	  battle.	  The	  combat	  loading	  procedure	  also	  designated	  certain	  
ships	  as	  nerve	  centers	  for	  the	  operation.	  They	  were	  to	  be	  equipped	  with	  the	  best	  
communications	  equipment	  in	  the	  field.	  At	  Tarawa	  it	  was	  realized	  there	  was	  no	  
ability	  to	  coordinate	  landing	  parties	  once	  they	  launched	  from	  their	  mother	  ships.	  
This	  issue	  made	  several	  assault	  waves	  late	  or	  worse	  caused	  some	  to	  be	  sent	  right	  
into	  the	  teeth	  of	  the	  Japanese	  guns.	  	  	  
	   Some	  other	  flaws	  that	  were	  addressed	  were	  communications	  and	  small	  unit	  
tactics.	  As	  historian	  Jeter	  Isley	  argued,	  the	  issue	  of	  faulty	  communications	  “stood	  out	  
like	  a	  sore	  thumb.”148	  When	  the	  assault	  on	  Betio	  was	  being	  planned,	  the	  decision	  
was	  made	  to	  name	  the	  battleship	  Maryland	  the	  command	  ship.	  This	  move	  turned	  
out	  to	  be	  a	  poor	  choice	  of	  ships	  as	  it	  was	  a	  main	  combatant.	  The	  constant	  salvos	  of	  
Maryland’s	  eight	  sixteen-­‐inch	  guns	  knocked	  the	  communications	  circuitry	  out	  
repeatedly,	  leaving	  the	  commanding	  generals	  blind	  to	  what	  was	  happening	  ashore,	  
and	  it	  left	  field	  commanders	  unable	  to	  coordinate	  landings	  and	  reinforcement	  
groups.	  To	  complicate	  things	  further,	  the	  radios	  provided	  to	  the	  Marines	  were	  
ungainly	  and	  not	  waterproof.	  This	  problem	  left	  the	  Marines	  with	  virtually	  no	  
communications	  with	  each	  other	  or	  the	  commanders	  back	  on	  the	  Maryland.	  This	  
lack	  of	  communications	  made	  the	  Betio	  success	  all	  the	  more	  amazing.	  However	  
amazing	  it	  was,	  that	  mistake	  could	  not	  be	  made	  in	  subsequent	  landings	  where	  the	  
margin	  for	  error	  grew	  smaller	  with	  each	  step	  taken	  towards	  Japan.	  Almost	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




immediately	  after	  the	  after-­‐action	  reports	  were	  released,	  lightweight	  and	  
waterproof	  radios	  went	  into	  production.	  Command	  and	  Control	  centers	  were	  also	  
changed	  to	  be	  either	  on	  frigates	  or	  more	  commonly	  on	  aircraft	  carriers.	  
	   The	  other	  major	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  was	  small	  unit	  tactics.	  The	  Marine	  
infantry	  were	  very	  well	  trained	  and	  disciplined	  in	  their	  field	  of	  expertise.	  What	  they	  
lacked	  was	  knowledge	  on	  how	  to	  work	  with	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  assault	  force	  such	  
as	  Marine	  engineers	  and	  tanks.	  One	  example	  was	  the	  combination	  of	  tanks	  and	  
infantry.	  The	  tanks	  were	  an	  important	  asset	  but	  were	  blind	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  
suicide	  bombers.	  They	  discovered	  quickly	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  address	  joint	  tank	  
and	  infantry	  tactics	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  tanks	  disabled	  by	  tank	  traps,	  hidden	  
Japanese	  bunkers,	  mines,	  and	  snipers	  that	  picked	  off	  any	  tanker	  who	  poked	  his	  head	  
out	  to	  see	  where	  he	  was	  going.	  It	  was	  evident	  that	  to	  be	  combat	  effective,	  tanks	  and	  
infantry	  had	  to	  be	  trained	  to	  work	  together.	  This	  training	  would	  pay	  dividends	  in	  
later	  battles,	  particularly	  Peleliu	  where	  the	  Japanese	  had	  constructed	  a	  complicated	  
bunker	  and	  tunnel	  system.	  Tanks	  also	  began	  to	  be	  outfitted	  with	  phones	  on	  the	  back	  
so	  that	  infantrymen	  could	  talk	  with	  the	  drivers.	  
	   Along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  joint	  tank	  and	  infantry	  tactics	  was	  better	  
coordination	  of	  infantry	  with	  the	  heavy	  weapons	  and	  engineers.	  The	  flamethrowers	  
and	  demolitions	  experts	  were	  highly	  valuable	  during	  and	  following	  Tarawa.	  The	  
fanatical	  attitude	  of	  the	  Japanese	  required	  the	  Americans	  to	  dig	  them	  out	  of	  every	  
bunker	  and	  underground	  tunnel	  that	  the	  Marines	  came	  across.	  The	  flamethrower	  




fire	  but	  also	  suffocate	  those	  out	  of	  reach.	  It	  would	  serve	  to	  better	  protect	  Marines	  by	  
not	  forcing	  them	  to	  search	  bunkers	  or	  tunnels,	  because	  the	  flamethrowers	  could	  kill	  
without	  their	  having	  directly	  to	  see	  what	  they	  were	  shooting	  at.	  The	  overwhelming	  
heat	  also	  cleared	  the	  dense	  vegetation	  the	  Japanese	  used	  so	  cleverly	  to	  conceal	  their	  
positions,	  making	  them	  easier	  targets	  for	  tanks	  and	  other	  heavy	  weapons.	  Therefore	  
more	  flamethrowers	  were	  issued	  to	  each	  division,	  and	  training	  commenced	  to	  teach	  
riflemen	  how	  to	  work	  with	  the	  flamethrowers.	  Flamethrowers	  became	  so	  valued	  in	  
the	  Pacific	  that	  tanks	  were	  even	  outfitted	  with	  larger	  versions	  and	  planes	  began	  
carrying	  the	  napalm	  bomb.	  
	   	  The	  final	  tactical	  lesson	  learned	  was	  the	  importance	  of	  demolitions	  experts.	  
The	  type	  of	  defenses	  encountered	  on	  Betio	  gave	  Americans	  great	  respect	  for	  the	  
Japanese	  as	  masters	  of	  defense.	  The	  engineers’	  importance	  grew	  significantly	  with	  
the	  discovery	  of	  hidden	  structures	  that	  navy	  ships	  and	  aircraft	  could	  not	  destroy.	  It	  
would	  be	  up	  to	  them	  to	  destroy	  beach	  obstacles,	  tank	  traps,	  hidden	  bunkers,	  and	  
other	  fortifications	  that	  could	  be	  encountered.	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  a	  rise	  in	  joint	  
communications	  and	  tactical	  movement	  training	  between	  riflemen	  and	  engineers.	  
The	  Navy	  also	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  a	  special	  type	  of	  warrior.	  While	  they	  did	  have	  sound	  
intelligence	  on	  Betio,	  they	  realized	  they	  could	  not	  account	  for	  obstacles	  in	  the	  water	  
and	  on	  the	  beach.	  Naval	  leaders	  also	  knew	  their	  hydrographic	  data	  on	  positions	  
were	  guesses	  at	  best.	  They	  wanted	  to	  develop	  a	  team	  of	  underwater	  swimmers	  that	  




defenses,	  and	  surf	  conditions.149	  This	  group	  would	  also	  be	  able	  to	  destroy	  enemy	  
mines	  or	  other	  obstacles	  that	  blocked	  heavy	  equipment	  from	  reaching	  the	  beaches.	  
This	  extraordinary	  vision	  was	  the	  origin	  for	  the	  Underwater	  Demolition	  Teams	  
(UDTs).	  Admiral	  Kelly	  Turner,	  who	  served	  in	  Operation	  GALVANIC,	  began	  
organizing	  the	  UDTs	  shortly	  after	  the	  battle.	  Once	  they	  were	  established,	  they	  
served	  in	  nearly	  every	  battle	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  They	  proved	  a	  useful	  commodity	  that	  
evolved	  into	  what	  are	  today	  the	  Navy	  SEALs.	  	  
Tarawa	  revealed	  many	  of	  the	  faults	  in	  Marine	  Corps	  amphibious	  doctrine;	  
sadly	  1,000	  men	  gave	  their	  lives	  during	  this	  test.	  Despite	  the	  sacrifices	  that	  were	  
made,	  the	  commanders	  saw	  meaning	  in	  those	  they	  had	  to	  bury.	  The	  Commanding	  
General	  of	  the	  Pacific	  wrote	  a	  telegram	  to	  those	  who	  served	  on	  Tarawa	  that	  read,	  
“Congratulations	  on	  your	  hard	  fought	  victory.	  The	  Second	  Marine	  Division	  has	  
added	  another	  brilliant	  page	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Corps.	  The	  lessons	  learned	  from	  
our	  battle	  on	  Betio	  will	  be	  of	  greatest	  value	  to	  our	  future	  operations.”150	  
Nearly	  every	  commander	  involved	  at	  Tarawa	  agreed	  it	  had	  to	  happen	  as	  it	  
did.	  There	  were	  many	  tactical	  and	  operational	  lessons	  learned	  from	  this	  battle.	  	  
Reflecting	  back	  on	  the	  Pacific	  Campaign,	  Major	  General	  Merritt	  Edson	  said,	  “Without	  
Tarawa,	  Peleliu,	  Saipan,	  and	  Iwo	  Jima	  probably	  would	  have	  been	  defeats,	  not	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  from	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victories.”151	  There	  were	  other	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  this	  battle	  as	  well.	  Those	  
were	  the	  psychological	  lessons	  taught	  to	  the	  American	  people.	  	  
Before	  people	  saw	  the	  battle	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  combat	  cameramen,	  they	  
were	  under	  illusions	  about	  what	  mortal	  combat	  involved.	  They	  failed	  to	  grasp	  the	  
severity	  and	  brutality	  of	  warfare	  and	  focused	  on	  their	  own	  concerns	  instead	  of	  
supporting	  the	  war	  effort.	  This	  attitude	  is	  exemplified	  by	  Americans’	  concern	  for	  
maintaining	  segregation;	  and	  the	  labor	  strikes	  that	  plagued	  the	  cities	  costing	  the	  
production	  of	  needed	  equipment	  on	  the	  frontlines.	  General	  Julian	  Smith	  had	  been	  
partially	  correct	  when	  he	  charged	  that	  the	  public	  had,	  “developed	  the	  psychology	  
that	  battles	  can	  be	  won	  with	  practically	  no	  losses.”152	  Those	  near	  4,000	  casualties	  in	  
76	  hours	  opened	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  all	  around	  the	  country.	  When	  the	  shock	  wore	  off	  
that	  an	  “inferior”	  race	  of	  Japanese	  soldiers	  could	  do	  that	  to	  so	  many	  Americans,	  they	  
began	  looking	  for	  answers.	  The	  answer	  they	  discovered	  was	  not	  one	  they	  were	  
expecting.	  They	  found	  that	  all	  the	  technology	  in	  the	  world	  could	  not	  be	  the	  deciding	  
factor	  in	  such	  a	  fierce	  fight.	  Yes,	  it	  can	  disrupt	  communications,	  destroy	  pillboxes,	  
and	  large	  gun	  emplacements;	  but	  it	  cannot	  destroy	  every	  machine	  gun	  crew,	  sniper,	  
or	  bunker	  complex.	  The	  realization	  set	  in	  that	  the	  great	  conflict	  could	  only	  be	  won	  
through	  the	  blood,	  sweat,	  and	  grit	  of	  their	  own	  flesh	  and	  bone.	  The	  newfound	  
consciousness	  that	  lives	  would	  have	  to	  be	  lost	  and	  more	  costly	  battles	  were	  on	  the	  
horizon	  was	  the	  biggest	  lesson	  learned	  from	  Tarawa.	  Hatch’s	  film	  foreshadowed	  this	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reality	  through	  bringing	  the	  truths	  of	  modern	  warfare	  to	  the	  homefront.	  The	  
profound	  effect	  of	  this	  film	  was	  that	  the	  American	  people	  were	  now	  prepared	  for	  
more	  headlines	  reading	  “Heavy	  Casualties	  Expected.”	  	  It	  gave	  Americans	  a	  taste	  of	  
war’s	  painful	  cost	  and	  taught	  them	  that	  victory	  would	  not	  come	  easy.	  Without	  this	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   Looking	  at	  the	  numbers	  of	  dead	  and	  wounded	  in	  other	  battles	  in	  relation	  to	  
Tarawa	  illustrates	  Tarawa’s	  losses	  paling	  in	  comparison.	  Given	  what	  we	  know	  about	  
the	  public’s	  reaction	  to	  Tarawa,	  one	  can	  only	  imagine	  how	  they	  would	  have	  received	  
the	  news	  of	  Iwo	  Jima’s	  losses.	  The	  casualty	  rate	  for	  the	  Marines	  at	  Iwo	  Jima	  was	  so	  
high	  that	  the	  5th	  Marine	  Division	  was	  split	  up	  and	  never	  reorganized.	  Had	  this	  or	  
another	  large	  battle	  site	  been	  the	  first	  test	  of	  amphibious	  landings,	  Americans	  might	  
have	  succumbed	  to	  the	  Japanese	  strategy	  by	  demanding	  an	  end	  to	  the	  hostilities	  and	  
a	  meeting	  at	  the	  peace	  table.	  Without	  a	  supporting	  public	  in	  a	  democratic	  country,	  it	  
is	  impossible	  to	  attain	  victory,	  especially	  fighting	  somewhere	  so	  far	  away.	  It	  is	  for	  
that	  reason	  that	  the	  most	  important	  lesson	  of	  all	  was	  mentally	  preparing	  the	  
military	  and	  the	  public	  for	  the	  war	  to	  come.	  Mentally	  the	  military	  knew	  it	  was	  going	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





to	  be	  a	  tough	  fight.	  What	  they	  did	  not	  know	  was	  whether	  their	  methods	  would	  work	  
and	  just	  how	  sophisticated	  the	  Japanese	  defenses	  were.	  Tarawa	  revealed	  the	  flaws	  
in	  their	  strategy	  and	  primed	  them	  for	  their	  future	  conquests	  across	  the	  Pacific.	  
General	  Julian	  Smith	  added	  another	  important	  element	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  
Tarawa.	  The	  following	  passage	  was	  from	  an	  interview	  conducted	  with	  him	  ten	  years	  
following	  the	  battle.	  	  
The	  significance	  of	  Tarawa	  is	  that	  it	  proved	  that	  even	  the	  most	  strongly	  
fortified	  islands,	  defended	  by	  men	  determined	  to	  fight	  to	  the	  bitter	  end	  
would	  fall	  to	  men	  imbued	  with	  still	  greater	  determination	  to	  win	  regardless	  
of	  the	  cost.	  It	  set	  the	  pattern	  for	  all	  the	  later	  battles	  in	  the	  Central	  Pacific.	  It	  
showed	  America	  that	  the	  advance	  across	  the	  Pacific	  was	  not	  only	  possible	  
but	  practical.	  To	  the	  Japanese	  it	  proved	  that	  their	  strongest	  outposts	  would	  
surely	  fall	  and	  expose	  their	  homeland	  to	  invasion	  based	  on	  the	  very	  
strongholds	  they	  had	  considered	  impregnable.	  For	  Japan,	  Tarawa	  was	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  end	  of	  their	  dream	  of	  empire,	  and	  for	  America	  it	  was	  a	  step	  
towards	  victory,	  which	  it	  was	  hoped,	  would	  bring	  peace	  to	  the	  world	  and	  
freedom	  to	  its	  oppressed	  peoples.154	  
Julian	  Smith	  could	  not	  prove	  that	  the	  Marine	  “determination	  to	  win”	  was	  
greater	  than	  that	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  but	  he	  was	  justified	  in	  emphasizing	  the	  
importance	  of	  their	  valor	  and	  determination	  in	  the	  face	  of	  heavy	  casualties.	  It	  also	  
may	  not	  have	  proven	  that	  the	  Japanese’s	  “strongest	  outpost	  would	  surely	  fall,”	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the	  overall	  lessons	  Smith	  drew	  were	  those	  of	  optimism	  in	  the	  skill	  and	  valor	  of	  the	  
American	  fighting	  man.	  	  	  
Approaching	  the	  war	  with	  a	  renewed	  determination,	  Americans	  began	  to	  
brace	  themselves	  for	  the	  fight	  to	  come.	  American	  society,	  for	  a	  brief	  moment,	  
banded	  together.	  They	  knew	  they	  could	  win;	  they	  knew	  it	  would	  come	  with	  a	  price	  
and	  that	  they	  had	  to	  come	  together	  to	  support	  the	  war	  effort.	  Although	  labor	  strikes	  
continued	  to	  happen	  sporadically,	  the	  numbers	  decreased	  in	  the	  industries	  that	  
were	  needed	  to	  make	  war	  supplies.	  Women	  and	  African-­‐Americans	  were	  employed	  
in	  positions	  previously	  closed	  to	  them.	  	  
While	  Tarawa	  did	  not	  affect	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  American	  society,	  it	  did	  
have	  a	  profound	  impact	  upon	  it.	  It	  brought	  people	  together,	  if	  only	  for	  one	  instant,	  as	  
Americans.	  The	  savagery	  Norman	  Hatch	  and	  Robert	  Sherrod	  revealed	  consumed	  
Americans	  with	  an	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  urgency.	  Seeing	  the	  dead,	  disfigured,	  and	  
helpless	  pulled	  the	  blinders	  off	  of	  a	  culture	  disillusioned	  by	  years	  of	  isolation.	  Betio	  
taught	  the	  U.S.	  military	  many	  lessons	  to	  be	  used	  in	  future	  amphibious	  operations.	  It	  
taught	  them	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  reef-­‐crossing	  vehicles,	  and	  ship-­‐to-­‐shore	  
communication.	  It	  revealed	  the	  flaws	  in	  preliminary	  bombardment	  and	  how	  timing	  
was	  everything.	  America	  learned	  the	  necessity	  of	  packing	  light,	  moving	  quickly,	  and	  
waterproofing	  valuable	  equipment	  such	  as	  radios.	  Commanders	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  
training	  joint	  maneuvers	  among	  the	  riflemen,	  engineers,	  and	  tanks.	  	  
Outside	  of	  the	  tactical	  lessons	  learned,	  the	  more	  important	  schooling	  




Sherrod,	  Norman	  Hatch,	  and	  other	  correspondents	  Americans	  saw	  the	  true	  colors	  of	  
war.	  A	  divided	  nation	  saw	  firsthand	  that	  with	  combat	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  road.	  They	  
also	  gained	  confidence	  that	  they	  could	  win,	  but	  only	  with	  full	  support	  of	  a	  united	  
people.	  There	  could	  be	  no	  more	  bickering	  over	  labor	  because	  for	  every	  strike,	  there	  
would	  be	  another	  American	  killed.	  The	  issue	  of	  race	  had	  to	  be	  swept	  aside	  as	  those	  
men	  and	  women	  of	  color	  were	  Americans.	  While	  it	  did	  not	  heal	  all	  wounds,	  it	  
brought	  realization	  to	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  was	  realized	  that	  there	  is	  
nothing	  glamorous	  about	  the	  mortal	  clash	  of	  human	  flesh	  and	  steel.	  Americans	  knew	  
with	  certainty	  that	  its	  sons	  would	  be	  wounded,	  would	  suffer,	  and	  would	  die.	  
Historian	  Joseph	  Alexander	  described	  Tarawa’s	  effect	  best	  in	  title	  of	  his	  book	  calling	  
it	  Utmost	  Savagery.	  The	  war,	  people	  realized,	  was	  one	  of	  utmost	  savagery	  and	  they	  
must	  steady	  themselves	  for	  the	  martyrs	  they	  must	  give	  up	  for	  victory.	  	  
Tarawa	  was	  only	  a	  small	  price	  Americans	  paid	  in	  a	  bigger	  and	  bloodier	  war.	  
It	  was	  a	  battle	  of	  many	  firsts	  both	  tactically	  and	  publically	  with	  it	  being	  released,	  
uncensored,	  to	  civilians.	  The	  shock	  and	  attitude	  of	  the	  American	  people	  revealed	  a	  
society	  psychologically	  unready	  to	  fight.	  Betio	  was	  called	  bloody,	  savage,	  brutal,	  and	  
many	  other	  vivid	  verbs.	  However,	  it	  was	  no	  bloodier	  than	  many	  other	  battles	  fought	  
in	  history.	  It	  was	  simply	  an	  engagement	  of	  mortal	  combat	  between	  both	  sides.	  
Tarawa	  became	  a	  symbol	  to	  the	  American	  people	  of	  war’s	  tragic	  nature.	  Wars	  are	  
fought	  and	  they	  are	  full	  of	  chaos	  and	  hurt.	  In	  war	  people	  die	  and	  they	  do	  not	  die	  a	  
clean	  death;	  they	  are	  mangled	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  suffer.	  Combat	  exhibits	  




It	  is	  an	  important	  lesson	  that	  citizens	  need	  to	  never	  forget	  and	  one	  the	  generations	  
of	  today	  seem	  to	  overlook.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  continues	  to	  fight	  wars	  today,	  
many	  people	  continue	  on	  in	  their	  lives	  unaware	  of	  the	  hardships	  service	  members	  
face.	  Arguably	  the	  media	  today	  is	  as	  much	  at	  fault	  as	  it	  was	  70	  years	  ago	  because	  it	  
does	  not	  inform	  people	  the	  about	  war.	  White	  House	  Correspondent	  Jack	  Tapper	  
voiced	  his	  concern	  on	  this	  by	  saying,	  “The	  media	  in	  the	  United	  States—taking	  their	  
cue	  from	  the	  American	  public—often	  shy	  away	  from	  such	  coverage,	  and	  that	  has	  not	  
served	  the	  nation	  well,	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  the	  troops	  or	  the	  people	  in	  those	  countries	  
that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  says	  it’s	  trying	  to	  help.”155	  	  Those	  words	  are	  reminiscent	  of	  
what	  Julian	  Smith	  must	  have	  thought	  a	  few	  weeks	  after	  taking	  the	  field.	  Today	  
American	  society	  could	  use	  a	  film	  to	  document	  the	  good	  the	  American	  military	  has	  
done.	  The	  public	  needs	  to	  see	  the	  heroic	  stories	  that	  never	  get	  attention	  due	  to	  be	  
being	  overshadowed	  by	  all	  the	  negative	  press.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  the	  positives	  be	  
revealed	  to	  not	  only	  bring	  America	  together	  in	  supporting	  the	  wars	  being	  fought	  
today,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  memories	  of	  the	  men	  and	  women	  who	  did	  not	  return	  while	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